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Is it Greek or deji&vu all over again?:
Neoliberalism and Winners and Losers of
International Debt Crises
Tayyab Mahmud*
The global financial meltdown and the Great Recession of 20072009 have brought into sharp relief the uneven distributionof gain and
pain during economic crises. The 2009-2010 debt crisis in Greece
resulted in a windfall for financial institutions at the expense of
taxpayers, a rollback of welfare systems, and the impoverishment of the
working classes. This outcome is consistent with the pattern that has
emerged in the international debt crises of the last three decades,
including the Latin American crisis during the 1980s and the Asian
crisis during the 1990s. The recurrent internationaldebt crises of the
last three decades and the resulting transfers of wealth from the poor to
the rich are the products of the neoliberal restructuring of economies
that aims to rollback the gains made by the working classes under the
Keynesian welfare compromise and to establish the hegemony of
finance capital. These neoliberalobjectives have been facilitatedby an
extensive refashioning of the U.S. and internationalregulatory regimes
resulting in financialization of the global economy and unbridled
internationalmobility of finance capital. Globalfinancial institutions
channeled excess global liquidity in ways that created unsustainable
international debts, which consistently resulted in international debt
crises. These crises were then managed to further advance neoliberal
prescriptionsfor globalfinance and nationaleconomies. The end result
of this refashioningof regulatory regime is the transfer of wealth from
the poor to the rich, further impoverishment of working classes, and
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Larry Meacham, Steven Ramirez, Darren Rosenblum, and Steven R. Smith for their thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts. Setareh Mahmoodi, Student Fellow at the Center for Global Justice,
and research librarians at Seattle University School of Law provided invaluable assistance with
this project as well.
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enhanced power of finance capital. A collective moratorium on debt
servicing by the Global South is a viable path towards a new global
financialorder that is sustainableandgives human beings priority over
capital.
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"Rule one: Never allow a crisis to go to waste. They are opportunities
to do big things."
- Rahm Emanuel, Former White House Chief of Staff'
"Bankers have a bad habit of making economic cycles worse. They
are notorious for lending people umbrellas when the sun is shining and
asking for them back when rain starts to fall."
-

The Economist2

"We live again in a two-superpower world. There is the U.S. and
there is Moody's. The U.S. can destroy a country by leveling it with
bombs; Moody's can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds."
-

Thomas Friedman3
I. INTRODUCTION

The world is awash with money, 4 but two-fifths of humanity remains
without access to a bank account, much less a line of credit.5 While
captains of finance capital bemoan an Asian "savings glut" 6 and
"liquidity glut," 7 nearly three billion people struggle to survive on less
1. Jeff Zeleny, Obama Reviewing Bush's Use ofExecutive Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008,

at A19 (quoting Rahm Emanuel in an interview regarding the crisis in the U.S. auto industry).
2. Joseph and the Amazing Technicalities, ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2008, at 18.
3. Thomas L. Friedman, Don't Mess with Moody's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1995, at A19.

4. In April 2010, the global foreign exchange market had a daily turnover of USD 4 trillion.
Global Foreign-ExchangeMarket, ECONOMIST (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/

16945118?storyid=16945118&fsrc=rss (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). The total daily global
financial transactions increased from USD 2.3 billion in 1983 to USD 130 billion in 2001. This
USD 40 trillion annual turnover compares with USD 800 billion needed to support international
trade and productive investment flows. See PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: RESHAPING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC MAP INTHE 21ST CENTURY 32-82 (4th ed. 2003). In 2006, on the eve of the

global financial meltdown and the Great Recession of 2007-2009, while the entire world output
was USD 47 trillion, market capitalization was USD 51 trillion, total international banking assets
were USD 29 trillion, and domestic and international bonds were USD 68 trillion. NIALL
FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 4-5, 62 (2008). In

December 2007, the face value of all over-the-counter derivatives was over USD 596 trillion,
with a market value of USD 14.5 trillion. Id. at 228. Nearly 90 percent of international financial
flows represent speculative and hedging behavior. L. Randall Wray, Monetary Theory and Policy
for the Twenty-first Century, in POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY
VIEWS ON THE TRENDS OF ECONOMICS 125, 139 (Charles J. Whalen ed., 1996).
5. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 281.
6. Ben S. Bernanke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Homer Jones Lecture: The Global Savings
Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit (St. Louis, Missouri, Apr. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050414/default.htm.
7. Alan Greenspan, The Fed Didn't Cause the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at
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than two dollars a day.8 The global financial crisis of our era may be "a
transformative moment in global economic history whose ultimate
resolution will likely reshape politics and economics for at least a
generation." 9 The magnitude of the crisis and the largest shrinking of
world output since the Great Depression lend new urgency to Karl
Polanyi's admonition: "Only a madman would have doubted that the
international economic system was the axis of the material existence of
the human race." 10 The International Labor Organization ("ILO")
estimates that the downturn has cost over fifty million lost jobs
worldwide,II while the United Nations ("UN") measures the share of
the "working poor" in the labor force in developing countries to have
increased to 64 percent.12 Up to eighty-four million people will remain
poor or fall into extreme poverty due to the crisis. 13
The global losses in the financial sector alone exceed USD 3.4
trillion, 14 and the bill for public rescue of financial institutions
worldwide is USD 20 trillion. 15 The long-term total potential cost of
the rescue of finance capital by U.S. taxpayers alone is estimated at
USD 23.7 trillion--over 150 percent of U.S. gross domestic product
("GDP").16 Much more pain may be on its way. The average GDP

Al5.
8. Fast Facts: The Faces of Poverty, UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM PROJECT (2006), http://
www.unmillenniumproject.org/resources/fastfactse.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
9. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 208 (2009).
10. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 18 (Beacon Press 2d ed. 2001) (1944).
11. Nelson D. Schwartz, Unemployment Surges Around the World, Threatening Stability,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at Bl.
12. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND
PROSPECTS 2010, at v (2010) [hereinafter DESA 2010 REPORT], available at http://www.un.org/
en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp archive/20 1Owesp.pdf.
13. Id. at vi.
14. INT'L MONETARY FUND [IMF], GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: NAVIGATING
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 5 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/
2009/02/pdf/text.pdf.
15. DESA 2010 REPORT, supra note 12, at xii-xiii.
16. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS, THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 174 (2010) (quoting the Special Inspector of the Trouble Asset
Relief Program). As of June 2009, the total assets held by the U.S. Federal Reserve were valued
at over USD 2 trillion, an increase of 2.3 times over their USD 852 billion value in 2006. While
Treasury securities were over 90 percent of the Fed assets in 2006, they were only 29 percent in
June 2009, reflecting the unprecedented funding of the financial system. Besides a lack of
transparency of these transactions, the adequacy of the collateralization of these positions is
suspect, and the "potential risk to the Fed from these positions is substantial." HAL S. Scorr,
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 31 (2009).
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contraction following a severe banking crisis is a stunning 9.3 percent,' 7
and, on average, banking crises lead to an 86 percent increase in
government debt over three years following a crisis. 18
We are living through a truly unique period. Historically, developed
nations typically provided the capital needed to spur growth in
developing nations. However, in "the ultimate role reversal in financial
history,"19 developing economies are now bailing out global finance,
and the revival of global economic growth increasingly rests upon
capital injections provided by developing countries. 20
While the developed world is becoming desperately dependent on
capital from developing nations for its survival, Wall Street has become
stronger as a result of the financial crisis 2 1 in "one of the largest
redistributions of wealth in such a short period of time in history."2 2

Hiring on Wall Street has picked up, "underscor[ing] the remarkable
recovery of the biggest banks and brokerage firms since Washington
rescued them in the fall of 2008, and follows the huge rebound in
profits." 23 How does a moment of general economic distress and
wrenching hardship for the many become an opportunity of enhanced
resources and power for the few? How do non-market forces work with
the market to produce and subsequently manage and profit from
international debt crises? In the search for an answer, we should be

17. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 229; see also MARTIN WOLF, FIXING GLOBAL
FINANCE 33 fig.3.1 (2010) (illustrating the comparative costs of several large financial crises in
terms of percent of GDP and explaining that an increase in the United States' public debt equal to
10 percent of GDP would add approximately USD 1.2 trillion to the total U.S. debt).
18. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 231. While the Global South has been the primary
arena of this phenomenon, advanced capitalist economies have not been immune to financial
crises. The Savings and Loan collapse in the 1980s, the exchange-rate crisis in Europe in the
early 1990s, Japan's prolonged deflation since the 1990s, the dot.com crisis of 2000, and the
2008-2010 financial meltdown and the resulting "great recession" are instances of this turn.

19.

FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 338.

20. In 2009, the net financial transfers (net capital flows minus investment income payments)
from developing countries to the developed ones were USD 568 billion, compared with USD 891
billion in 2008. DESA 2010 REPORT, supra note 12, at ix-x; see also Robert Wade, The FirstWorld Debt Crisis of2007-2010 in GlobalPerspective, 51 CHALLENGE, no. 4, 2008 at 23, 24.
21. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 155-56.
22.

JOSEPH E. STIGLITz, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE

WORLD ECONOMY 200 (2010).
23. Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall St. Hiring in Anticipation of a Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2010, at Al; see also Susanne Craig & Kevin Roose, Signs of Swagger, Wallets Out, Wall Street

Dares to Celebrate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010, at Al (noting that, while Wall Street salaries are
not significantly higher than in 2008, traders and financial-industry executives are decidedly more
secure in their jobs and are therefore more willing to spend personal income).
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mindful that "in the world of economics, things are never as they
seem." 24
Over 200 years ago, Thomas Jefferson cautioned that "banking
institutions are more dangerous than standing armies." 25 Today, in "the
age of leverage" 26 and derivatives, 2 7 finance capital equipped with
"financial weapons of mass destruction" 28 can, and does, inflict more
destruction than an eighteenth century army ever could. The economic
crises that are endemic to capitalism appear to be particular occasions
for such damage. 29 One study identifies 148 crises since 1870 in which
the GDP of a country fell 10 percent or more and eighty-seven crises
when consumption fell by a comparable magnitude. 30
International financial crises are rooted in dissonance between the
territorial logic of states and the globalizing imperative of capital. 31
24. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 71.
25. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 14 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
26. Niall Ferguson, Remarks at the Ninth Annual Niarchos Lecture at Peterson Inst. for Int'l

Econ., Fiscal Crises and Imperial Collapses: Historical Perspectives on Current Predicaments 4
(May 13, 2010), availableat http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/niarchos-ferguson-201 0.pdf.
27. For detailed studies of derivatives, see generally DICK BRYAN & MICHAEL RAFFERTY,
CAPITALISM WITH DERIVATIVES: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, CAPITAL
AND CLASS (2006); Raghuram G. Rajan, Has FinancialDevelopment Made the World Riskier?,
FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY 313 (2005), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/

sympos/2005/pdf/rajan2005.pdf.
28. WARREN BUFFETT, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2003),
availableat http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf.
29. In the history of capitalism, "crises are the norm, not the exception." NOURIEL ROUBINI &
STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE INTHE FUTURE OF FINANCE 15 (2010).
Indeed, "[c]apitalism is crisis; it introduced a level of instability and uncertainty that had no
precedent in human history." Id. at 46. For an overview of capitalism's boom and bust cycles
and the tendency towards crisis, see generally DAVID HARVEY, LIMITS OF CAPITAL (2006);
ROBERT HEILBRONER, THE NATURE AND LOGIC OF CAPITALISM (1985).
30. See generally Robert J. Barro & Jos6 F. Ursiia, Macroeconomic Crises Since 1870:
Comments and Discussion, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2008, at 255
(providing detailed analysis of a wide range of historical economic crises).
3 1. In the international arena, the dissonance between the tendency of capital to expand

globally and territorial sovereign states creates a basic dilemma for capital.

Capital is

denominated in the currency of the state whose space it occupies and must change its currency
denomination as it moves from one state to another. Multiple or national currencies circulate
internationally at changing rates of exchange and domestically determined and fluctuating interest
rates. Relative changes across monetary areas and over time within monetary spaces are
continually transmuted through derivatives. Besides mediating between savers and investors,
finance capital has to manage the risk born of spatial and temporal uncertainties. Financialization
of the last three decades can be seen, then, as devices of struggle between individual capitals to
profit from the global economy's need to hedge itself against the contingencies that disrupt global
circulation and accumulation of capital. Trading in financial markets has risen exponentially as
the risk born of uncertainty is continually passed along to whoever wishes to bear it. Competition
to profit between individual capitals to profit from the global economy's risk management leads
to misallocation of risks. At a tipping point, the misallocation of risk and capital turns into a
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The history of finance capital is one of bubbles, busts, shocks, and
crashes, 32 and a new global economic order has accelerated this
volatility. There have been 124 banking crises just in the Global South
between 1970 and 2007.33 The unmistakable lessons of the history of
debt and financial crises are that unfettered international mobility of
capital is harmful for the well-being of societies, 34 and that financial
liberalization is a leading indicator of future crisis. 35
financial crisis. See Christopher Rude, The Role of FinancialDiscipline in Imperial Strategy, in
THE EMPIRE RELOADED 82, 84-88 (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 2004).

32. Financial crises are born of the tendency of financial markets to over- or under-estimate
risk that results in misallocation of capital and economic bubbles. According to Hyman Minsky,
financial markets tend to go through a cycle from conservative hedge financing, to risky
speculative financing, to unsustainable Ponzi financing, and then back to hedge financing.
Without public intervention, this financial instability cycle transforms moderate prosperity into a
boom, which can unravel quickly to produce a deep recession. See generally Hyman P. Minsky,
The FinancialInstabilityHypothesis (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No.
74, 1992), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfim?abstract id=161024. Financial
speculative booms typically end with the "Minsky moment"-the moment it becomes clear that
borrowers are overextended and need to sell assets to meet debt obligations. See Justin Lahart, In
Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007, at Al
(defining "Minsky moment" as "the time when over-indebted investors are forced to sell even
their solid investments to make good on their loans, sparking sharp declines in financial markets
and demand for cash that can force central bankers to lend a hand"). For a succinct exposition of
Minsky's views about finance, see JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF
ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 205-17 (2009).
33. CASSIDY, supra note 32, at 13; Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises:

A New Database 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 08/224, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid-1278435. "Global South" and "Global North" are used here not
necessarily to describe distinct geographical regions, but to indicate the two-thirds and one-third
populations of the world that occupy broadly different positions within the global economy. For
an account of the North-South divide of the world, see Gustavo Esteva & Madhu Suri Prakash,
Grassroots Resistance to Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Banks of the Narmada, 20
ECOLOGIST, no. 2, 1992 at 45; Eric Sheppard & Richard Nagar, From East-West to North-South,

36 ANTIPODE, no. 4, 2004 at 557-58 (defining the "global North" as the political and economic
elite in privileged locations across the globe, in contrast to the "global South," which is made up
of the poor, underprivileged, and underdeveloped globally, and noting that development and
privilege are no longer along geographic boundaries, as populations of global North and global
South often occur within the same nation). "Global South" refers to all countries that are not part
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD").
34. See Ross P. Buckley, International Capital Flows, Developing Countries and Economic
Sovereignty, in 4 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL LAW 1999, at 17,

34 (Joseph J. Norton ed., 2001). In the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, "the
belief that unfettered capital flows are a boon for everyone-including the country on the
receiving end-has been dealt a major blow." Landon Thomas, Jr., Countries See Hazards in
Free Flow of Capital,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at Bl.
35. See Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, The Twin Crises: The Causes of
Banking and Balance-of-Payment Problems, 89 AM. ECON. REv., no. 3, 1999 at 473, 480

(analyzing the timing of bank crises and balance-of-payment problems and finding that financial
liberalization led to boom and bust cycles, which contribute to crises). Ferguson points out that
"[b]ubbles are more likely to occur when capital flows freely from country to country ... [and]
without easy credit creation a true bubble cannot occur." FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 122.
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Liberalization and financialization of the global economy ushered in
an era of recurrent financial and public debt crises. These crises, which
have become endemic, have "always caused transfers of ownership and
power to those who keep their own assets intact and who are in a
position to create credit."36 As a result, "public debt crises are always
and everywhere a political phenomenon." 37 Response to a debt crisis
"is at its heart a question of politics, not of economics or of regulatory
technicalities." 38 Such crises always force "difficult political decisions
about what is going to be sacrificed in order to pay the debt." 39 Nonmarket political forces manage the turmoil caused by these crises to
help deepen finance capital's hold on economies. 40 In what has become
a pattern over the last three decades, financial crises are managed so that
"the damage caused by the turmoil is directed away from the dominant
classes and the center towards the subordinated classes and the
periphery." 41 In a cycle of financial destruction, imperial forces
choreograph responses to debt crises that allocate the burdens of these
crises, such as unemployment and impoverishment, to subordinated
classes while any losses sustained by financial institutions are covered
by bailouts financed by public revenues, at the cost of public
expenditures on social welfare programs needed so desperately by those
subordinated classes already bearing the burden of the crisis.4 2 This
cycle of financial destruction routinely culminates in transfers of wealth
from the poor to the rich.

36. Robert Wade & Frank Veneroso, The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall
Street-Treasury-IMFComplex, 228 NEw LEFT REV. 3, 20 (1998).

37. Ferguson, supra note 26, at 9.
38.

JOHNSON & KwAK, supra note 16, at 221.

39. Ferguson, supra note 26, at 9.
40. The genesis, consolidation, and global expansion of capitalism cannot be separated from
the role played by the states, and it is therefore critical to appreciate the role states play in making
"free markets" possible. For example, the rise and consolidation of capitalism was dependent
upon the critical role states played in establishing legal regimes of property, contracts, currency,
and wage-labor in conjunction with colonial expansion and siphoning of value. See generally
SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1974); FERNAND BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM: 15TH-18TH

CENTURY (Siin Reynolds trans., 1982); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLDECONOMY (1979); ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, EMPIRE OF CAPITAL (2003). Note that it is the state

that creates "the most important of all financial markets-that in government debt." WOLF, supra
note 17, at 17.
41. Rude, supra note 31, at 83.
42. See infra Part V (describing the international debt crises in Latin America, Asia, and
Argentina).
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Furthermore, the "U.S. Treasury-Wall Street-IMF Complex"4 3
consistently takes advantage of international debt crises to further
promote an agenda of financial liberalization." In this sense, "financial
instability is functional. It disciplines world capitalism."45 In this
process, developing societies are relabeled overnight as "emerging
markets," 46 neoliberal missionary institutions push free-market ideology
on reluctant societies, 47 and "capital now flows upstream, from the
world's poor to the richest country of all." 48 As a result of the
neoliberalism promoted by finance capital institutions, whole
populations are subjected to "debt peonage" 49 In this deadly game, the
iron fist of the state and the hidden hand of the market come together to
make machinations of finance capital "the real cutting edge of
accumulation by dispossession on the global stage." 50
This article aims to explore the causes and mechanics of the uneven
distribution of gain and pain by locating the current Greek debt crisis in
the chain of international debt crises of the last thirty years, arguing that
the intensity and result of the Greek debt crisis, like the other
international debt crises that preceded it, are rooted in the neoliberal
reordering of global capitalism. This project necessitates a thorough

43. I adopt the construct from Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 18-19. Earlier, Jagdish
Bhagwati had used the construct "Wall Street-Treasury complex." See Jagdish Bhagwati, The
Capital Myth: The Diference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF., no. 3,
1998 at 7, 10-12.
44. See RAWI E. ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE 2426 (2007); PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF 175-205 (2001); Bhagwati, supra note 43, at 7-12.
45. Rude, supra note 31, at 82.
46. The term, initially coined by the World Bank economist Antoine van Agtmael, was
popularized by the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"). When investors remained
unenthusiastic about an IFC-investment-fund-styled Third World Investment Trust, the Emerging
Market Growth Fund, floated in 1984, proved marketable. The new name gained broad appeal by
the early 1990s. Alain Soulard, The Role of Multilateral FinancialInstitutions in Bringing
Developing Companies to US Markets, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S145, S147 (1994).
47. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13 (2002).
48. WOLF, supra note 17, at 59.
49. David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI., no. 1, 2007 at 22, 36 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 37. The key point of the accumulation by dispossession thesis is that the market
always relies on non-market forces and processes to facilitate accumulation of capital. This is in
tune with Polanyi's classic observation that "the market has been the outcome of a conscious and
often violent intervention on part of government which imposed the market organization on
society for non-economic ends." POLANYI, supra note 10, at 258. For a detailed discussion of
accumulation by dispossession, see David Harvey, The "New" Imperialism: Accumulation by
Dispossession, in THE NEW IMPERIAL CHALLENGE 63 (Leo Panitch & Colin Lays eds., 2003);
Tayyab Mahmud, "Surplus Humanity" and Margins of Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and
Accumulation by Dispossession, 14 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 11-25 (2010).
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examination of the genesis and operations of neoliberal reordering,
which is essential to understand the causes and results of international
debt crises. The neoliberal reordering was prompted by falling rates of
accumulation, threats to U.S. economic hegemony, and the need to
recycle global surpluses to fund fiscal and current account deficits of the
United States. 5 1 The reordering entailed ascendency of finance capital
and Americanization of global finance directed by the U.S. TreasuryWall Street-IMF complex. The resulting unbridled international capital
flows, while enhancing the returns for finance capital, have accelerated
and accentuated boom and bust cycles of the world economy that were
tempered by the Keynesian welfare compromise 52 and the Bretton
Woods system. 53 International debt crises are then managed to advance
the agenda of neoliberal restructuring of national economies, and result
in wealth and asset transfers from the poor to the rich.
Part II recounts the unfolding of the 2009-2010 Greek debt crises, 54
describing the sequence of events to illustrate how the bond market
pushed the Greek government to squelch economic rights enjoyed by
the working classes for over a generation, while the European Union
("EU") was browbeaten to commit over USD 1 trillion to subsidize
financial institutions. Part III describes the post-World War II Bretton
Woods system of capital controls, which provided a measure of stability
to global finance for over a generation, and then explains how the
growing U.S. balance-of-payment deficits brought this system to an
end.5 5 Part IV analyzes the neoliberal counterrevolution to show that it
was designed to secure U.S. economic hegemony through ascendency
of finance capital and to roll back gains made by the working classes
under the Keynesian welfare compromise. 56 Part IV also argues that
neoliberalism was not a self-generating phenomenon of free markets or
the result of deregulation, but that it was an elaborate reordering of U.S.
and global regulatory regimes that established the legal and institutional
frameworks to facilitate financialization of the global economy and
Part V examines three major
ascendency of finance capital.
international debt crises of the neoliberal era that preceded the Greek
crisis, and shows that each of these crises was caused by opportunistic
channeling of access liquidity towards developing economies by
financial institutions, eventually and inevitably resulting in
51. See infra Part IIl.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See infra Part Ill.

See infra Part 1H.
See infra Partl .
See infta Part Ill.
See infra Part IV.
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impoverishment of the working and marginalized sections of societies,
as well as enhancement of the power of global finance capital.5 7 These
crises also served as a means to force neoliberal restructuring of
targeted economies. Part VI draws conclusions from the examination of
international debt crises and recommends a collective moratorium on
debt servicing by developing economies in order to force a reordering of
the global financial system in such a way that human beings would be
given priority over finance capital.
II. APPEASING THE BOND GODS 59 : A MODERN GREEK TRAGEDY
Deployment

of extra-economic

power to secure payment

of

international debts is an age-old phenomenon. The means and methods
of doing so, of course, have changed over time. During the colonial era,
colonial powers periodically intervened militarily to enforce debt
contracts. 60 In October 2009, the newly-elected Socialist government of
George A. Papandreou discovered a budget deficit of 12.7 percent of
GDP for 2009, more than twice what was asserted by the departing

government, and four times the initial estimates. This triggered a battle
between Greece and the global bond market about how to service the
USD 430 billion Greek debt held by foreign banks.6 1
Rating agencies reacted to the disclosure and, led by Moody's, cut
their Greek debt rating, citing the government's "crumbling finances." 62
In response, the Greek parliament quickly passed an "austerity budget,"
57.
58.

See infra PartV.
See infra Part VI.

59. I adopted the expression from Paul Krugman, Appeasing the Bond Gods, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 2010, at A21.
60. For detailed discussions of such interventions, see FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 98-100;
MICHAEL TOMz, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS

THREE CENTURIES 114, 157 (2007); Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, The Empire Effect: The
Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880-1913, 66 J. ECON. HIST.
283, 284 (2006); Kris James Mitchener & Marc Weidenmier, Empire, Public Goods, and the
Roosevelt Corollary, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 658, 658-63 (2005). Such military actions include

Britain in Turkey (1876) and Egypt (1882), and the United States in Venezuela (1905) and Haiti
(1915). REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 54. The imposition of British rule over Egypt in
1882 "practically amounted to a 'no default' guarantee" for the bond markets. FERGUSON, supra
note 4, at 295.
61. Rachel Donadio & Niki Kitsantonis, Greece Struggles to Tame Debt as Its People Grow
More Restive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at A4. France, Greece's biggest creditor, holds USD

67 billion of the Greek debt. German financial institutions hold USD 37 billion; Italy USD 27
billion; followed closely by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. American banks hold
USD 16.6 billion. Jack Ewing, Already Holding Junk, Germany Hesitates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,

2010, atBl.
62.

David Jolly, Moody's Joins Others in Cutting Debt Rating on Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

23, 2009, at B2.
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promising to cut public spending by 10 percent.6 3 The bond market,
however, was unimpressed, and Greece was "punished by the rough
treatment of bond investors no longer willing to countenance soft
promises of reform." 64 The European Central Bank ("ECB") told
Greece not to "expect from us any special treatment," and Moody's
warned that "the government knows what it needs to do." 65 Greece
announced a three-year plan to reduce its budget deficit from 12.9
percent to 3 percent of GDP.66 Corporate media recommended that
"powerful countries of the European Union-like Germany-must
come to the rescue." 67 The crisis started putting downward pressure on
the euro, and there was speculation about a possible Greek exit from the
single currency zone. 6 8 The ECB reiterated its no-special-treatment
posture and reminded Greece that "it ha[d] to catch up on its
homework." 69 While investors "worr[ied] that the crisis in Greece
could touch off a domino effect across Southern Europe," European
leaders remained divided on whether to involve the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") in a possible bailout. 70 Greece paid 6.22
percent to borrow money, a rate the government called "punitive." 7 1
Greece felt constrained to express "contrition for [past] mistakes . . . and

promised to do better," and affirmed its commitment to the euro. 72
Greece needed to raise USD 50 billion before June 30, 2010 or default,
while the bond market remained "skeptical that Greece [could] achieve
the magnitude of required savings in the face of recession and rising
social and labor unrest." 73 Pressure on the euro mounted, and rising
bond rates put pressure on Germany and France to decide whether to
bail out the troubled EU economies or let them default with "major
63. Rachel Donadio, Greece: Austerity Budget Passed,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at AlO.
64. Landon Thomas, Jr., With Greece Teetering, the Worst May Not Be Over for Europe,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2009, at B.
65. Jack Ewing, Bank Chief Says Greece Gets No Special Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,

2010, at B4.
66. Id.
67.
68.

Editorial, After Dubai,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at A20.
Europe Markets Rise Amid Rumors on Deals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www

.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/business/19markets.html?dbk=&pagewanted-print.
69. Javier C. Hernandez, DisappointingEarnings Send Markets Lower a Day After 15-Month

Highs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at Bl5 (quoting European Central Bank policy maker Jirgen
Stark).
70.

Stephen Castle & Matthew Saltmarsh, Rumblings of a Bailout,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010,

at B.
7 1.

72.

Id
Jack Ewing, Spain, Greece andLatvia Affirm Their Commitment to the Euro, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 29, 2010, at B5.
73. Editorial, The Not-So-Safe Euro Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A26.
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repercussions for Europe and financial markets worldwide." 74
Meanwhile, "markets [were] having fun testing the euro," and there was
an increasing recognition that the euro's problem "ha[d] at its heart
elements of a political crisis"-national or EU control over economic
and fiscal policies. 75
As the bond rates in Europe kept climbing, investors wanted to know
whether governments "[would] have the stomach to push through tough
reforms," and bond investors were "spending as much time analyzing
the power of. .. Greek unions as they [did] the spreads on credit default
swaps." 76 "[B]ond vigilantes" started challenging "weak governments
to raise taxes and impose harsh spending cuts on a restive population to
bring down their deficits." 77 Nobel Prize laureate Joseph Stigliz found
"the investor demands . . . as lacking in merit" and reminded the

markets that "[t]hese [were] democracies-not dictatorships."78
Observers noted that Greeks viewed "welfare policies as acquired
rights," and the head of the civil servants union argued that "[i]t [was]
not the workers that should [have been] blamed for [the crisis]; it [was]
bankers and large capital." 79
Because European leaders did not want to turn to the IMF to bailout
Greece, and the ECB was prevented from buying government bonds or
offering direct support to troubled banks, their options were to
guarantee Greek bonds, advance aid funds, or issue bonds on behalf of
Greece.80 Rumors that a rescue of Greece by the wealthy nations of
Europe could be in the offing touched off a broad rally in European
stocks, bonds, and the euro.8 1 The EU President used growing alarm
over debt levels to call for a new form of "economic government" in
Europe and argued that "[w]hether it [was] called coordination of
policies or economic government . . . only the European Council [was]

capable of delivering and sustaining a common European strategy for

74. Floyd Norris, Frayingat the Edges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,2010, at Bl.
75.

Steven Erlanger, Euro Debt Crisis Is Political Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at Al.

76. Landon Thomas, Jr., Under Siege in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,2010, at Bl.
77. Id.

78. Id. Historically, dictatorships have proved more amenable to giving foreign creditors
priority over citizens. For example, during the global debt crises of the 1980s, Romanian dictator
Nikolai Ceausescu "single-mindedly insisted on repaying ... the debt of $9 billion owed by his
poor nation to foreign banks." REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 51.
79. Landon Thomas, Jr., Is Debt Trashing the Euro?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,2010, at Bl.
80.

Jack Ewing, European Central Bank in a Squeeze with Hands Tied, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,

2010, at BI.
81.

Javier C. Hernandez & Jack Ewing, Talk ofAssistance for Greece Propels Markets, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at Bl.
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more growth and more jobs." 82 An economist warned the EU: "If you
... encouraged the markets to believe that support [was] forthcoming
and then it [was] not, we [would] see a backlash." 83 While Germany
found itself "forced to help Greece remain solvent, or risk watching
markets attack one weak member [of the EU] after the next," coalition
partners in the Merkel government insisted that there be "no direct
financial help for Greece ... . It would send the absolutely wrong signal
to other euro countries that no country has to strain to save any more." 84
The Greek government announced new plans for USD 2.75 billion in
spending cuts, including a salary freeze, increased retirement age, and a
higher gasoline tax, and striking civil servants pledged that they
"[wouldn't] pay for the crisis! . . . Not one euro to be sacrificed to the

bankers!" 85 Faced with further pressure on the euro, EU leaders
promised to safeguard the euro by aiding Greece, but offered no
immediate assistance and remained silent about their response as
investors remained jittery about Greece.86 The Merkel government felt
domestic pressure as seven in ten Germans opposed financial support to
Greece.87 Market analysts warned that "anything that encourage[d] the
sovereign[s] . . . to prevaricate over tough fiscal measures . .. would be

a mistake." 88
Regulators discovered that Goldman Sachs had helped Greece hide
billions in debt from EU budget overseers. 89 Starting in 2001, Goldman
Sachs, for USD 300 million in fees, had designed instruments that
disguised loans as currency trades, thus hiding the size of the Greek
debt.90 The scheme amounted to "a garage sale on a national level,
Greek officials essentially mortgaged the country's airports and
highways." 91 While this scheme was underway, EU finance ministers,
82.

Stephan Castle, European Debt Issues Top Agenda for Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,

2010, at B9 (emphasis added).
83.

Stephen Castle, Europe Agrees to Help Greece, but Is Unsure of How, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

11, 2010, at BI.
84. Nicholas Kulish, Germany, Forcedto Buoy Greece, Rues Euro Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2010, at Al.
85. Dan Bilefsky & Niki Kitsantonis, Greek Civil Servants Strike over Austerity, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2010, at A3.
86. Stephen Castle, European Leaders Vow to Aid Greece, but Skirt Details,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
12, 2010, at A6.
8 7. Id.
88. Rob Cox & Rolfe Winkler, A U.S. Analogy for a Greek Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at
B2.
89. Louise Story, Landon Thomas, Jr. & Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall St. Helped to Mask Debt
FuelingEurope's Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at Al.
90. Id

91. Id. In 2009, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley also drew up a plan to overhaul the
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in 2002, decided not to prohibit the use of derivatives for creative
accounting. 92 The same day a bomb exploded at JPMorgan Chase's
offices in Athens, EU officials asked Greece to "immediately explain
how the government used complex financial tactics engineered by Wall
Street to mask its rising debt." 93 Bets against Greece, made by some of
the same banks that had helped Greece shroud its mounting debt,
"alarm[ed]" bond investors and escalated the financial crisis. 94 A
sovereign bond index fund, iTraxx SovX Western Europe, launched in
September 2009, "let traders gamble on Greece shortly before the crisis.
. . . [D]erivatives ha[d] assumed an outsize role in Europe's debt

crisis." 95 A financial expert opined, "The iTraxx SovX did not create
the situation, but it ha[d] exacerbated it.

. .

. Credit-default swaps [gave]

the illusion of safety but actually increase[d] systemic risk." 96 Another
expert termed credit derivatives "the most dangerous instruments yet,"
and added that "[i]nnovation has now cost us $7 trillion.

. .

. That's a

97

pretty high price to pay for innovation." Given how such instruments
had been used, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke shared his
view that "it's 'counterproductive' to use credit default swaps to crash
an institution or a nation exhibits a certain naivet6 about how the titans
of finance operate now." 98 The U.S. Federal Reserve disclosed that it
was investigating Goldman Sachs and the other banks that helped
Greece mask its debt. 99 Calls for a crackdown on derivatives increased
as an August 2009 confidential Goldman Sachs report surfaced that had
advised its clients to "buy CDS [credit default swaps] of developed
countries" months before the Greek debt became a big story in financial
markets.100 Greece called on the United States and EU to "crack down
on speculative trading, arguing that exotic bets had driven up Greece's
Greek railway system. Landon Thomas, Jr. & Niki Kitsantonis, Rail System in Greece Adds to
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at Bl. The plan involved laying off half of the system's 7,000
workers and having the government take over half of the company's 8 billion euros in debt. Id.
92. Story et al., supra note 89, at Al.
93. Stephen Castle, PressureRises on Greece to Explain and Fix Crisis,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,
2010, at B3.
94. Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Banks Bet Greece Defaults on Debt They Helped Hide,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at Al.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Gretchan Morgenson, It's Time for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2010, at Bl.
98. Id.
99. Nelson D. Schwartz & Sewell Chan, As Greek Crisis Appears to Deepen, Fed Studies
Wall St.'s Activities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,2010, at Bl.
100. Lynnley Browning & Matthew Saltmarsh, Calls Increasefor Crackdown on Derivatives,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at Bl.
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0 A
borrowing costs and threatened its effort to ease its debt crisis."o'
hedge fund investor characterized inquiries into questionable hedge
fund activities as "witch hunts." 1 02
Faced with growing opposition in Germany towards a bailout of
Greece, the EU again refused to specify measures to help Greece and
the euro. 103 The EU proposed new powers for Eurostat, the European
statistical agency, to audit books of national governments, a regime that
would constitute "a significant erosion of sovereignty."1 04 Crowds in a
twenty-four hour general strike that paralyzed Greece chanted "hands
off our pension funds" and wondered "what else are they going to cut,
the air that we breathe?" 0 5 Moody's and Standard & Poor's warned
that they might again downgrade Greek government bonds. 106 The
EU's commissioner for monetary affairs said that Greece's austerity
measures, though not adequate, were steps "in the right direction." 107
The head of the main Greek labor union, however, characterized these
measures as "a cause for war."108 Calling them "painful decisions,"
Greece announced that it was studying a new series of austerity
measures. 109 Investors welcomed the news that Greece would raise
taxes and cut spending by USD 6.5 billion this year, and derivative
traders turned their attention to other vulnerable economies in
Europe.11 0 Greece raised USD 6.8 billion in the bond market at 6.37
percent, twice the rate on comparable German bonds; this suggested that
101. Sewell Chan & Jack Ewing, Greece Fumes at Speculators, and Backs a New Monetary
Fund,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, at B3.
102.

Nelson D. Schwartz & Graham Bowley, Traders Turn Attention to the Next Greece, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at B 1.
103.

Nicholas Kulish, Germans Upset over Helping Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, at

A4.
104. Stephen Castle & Matthew Saltmarsh, Greece Struggles to Win Europe's Trust in Its

Deficit-CuttingPlan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, at B3.
105. Niki Kitsantonis, Greeks Strikefor 2nd Time Against Steps to Cut Deficits, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 25, 2010, at Al3. In its 2009 annual report on Greece, the IMF warned that "excessive
pension and health care payments to the elderly" would result in a debt level of 800 percent of
GDP by 2050. Landon Thomas, Jr., Retiring at 50? Greek Trend Is a Cautionary Tale, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 12, 2010, at Al. A similar calculation for the United States estimates the true
measure of federal debt, incorporating Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and other obligations
at USD 79 trillion, or about 500 percent of GDP. Id.
106. Schwartz & Chan, supra note 99, at Bl.
107. Niki Kitsantonis, Greece Is Urged to Make More Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,

2010, at B3 (quoting Olli Rhen, the commissioner for monetary affairs at the European Union)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id. (quoting Yiannis Panagopoulos, the head of Greece's main labor union) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
109.

Niki Kitsantonis, Greece Plans New Austerity Measures to Cut Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

3, 2010, at B3.
110. Schwartz & Bowley, supra note 102, at Bl.
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"once-reluctant governments [were] now heeding market warnings and
taking the political risks necessary to carry out tough fiscal
measures."Ill
In a "game of brinkmanship," Greece "threatened to turn to the [IMF]
for a bailout" if Merkel and other European politicians resisted pledging
aid to help Greece "cope with its newfound frugality."ll 2 As protesters
clashed with police in Athens, the Merkel government, feeling
vulnerable in the upcoming election because of widespread opposition
to helping Greece, made no public offer of support after Merkel's
meeting with the Greek prime minister. 113 German politicians
suggested the Greeks consider "plugging the large hole in their budget
by selling off some of their lovely islands."114 Greece said it "would
not rule out turning to the I.M.F. for assistance."I 15 The European
Commission, "wary of I.M.F. involvement" in the Greek crisis,
endorsed a German proposal for a "European monetary fund" to head
off future debt crises. 116
The EU announced a mechanism to help Greece that would not
include loan guarantees but would involve "coordinated European
action, which [would] make bilateral aid available."1 1 7 Standard &
Poor's affirmed Greece's long-term credit rating of BBB+ but warned
of a negative outlook.118 Merkel demanded that the "turnaround ...
come from Greece" and warned about the possibility of excluding the
country from the euro zone for the non-fulfillment of fiscal
obligations.119 Greece's benchmark ten-year bonds climbed to 6.265
percent as Germany signaled that assistance for Greece should come
111. Landon Thomas, Jr. & David Jolly, Big Bond Sale Eases Pressure on Greece, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at BI.
112.

Swell Chan & Liz Alderman, I.MF. Help for Greece Is a Risky Prospect, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 5, 2010, at B l.
113. Nicholas Kulish, Germany Offers No FinancialHelp to Ailing Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.

6, 2010, at A6.
114. Nicholas Kulish, A Chorus of Strum, Drang and Pathos,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at

WK4.
115. Chan & Ewing, supra note 101, at B3.
116. Id.
117. Stephen Castle, Europe Creates an Apparatus to Provide Loans to Greece, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2010, at B2.
118. Stephen Castle, Greece Eagerfor Details on Loansfrom Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2010, at B3. Bond credit ratings assess the credit worthiness of borrowers, analogous to credit
ratings for individuals. They are assigned by credit rating agencies and have letter designations
(e.g., AAA, B, CC) that represent the quality of a bond; the higher the rating, the lower the risk of
default. Bonds with ratings below BBB/Baa are considered not investment grade and are
colloquially called "junk bonds."
119. Jack Ewing, Merkel Urges Tougher Rules for Euro Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at

A12 (quoting Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from the IMF rather than Europe. 12 0 With Germany reluctant to be part
of any package that appeared to be a bailout of Greece, the IMF was
more likely to lead any rescue efforts.121 Given the important U.S. role
in the IMF, the Fund's involvement remained "neuralgic" for the
Europeans, who believed that "if they [couldn't] come up with a
European solution, it [would] undermine the credibility of the euro zone
as a whole." 122 The EU agreed on a financial safety net for Greece that
would take effect if the Greek government was unable to borrow in the
commercial markets and called for the European Council to become a
form of "economic government" for the European Union. After
objection from many countries about the implied loss of sovereignty,
the wording was changed to "economic governance" in the final English
version. 123
Greece was able to raise another USD 6.7 billion in the bond market
at a 6 percent interest rate. 124 The Greek government announced that
due in part to austerity measures, the Greek economy would contract 3
percent in 2010.125 The yield of the Greek bonds pushed over 7 percent
for the first time in two months.126 As Greek bond yields continued to
climb, it became apparent that "the end game [was] an I.M.F. program,
and the end game [was] getting closer." 27 Investors remained
suspicious of the European assistance package, suspecting that "it was
designed to fob off the market and buy everyone time." 28 Greek bond
yields continued to rise even as the head of the ECB said that Greece
would not be allowed to default.129 With Greek bond yields reaching as
120. Matthew Saltmarsh & Nelson D. Schwartz, Germany, in a Reversal, Says Greece Should
Turn to I.MF, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at Bl.
121. Stephen Castle, I.MF Is More Likely to Lead Efforts for Aid to Greece, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2010, at B2.
122. Steven Erlanger, With Greece Struggling, Europe Looks Uneasily at the I.MF, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A6 (quoting Philip Whyte, an economist at the Center for European
Reform in London) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Stephan Castle & Matthew Saltmarsh, Europeans Reach Deal on Rescue for Greece,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at B1 (emphasis added).
124. David Jolly, In Crucial Test, GreeceRaises $6.7 Billion with Sale ofBonds, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2010, at B3.
125. David Jolly, Optimism and Doubt Feed a Dual over Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010,
at B3.
126. Javier C. Hernandez, Optimism on Low Interest Rates Offsets Worry over Greece, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at B8.
127. Nelson D. Schwartz, Greek Bond Yields Soar in Sell-Off N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at
B1 (quoting Marco Annunziata, Chief Economist for UniCredit) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128. Matthew Saltmarsh & Niki Kitsantonis, Pressure Builds on Greece as Europe Delays
Details on CrisisHelp, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at B1 1.
129. Matthew Saltmarsh, Head of European CentralBank Says Greece Will Not Be Allowed
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high as 7.5 percent, it appeared that "[t]he market [was] testing
Europe's resolve," 1 30 and that this was "no longer about liquidity; it
[was] a solvency issue."131 As Greece approached "the point of no
return," the only way out appeared to be "savage spending cuts and tax
increases . . . . No wonder, then, that bond markets [were] losing

confidence, andpushing the situation to the brink."1 32 Europe offered

USD 40 billion in aid to Greece at a 5 percent interest rate, and the IMF
offered another USD 20 billion at an even lower rate. 133 As frustration
grew over Germany's harsh handling of the Greek debt crisis, a German
scholar claimed: "We sublimated hegemony,

. . .

[b]ut we're dropping

sublimation now."1 34
With its "monster [rescue] package," the IMF "[was] back at the peak
of its power and relevance." 135 However, investors "largely shrugged
off' the package, claiming that "many of the details had already been
priced into markets." 1 36 Investors "enthusiastically snapped up" USD
2.12 billion Greek short-term securities at rates more than double those
that Greece paid in January on similar maturities. 137 While Greek bond
yields hovered around 7.3 percent, speculators began to "zero in" on
Portugal's debt.138 Greek bond yields closed at 7.6 percent, and "the
market want[ed] it clearly pinned down that the [rescue] money [was]
there and ready to go." 139 Greek bond yields climbed to 7.85 percent,
and the yield-gap over comparable German bonds rose to a record 4.76
to Default, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at B8.
130. Landon Thomas, Jr., Running Out of Time in Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at BI
(quoting a senior official in the Greek government) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id. (quoting Stephen Jen, a former economist at the IMF) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
132. Paul Krugman, Learning from Greece, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010, at A27 (emphasis
added).
133.

Stephan Castle & Jack Ewing, Europe Unites to Assist Greece with Line of Aid, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at Al.
134. Steven Erlanger, Germany Asserts Its Interests as Greek Debt Crisis Unfolds, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at A4 (quoting Ukike Gudrot, a senior research fellow with the European
Council on Foreign Relations) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Christopher Swann & Nicholas Paisner, History Is Hardly on Greece'sSide, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2010, at B2.
136. Javier C. Hernandez, Move to Aid Greece Helps Dow Close Above 11,000, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 13, 2010, at Bl.
137. Jack Ewing & David Jolly, Some Respite for Greece in Successful Debt Sale, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010, at B5.
138. Landon Thomas, Jr., Debt Worries Shif to Portugal,Spurred by Rising Bond Rates, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at Bl.
139. Matthew Saltmarsh, Greece's Uncertain Future Weighs on Bond Market, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 20, 2010, at B3 (quoting David Schnautz, a strategist at Commerzbank in Frankfurt)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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percent.140 Eurostat raised its estimate of the Greek budget deficit for
2009 to 13.6 percent of GDP; the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio now stood at
115.1 percent. 14 1 With the yield on Greek bonds at nearly 9 percent, the
Greek prime minister described his country's economy as "a sinking
ship" and formally requested an international bailout. 142 Chancellor
Angela Merkel of Germany insisted that Greece first had to negotiate "a
credible savings program," 43 and a German lawmaker believed the
program "ha[d] to hurt."144 Merkel insisted that Greece accept "hard
measures" for three years as specified in the IMF program.145 In turn, a
restructuring of the Greek debt became likely.146 The EU and IMF
package did "little to calm the markets," while Standard & Poor's cut
Greece's debt to junk level, warning that bondholders could face losses
of up to 50 percent in a restructuring.147 The IMF increased its package
to USD 160 billion.14 8 Merkel, her "hand . . . forced by mistrustful

credit markets and the ratings agency that downgraded Spain, Portugal,
and Greece in a matter of just two days," now said that negotiations
with Greece "had to be accelerated and that Germany would do its part
to safeguard the euro." 1 49
Merkel's "foot-dragging" gave markets "both reason and room to run
up the price of Greek debt to unsustainable levels." 150 Observers found
it "astonishing" that a German regional election "[could] play such a
disproportionate role in messing up efforts to contain what was a much
140. David Jolly, Greece Sells Bills, but ProspectsAre Dim, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2010, at

B2.
141. Matthew Saltmarsh, A Setback for Greece as Europe Says Deficit Is Larger than
Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, at B1.
142. Niki Kitsantonis & Matthew Saltmarsh, Greece, Out ofIdeas, Requests Global Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at Bl.
143. Editorial, Greece and Who's Next?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A18 (emphasis added)
(quoting Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Georg Nuesslein, a lawmaker in Merkel's governing
coalition) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Judy Dempsey & Matthew Saltmarsh, Confidence About Greek Debt Falters in
Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at B1 (quoting Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Jack Ewing, Best Hope for Greece: Minimize the Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at
Bl.
147. Landon Thomas, Jr., FinancialFears Grow in Europe over Greek Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2010, at Al.
148. Landon Thomas, Jr. & Nicholas Kulish, I.MF. Promises More Aid for Greece as
European Crisis Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,2010, at Al.
149. Nicholas Kulish, Ripplesfrom Greek Crisis Speed Up Merkel's Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2010, at A12.
150. Steven Erlanger, In Debt Crisis, Europe's Latest Drama, Leaders Are Offstage, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at Al.
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smaller crisis several months ago."151 An economist claimed that "the
LMF. [was] the last man standing and [was]

structuring the

program."l 52 In return for USD 160 billion over three years, the IMF
demanded that Greece cut public sector spending by eight billion euro
in fourteen months, raise value-added tax to 25 percent, freeze civil
servants' wages, eliminate public sector bonuses amounting to two
months' pay, adopt measures making it easier to lay off public sector
workers, and privatize health care, transportation, and energy sectors.1 53
Tens of thousands of Greeks took to the streets to protest these austerity
measures. 154 Some economists expressed fear that "such harsh
measures risk[ed] killing the patient."15 5 Others pointed out that
"unfortunatelyfor economists, there is democracy . . .. If you impose

too strict a program, the population will refuse." 156 Germany approved
its share of the Greek bailout, and ECB said that it would accept Greek
bonds as collateral regardless of any future downgrades.1 57 Despite the
"supersize" bailout, the yield on two-year Greek bonds rose to 14
percent, under the "logic" that "Greece still has to go through
wrenching cuts and may still end up restructuring its debt which could
force current bondholders to take a haircut."1 58 Speaking about the
impact of the Greek bailout on the prospects of the euro, an economist
opined that "[i]t is not really about money, . . . [i]t is about how much
pain the people in periphery can stand in order to keep this thing

going." 5 9 Three people were killed as continuing protests in Athens
turned violent. 160 The bond market expressed disappointment that ECB
151. Id. (quoting Jacob Kirkegaard, a research fellow in European affairs and structural
reform at the Peterson Institute for International Economics) (internal quotation marks omitted).
There was an alarm that "[t]he Greek debt crisis [was] spreading. Europe need[ed] a bolder
solution-and quickly." Acropolis Now, ECONOMIST, May 1, 2010, at 11.

152. Erlanger, supranote 150, at Al (emphasis added).
153. Dan Bilefsky & Landon Thomas, Jr., Aid Terms Include Higher Taxes and Cuts in Jobs
and Pay, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at Bl.
154. Dan Bilefsky, Greeks Take to Streets to Protest Cutbacks, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at

A20.
155.

Steven Erlanger, In Bitter Pill, No Sure Cure, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at Al (emphasis

added).
156. Id. at A3 (quoting Jean-Paul Fitoussi, a professor of Economics at the Institut d'Etudes

Politiques in Paris) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Judy Dempsey & Jack Ewing, Germany Approves Assistance for Greece, N.Y. TIMES,

May 4, 2010, at B4.
158. Antony Currie, Nicholas Paisner & Agnes T. Crane, TradingDesks Keep Churning, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2010, at B2.
159. Landon Thomas, Jr., Bold Stroke May Be Beyond Europe's Means, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,

2010, at BI (emphasis added) (quoting Timothy Congdon, an economist and professed euro
skeptic) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Dan Bilefsky, 3 Reported Killed as Violent Groups Overtake Athens Protest, N.Y.
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did not decide to buy the Greek bonds itself as part of the rescue
package, and bond yields rose across Europe. 16 1 Greece's problems
were deemed "deeper than Europe's leaders [were] willing to
acknowledge," and the possibility of Greece leaving the euro zone
remained. 162 Investors were now focused on the risk to European banks
if severe budget cuts in crisis-ridden countries froze credit markets and
caused a double-dip recession-"the risk [was] that the periphery
[would] pull[]down the rest of Europe." 63 Ripple effects of the Greek
debt crisis started "affecting the broader global economy," including the
ability of Asian firms to raise money and U.S. banks that have USD 3.6
trillion exposure to European banks. 164
Finally, EU leaders reached an "extraordinary agreement"l 65 to
provide a rescue package of USD 1 trillion-"afinancial bazooka"-to
stop the spreading debt crisis. 16 6 The IMF and EU hoped that the sum,
which could rise to "more than a quarter of the bloc's gross domestic
product [would] prevent troubled institutions from falling."1 67 The new
plan came after "some not so subtle prodding" from President Obama,
worried about the threat of the debt crisis to "the still-fragile" recoveries
in the United States and Asia. 16 8 The Greek bailout is likely to follow
the model of the World Bank and IMF bailout of Russia after the 1998
default-"taxpayers paying for the bailout while investors in Greek debt
are largely made whole."1 69 The IMF's rescue package precluded the
option of debt restructuring that "would have been a way to blunt some
of the pain Greeks are feeling and shift some of the burden to bankers
who made irresponsible loans in the first place." 70 ECB bought 16.5
TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A6.
161. Jack Ewing, EuropeanBank's AssurancesFailto Placate Investors, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2010, at Bl.
162. Paul Krugman, A Money Too Far,N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A27.
163. Jack Ewing, Risk to EuropeanBanks Seen in Austerity Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2010, at B6 (quoting Stefan Kolek, a debt analyst at UniCredit in Munich) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
164. Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Greek Debt Woes Ripple Outward,From Asia to US.,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2010, at Al.
165. Christine Hauser, Stocks Soar After Europe Announces Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2010, at B1.
166. Id. at B8 (emphasis added) (quoting Justin Golden, a senior strategist for Marco Risk
Advisors) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Jack Ewing & Matthew Saltmarsh, Doubts Persist as Most European Banks Pass Stress
Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at B4.
168. Steven Erlanger, Katrin Benhold & David E. Sanger, After Half Steps, Major Rescue
Took a Nudge from Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at Al.
169. Andrew E. Kramer, The Euro in 2010 Feels Like the Ruble in 1998, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2010, at B4.
170. Landon Thomas, Jr., I.M.F. Plays Deal Maker in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at
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billion euro in bonds taking the unprecedented step of intervening in
markets to halt a sell-off of Greek and other European debt.1 7 1
Historians "will likely look back to May 9 as a turning point," when
European leaders announced the USD 1 trillion in guarantees to deal
with the debt crisis in Europe. 172 The Greek pledge to slash its budget
deficit by more than 10 percent of GDP by 2014 was characterized as "a
recipe for economic stagnation. . . . [D]ebt restructuring [was]

inevitable." 17 3 Greece announced plans for "a big sale of state-owned
assets," including 49 percent of the state railroad, 39 percent of the postoffice, minority stakes in water utilities, listing ports and airports on the
stock market, and privatizing casinos. 174 Moody's now downgraded
Greece's credit rating to junk status. 175 A fifth general strike ground
Greece to a halt. 176 The Greek parliament, by a vote of 157-134,
"forc[ed] through a pension bill that would sharply pare down the
country's welfare state by increasing the retirement age and reducing
benefits."1 7 7 The drafters called this bill, which also made it easier for
companies to fire workers, "our passport out of hell." 78 Since most
Greek debt is held abroad, roughly 80 percent of the budget savings go
straight to foreign bondholders. 179 Perceptive economists believe that
because the bailout requires draconian fiscal adjustments, prolongs the

B 1,B4.
171.

Jack Ewing, Central Bank Buys Billions in European Debt, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK

(May 18, 2010, 2:14 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/central-bank-buys-billionsin-european-debt/. The Maastricht Treaty expressly prohibits such bailouts, and this prohibition
has been reaffirmed by the German Constitutional Court. See George Soros, The Euro and the
Crisis, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010, at 28, 29 (discussing how the Maastricht Treaty's
prohibitions have made the current crisis in Greece difficult to deal with).
172. Gabot Steingart, It Takes a Crisis to Make a Continent, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, at
A17.
173.
174.

Op-Ed., Europe's Endangered Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2010, at WK7.
David Jolly, Greece to Sell Assets to Help Pay Down Deficit, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK

(June 3, 2010, 2:52 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/greece-to-sell-assets-to-helppay-down-deficit/.
175. Christine Hauser, Greece's Rating Is Cut, and the Markets Ebb, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,

2010, at B7.
176.

Niki Kitsantonis, World Briefing Greece: Workers' Strike Halts Public Services and

Transportation,N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at A8.
177. Landon Thomas, Jr. & Niki Kitsantonis, Greece Approves Pension Overhaul Despite
Protests, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2010, at Bl.

178. Id. (quoting Yannis Stournaras, an economist in Athens) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
179. Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, It's Not About Greece Anymore, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX
(May 6, 2010, 6:11 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/its-not-about-greeceanymore/.
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country's recession, and leaves the country with a debt-to-GDP ratio of
148 percent by 2016, Greece's "best option" is an "orderly default."180
As the long hot summer of 2010 came to a close, the Greek debt
stood at 114 percent of its GDP. 181 By 2040, Greece would have to
spend 20 percent of its GDP to simply service this debt. 182 The rescue
package has "not paid down one penny. [It is] just moving around a big
pile of debt."1 83 Even with interest rates around the world "stuck to the
floor," Greece had to pay 11 percent on its five-year bonds, while
Germany paid 1.4 percent. 184 A team from the IMF and EU was in
Athens "to examine the government's progress." 85 An "extremely
imperfect" stress test of European banks conducted by European
regulators did not test banks' ability to survive a default by Greece. 186
The bond market remained skeptical about the ability of Greece and
other debt-ridden economies in Europe to "manage their debts long
term."1 87 Many European officials, including the French president,
believed that Europe's banking problems and sovereign debt crisis were
"largely the creation of speculators out to make a profit."' 88 This Greek
tragedy underscores that borrowing from the bond market to make up
budgetary shortfalls rather than relying on taxation has a profound
impact on public policies and accountability as the state becomes
beholden to capital-owning classes, particularly the bond market. 189
The developments surrounding the Greek debt crisis also substantiate
180. Nouriel Roubini, Greece's Best Option Is an Orderly Default, FIN. TIMES (June 28,

2010, 10:56 PM),
#axzzl6FQi4BGo.
181.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3874e80-82e8-l ldf-8bl5-00144feabdcO.html

Christopher Swann & Nicholas Paisner, History Is Hardlyon Greece's Side, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 13, 2010, at B2.
182. Ferguson, supra note 26, at 8.
183.

Javier C. Hernandez, Dow Finishes Above 11,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at BI

(quoting Phillippe Gijsels, head of research at BNP Paribas) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Floyd Norris, Interest Rates Stuck to Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at Al, A3.

185. Thomas & Kitsantonis, supra note 177, atBl.
186. Jack Ewing, Despite Flaws, Stress Tests May Satisfy Markets, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,

2010, at B3 (quoting Nicolas Vdron, a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International
Economics in Washington) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Matthew Saltmarsh, Default Fears Return to European Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,

2010, at B3.
188. Ewing, supra note 186, at B3.
189. According to the head of PIMCO, the largest bond fund in the world, "bond markets
have power because they're the fundamental base for all markets. The cost of credit, the interest
rate [on a benchmark bond], ultimately determines the value of stocks, homes, all asset classes."
FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 68 (quoting PIMCO CEO Bill Gross). Historically, bondholders are
the capital-owning classes and constitute a very small minority of the population. See id. at 73,
100 (noting that bond purchasers must have large amounts of ready capital that they are willing to
risk).
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that in the face of unbridled global mobility of finance capital,
governments increasingly are "hostages to financial-market sentiments,
[and] compelled to take account of investor concerns at every turn."1 90
The thesis that unchecked international capital flows result in
"dramatically more regressive income distribution and an effective veto
over public policy" came to fruition in the Greek crisis. 19 1
All this raises profound questions about the architecture and
architects of the global financial system, the patterns of distribution of
gain and pain that issue from international capital flows, and the role of
international debt crises in this schema. It also raises issues regarding
the asymmetrical sovereignty of states and the representative nature and
Finally, it brings into relief
accountability of political orders.
accumulation by dispossession, an enduring feature of capitalism
whereby markets always rely on non-market legal and extra-legal forces
to augment capital accumulation by impoverishing subordinated
classes. 192 To address these questions, an examination of the genesis of
the current global financial order is warranted. The first step in that task
is to examine the Bretton Woods system that governed the international
capital flows for three decades after World War II, and the demise of

190. Benjamin J. Cohen, Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance, 48 WORLD

POL. 268, 286 (1996).
191. Id. Historically, increase in the mobility of taxable property had always forced political
authorities to "bargain with those who possess property rights over the moveable tax base and to
share with them formal control over the conduct of public affairs." Robert H. Bates & Da-Hsiang
Donald Lien, A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government, 14 POL. &

Soc'Y 53, 57 (1985). A study of four European welfare states demonstrated that "as business and
finance became more mobile, their power resources increased, and those of labor decreased," and
governments "lost the ability to carve out national economic strategies and to sustain social
accords."

PAULETTE KURZER, BUSINESS AND BANKING: POLITICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION INWESTERN EUROPE, at viii (1993). The result is "the abandonment of policies
traditionally associated with social democracy-including numerous entitlement programs;
redistributive income policies; and consensual tripartite exchanges among business, labor, and
government." Cohen, supra note 190, at 286; see also Jonathon W. Moses, Abdication from
National Policy Autonomy: What's Left to Leave?, 22 POL. & SOC'Y 125, 125-26 (1994)

(examining the tension between global financial integration and social democracy).
192. For detailed analyses of the unavoidable relation between the market and non-market
forces, see DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM 137-82 (2003) (noting the importance of
primitive accumulation to economic hegemony); MICHAEL PERELMAN, THE INVENTION OF
CAPITALISM: CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE

ACCUMULATION 25-37 (2000) (describing the centrality of primitive accumulation to the
emergence and consolidation of capitalism); Jim Glassman, Primitive Accumulation,
Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by 'Extra-Economic' Means, 30 PROGRESS HUM.

GEOGRAPHY

608, 608-09 (2006)

(discussing the political implications

of primitive

accumulation); Michael Perelman, Primitive Accumulation from Feudalism to Neoliberalism, 18
CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIALISM, no. 2, 2007 at 44, 54 (describing the role of primitive

accumulation from early capitalism to the neoliberal phase).
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which furnished the grounds for the neoliberal architecture of global
finance.
III. BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM AND ITS COLLAPSE

By the end of World War II, the center of gravity of global capitalism
and military power had decisively shifted to the United States. At this
point, as Dean Acheson put it, "only the U.S. had the power to grab
hold of history and make it conform." 1 93 A new imperial economic
order had to be designed to overcome the earlier fragmentation of global
capitalism into rival empires and to facilitate U.S. economic penetration
and close institutional linkages with other advanced capitalist states.
The United States proceeded to "conjugate its particularpower with the
general task of coordination."1 94 A critical step in this direction was to
choose an enabling global financial architecture. The preference of U.S.
finance capital had been articulated in the 1942 joint statement of the
editors of Fortune, Time, and Life magazines. It called for a "new
American imperialism" whose goal would be "to promote and foster
private enterprise, by removing barriers to its natural expansion," by
creating "an expansionist context in which tariffs, subsidies,
monopolies, restrictive labor rules . . . and all other barriers to further

expansion can be removed," with "universal free trade" as "the ultimate
goal of a rational world."1 95 Managers of the U.S. state, however,
remained mindful of the instability and conflict that unregulated global
capital markets had engendered in the pre-World War I era, and the
havoc global financial mismanagement had unleashed in the inter-war
period. 196
193.

WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE 185 (1980).

This

understanding of omnipotence appears to be an enduring feature of U.S. foreign policy
establishment. Madeleine Albright claimed that the United States is "the author of history."
PETER GOWAN, A CALCULUS OF POWER: GRAND STRATEGY INTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
137 (2010). In her first major foreign policy address, Hillary Clinton cited with approval Tom
Paine's statement that "We have within our power to begin the world over again," and went on to
declare, "Today ... we are called upon to use that power." Sec'y of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations (July 15, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm.
194. Perry Anderson, Force and Consent, 17 NEW LEFT REv. 5, 20 (2002). For a detailed
analysis, see MICHAEL HUDSON, SUPER IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC STRATEGY OF AMERICAN
EMPIRE 137-44 (1971).
195. An American Proposal,FORTUNE MAG., May 1942, at 59-63.
196. This critical posture towards finance capital is captured by Louis Brandeis in 1914: "The
dominant element in our financial oligarchy is the investment banker." LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 4 (1914); see also Jefferey Rosen, Why
Brandeis Matters: The Constitution and the Crash, NEW REPUBLIC, July 22, 2010, at 19
(discussing Brandeis' critique of big business and finance). For the inter-war havoc in global
finance, see BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
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Faced with the tasks of reconstruction of Europe and Japan,
containment of the socialist bloc, and management of decolonization in
the Global South, the emerging Keynesian consensus of the postdepression era appeared the right road to take. A cautious posture
towards finance capital, and the comprehensive war-time controls over
currency and capital flows furnished the backdrop of the new global
financial architecture institutionalized at Bretton Woods. 197 U.S.
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau articulated the agenda as seeking
a "New Deal in international economics," and "driving the usurious
money lenders out of the temple of international finance." 1 98
Economist Arthur Bloomfield, writing in 1946, captured the posture
well:
It is now highly respectable doctrine, in academic and banking circles
alike, that a substantial measure of direct control over private capital
movements, especially of the so-called hot money varieties, will be
desirable for most countries not only in the years immediately ahead
but also in the long run as well. . . . This doctrinal volte-face

represents a widespread disillusionment resulting from the destructive

behavior of the movements in the interwar years. 99
Keynes, the guiding light at Bretton Woods, was deeply suspicious of
speculative capital flows and considered capital controls essential for
A global financial architecture was
exchange rate stability. 200
envisaged that would complement the Keynesian compromise so that
national fiscal and monetary policies could be calibrated, aiming at full
employment and a welfare state. 20 1 The Bretton Woods system was
MONETARY SYSTEM 43-90 (2d ed. 2008) (describing the instability of the monetary system
between the world wars); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE

PEACE 66-81 (Indo-European Publishing 2010) (1920) (proposing that the treaty concluding the
First World War would have drastic economic consequences).
197. The Commission responsible for establishing the IMF was chaired and tightly controlled
by Harry White, American Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, who ensured that "legal language
which made everything difficult to understand" would "make easier the imposition of a fait
accompli."

ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES: FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, 1937-

1946, at 350-51 (2001).
198. Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, Finance and American Empire, in THE EMPIRE RELOADED,

supra note 31, at 46, 49-50.
199. ABDELAL, supra note 44, at 45.

200. Id. at 19.
201.

A good definition of a welfare state is offered by Asa Briggs:

A welfare state is a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least
three directions-first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a minimum income
irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by narrowing
the extent of 'social contingencies' (for example, sickness, old age or unemployment)
which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all
citizens without distinction of status or class are offered the best standards available in
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created to lend stability to global finance. 202 The adopted approach
aimed at charting a course between the rigidity of the gold standard and
the volatility of unbridled mobility of capital.203 The new order
envisaged that control of capital movements would be "a permanent
feature of the post-war system." 204 The USD, convertible into gold at
USD 35 per ounce, was to be the new anchor of the global financial
architecture. The IMF was created to police this system of fixed
exchange rates. IMF Articles of Agreement required each member state
to maintain a fixed par value for its currency, expressed in USD, and to
intervene in foreign exchange markets to maintain the value within a 1
percent range; if a central bank ran out of gold or dollars to maintain the
fixed rate, the IMF would provide bridge loans. 205 Cross-border capital
movement was to be controlled and the classic "trilemma," 206 or the
"unholy trinity," 207 was resolved in favor of a fixed exchange rate and
independent monetary policy. A prolonged era of growth, often termed
"the golden age" of capitalism (1947-1973), was the result.2 08 The U.S.
finance capital did quite well during this phase, and was able to get rid
of the negative image that had attached to it in the post-Great
Depression phase. 209 While operating under New Deal regulations,
financial institutions took advantage of the post-war boom and rising

relation to an agreed range of social services.
Asa Brigggs, The Welfare State in HistoricalPerspective, in THE WELFARE STATE READER 16,

16 (Christopher Pearson & Francis G. Castles eds., 2d ed. 2006).
202. For details of Bretton Woods' system of fixed exchange rates, see ANTHONY M.
ENDRES, GREAT ARCHITECTS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: THE BRETTON WOODS ERA 14-31
(2005); ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS: BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM (1978).

203.
204.
205.
IMF).
206.
options:

For the era of the gold standard, see EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 6-42.
ABDELAL, supra note 44, at 46 (quoting John M. Kaynes).
For details, see EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 91-100 (discussing the structure of the
"Trilemma" refers to the fact that a state can choose only two of three financial policy
unbridled cross-border capital movements; a fixed exchange rate; and an autonomous

monetary policy. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 306.

207. This is Benjamin Cohen's term to signify the intrinsic incompatibility of exchange rate
stability, capital mobility, and national monetary policy autonomy. Benjamin J. Cohen, The
Triadand the Unholy Trinity: Lessons for the Pacific Region, in PACIFIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS
INTHE 1990S: COOPERATION OR CONFLICT? 133, 133-34 (Richard Higgott et al. eds., 1993).

208. Hyman Minsky observed that "the most significant economic event of the era since
World War 11is something that has not happened: there has not been a deep and long-lasting
depression." HYMAN MINSKY, Introduction, Can "It: Happen Again? A Reprise, in CAN "IT"
HAPPEN AGAIN?: ESSAYS ON INSTABILITY AND FINANCE, at xi (1982).

209. Failure of a 1947 anti-trust suit initiated by the Justice Department against investment
houses was a watershed in the history of Wall Street that finally freed the Street of its public
image as the home of monopoly capitalists. RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN
AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 502-06 (1990).
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mass consumption, and profits of financial firms grew faster than nonfinancial profits through the 1950s and 1960s. 2 10
Within a few decades, however, negative U.S. balance of payments
started putting strains on this system. A steady flow of USD and gold
out of the United States and emergence of the unregulated Eurodollar
and Eurobond markets were the result. 211 By the late 1960s, American
hegemony of global capitalism was in crisis. The growing offshore
pool of convertability-seeking USD in the Eurodollar market was
augmented by growing intra-firm transfers by rapidly expanding
transnational corporations and direct foreign investments. 2 12 Rapidly
expanding U.S. balance-of-payment deficits, particularly with Europe
and Japan, and the resulting outflows of USD also created the so-called
Triffin dilemma 213 : the Bretton Woods system had created an incentive
for reserve banks around the world to accumulate dollars, as their
convertability was guaranteed; however, the greater such accumulation
relative to U.S. gold reserves, the greater the risk to the guarantee. In
order to stem its growing balance-of-payment deficits, the United States
incrementally instituted controls over export of capital in the early
1960s. 214 The immediate effect was that U.S. banks expanded their
overseas operations to participate directly in the unregulated
210. Between 1945 and 1962, the average annual growth in profits in finance was 18 percent
compared to 11 percent in the non-financial sector; from 1953 to 1969, the figures were 7.5
percent versus 4.5 percent. Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 24. Bank failures, an endemic
feature of capitalism, also were at their lowest in history during this period. See JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 16, at 36 fig.1-1 (showing the near absence of bank failures during this
period).
211. In 1948, the United States held more than two-thirds of global monetary reserves; within
a decade, its share had fallen to one-half. EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 112. For the
emergence of the Euromarket, see ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 82-91 (1996). Some protectionist actions by the United States also

had the unintended consequence of enhancing the Eurodollar market. For example, the Interest
Equalization Tax instituted in 1963 to stem foreign-bond sales in the United States gave further
impetus to the rise of the Eurobond market. Cohen, supra note 190, at 279; John B. Goodman &
Louis W. Pauly, The Obsolescence of Capital Controls?: Economic Management in an Age of

GlobalMarkets, 46 WORLD POL. 50, 79 (1993).
212. The growth of the Eurodollar market also reflected the fact that between 1950 and 1970,
Europe's share of American direct foreign investment more than doubled to match Canada's
share of over 30 percent, while Latin America's share fell from 40 to under 20 percent. MICHAEL
BARRATr BROWN, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERIALISM 39, 57 (1974).
213. See EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 114-15 (discussing the emergence of the U.S.
balance-of-payment deficits); Walker Todd, Triffin 's Dilemma, Reserve Currencies, and Gold,

AM. INST. ECON. RES. (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.aier.org/research/briefs/975-triffins-dilemmareserve-currencies-and-gold (providing a brief overview of Triffin's theory). For a detailed
exposition, see generally ROBERT TRIFFIN, GOLD AND THE DOLLAR CRISIS: THE FUTURE OF

COVERTABILITY (1961) (discussing the dollar-gold convertibility regime and the emergence of
the dollar crisis).
214. EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 127.
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Euromarket and secure funding for domestic operations. 2 15 An added
incentive was that Glass-Steagall's separation of commercial and
investment banking did not extend to overseas operations of U.S.
banks. 216 These overseas operations helped American banks "to
internalize aspects of [the unregulated Euromarket] within the U.S.
domestic financial system." 2 17 As U.S. deficits grew sizable, Europe
started complaining that the United States was collecting "seigniorage"
from foreign creditors by printing USD. 2 18 As the real value of gold
started to exceed the fixed USD price of gold, demands for gold
conversion from foreign holders of USD increased. 219
For the capital-owning classes in the United States, a crisis was
building rapidly. Rates of profit were falling, the share of income of
capital-owning classes was shrinking, and the oil price hike of the early
1970s exacerbated the crisis and triggered "stagflation"-an
unprecedented combination of inflation and stagnation. 22 0 The share of
national income by the top 1 percent of earners in the United States fell
from a pre-World War II high of 16 percent to less than 8 percent by
1978. While the inflationary climate made for "the worst bond bear
215. Thomas E. Huertas, US Multinational Banking: History and Prospects, in BANKS AS
MULTINATIONALS 248, 254 (Geoffrey Jones ed., 1990).
216. International Banking Operations, 12 C.F.R. § 211 (2010). A foundation of New Deal
regulation of finance capital and popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, the Banking Act of
1933 was a reaction to the collapse of a large portion of the U.S. commercial banking system in
early 1933. The Act introduced the separation of bank types according to their businesscommercial and investment banking.
217. LEONARD SEABROOKE, U.S. POWER IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: THE VICTORY OF
DIVIDENDS 111 (2001).
218. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 308 (emphasis added). Seigniorage is the difference
between the value of money and the cost to produce it-in other words, the economic cost of
producing a currency within a given economy or country. If the seigniorage is positive, then the
government makes an economic profit; a negative seigniorage will result in an economic loss.
Holders of overseas USD were well aware that the United States' suspension of gold
convertability to print money in response to the liquidity crisis went back to the Aldrich-Vreeland
Act of 1908. See WILLIAM L. SILBER, WHEN WASHINGTON SHUT DOWN WALL STREET: THE
GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1914 AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA'S MONETARY SUPREMACY
84-85 (2007) (describing the impact of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908).
219. Starting in 1960, the United States' external USD liabilities exceeded its gold reserves,
and the price of gold in international markets started rising significantly above the pegged value
of USD. EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 117, 126.
220. See ROBERT BRENNER, THE BOOM AND THE BUBBLE: THE US IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 19-22 (2002) [hereinafter BRENNER, BOOM AND BUBBLE] (discussing the decline in
profit rates in the private economy). For detailed analyses of crises of capitalism, see generally
GIOvANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME (1994); ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE (2006); Robert
Brenner, Uneven Development and the Long Downturn: The Advanced Capitalist Economies
from Boom to Stagnation 1950-1998, 229 NEW LEFT REv. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Brenner, Uneven
Development].
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market not just in memory but in history," 22 1 others started to foresee
"the death of equities."222 In the face of accelerating demands from the
working classes for expanded economic and social rights, Keyensian
welfare capitalism and the compact between capital and labor in the
Global North supervised by an interventionist state appeared exhausted.
The costs of a welfare state within and imperial wars outside kept
increasing the pressure on the USD, and the Bretton Woods system did
not offer any satisfactory options. 223 As a buildup towards the end of
covertability, the Nixon administration rescinded the temporary capital
controls of the 1960s and positioned the United States as unequivocally
opposed to the use of such controls. 224 The formal end of USD-gold
convertability by the United States in 1971-a refusal to honor a
commitment to pay gold for USD at a fixed rate-was in effect a default
on foreign obligations and sounded the death knell for Bretton
Woods. 2 25 With this delinking, the fixed rate international regime and
the so-called "golden age" of capitalism came to an end.2 2 6
The termination of USD-gold convertability in 1971 was done more
as an act of expedience than as a foundational break with the Bretton
Woods system.2 2 7 This was not quite "the dawning of a new
international regime for money and international relations." 228
Inflation, stagnation, and balance-of-payment problems improved only
marginally. Declining value of the USD and large outflows of capital
221. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 108 (quoting PIMCO CEO Bill Gross).
222. The Death of Equities: How Inflation is Destroying the Stock Market, Bus. WK., Aug.
13, 1979, at 54.

223. A state faced with negative balance of payments has a variety of options: devalue the
currency, impose capital controls, restrict capital accounts, seek reduction of trade barriers of
trading partners, or adopt tight fiscal and monetary policies. Only some of the options were open
under the Bretton Woods system. Adjustment of currency value was restricted. The Keynesian
welfare compromise between capital and labor precluded raising interest rates or curbs on
spending. Capital controls were permitted but became increasingly difficult to enforce because of
growing capital mobility that came with the growth of intra-company transfers of proliferating
multination corporations.
224. HELLEINER,supra note 211, at 101-21.
225. See Michael Bordo, The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical
Overview, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM 3 (Michael Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
226. The period between 1949 and 1973 is often referred to as the "golden age" because of the
unusually high and sustained growth and moderate business cycles enjoyed by capitalist
economies. For a detailed discussion, see generally PHILIP ARMSTRONG, ANDREW GLYN & JOHN
HARRISON, CAPITALISM SINCE WORLD WAR II: THE MAKING AND BREAKUP OF THE GREAT

BOOM (1984).
227. JOANNE GOWA, CLOSING THE GOLD WINDOW: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE END OF
BRETTON WOODS 147, 166 (1983).
228. PETER GOWAN, THE GLOBAL GAMBLE: WASHINGTON'S FAUSTIAN BID FOR GLOBAL
DOMINANCE 33 (1999).
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threatened the very grounds of U.S. global domination, and democratic
pressures on the welfare state kept growing. 229 Low rates of interest,
stagnant profits, and inflation were putting increasing pressure on
American finance capital. 2 30 Due to inflation, bond returns in the
United States remained negative for nearly four decades. 23 1 The
measure of discontent on Wall Street was one "not seen since the last
days of the Hoover presidency." 2 32 In 1979, even the usually
circumspect Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") raised the alarm
of "a genuine dollarcrisis."233

The search for qualitative transformations was increasingly running
up against the New Deal banking regulations. The gap between the
potential and highly profitable markets for private credit and New Deal
restrictive regimes was bridged by an incipient "financial services
revolution" that can be dated as beginning in the mid-1970s with the
abolition of fixed rates on brokerage commissions on Wall Street.2 34
229. For detailed analyses of this phenomenon, see EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 6-89;
EMMANUEL TODD, AFTER THE EMPIRE: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AMERICAN ORDER 13-22
(2003); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN POWER: THE U.S. IN A CHAOTIC

WORLD 13-27 (2003); G. John Ikenberry, Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony, 104

POL. ScI.

Q. 375,

397 (1989).

For critiques of the decline thesis, see Stephen Gill, American

Hegemony: Its Limits and Prospectsin the Reagan Era, 15 MILLENIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 311, 311

(1986) (criticizing the assumptions that America's power has weakened); Bruce Russett, The
Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?, 39 INT'L ORG. 207,

207 (1985) (reexamining the arguments for America's declining influence in the world); Susan
Strange, The PersistentMyth of Lost Hegemony, 41 INT'L ORG. 551, 552 (1987) (refuting the

position that America's international influence has diminished).
230. See BRENNER, BOOM AND BUBBLE, supra note 220, at 7-48 (discussing the stagnation of
the American economy); MAKOTO ITOH, THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS AND JAPANESE
CAPITALISM 60 (1990) (discussing the inflationary crisis of the 1970s); DAVID MCNALLY,
ANOTHER

WORLD

IS

POSSIBLE:

GLOBALIZATION

&

ANTI-CAPITALISM

226-31

(2006)

(describing the increase in inflation in the United States between 1971 and 1980, the subsequent
increase in interest rates in order to tame inflation, and the impact of these actions across the
globe); Brenner, Uneven Development, supra note 220, at 93 (examining stagflation); David
McNally, From FinancialCrisis to World-Slump: Accumulation, Fiancialization,and the Global
Slowdown, 17 HIST. MATERIALISM 35, 43 n.23 (2009) [hereinafter McNally, From Financial

Crisis] (arguing against the position that the thirty-five years since 1973 constitutes a
"depression" or "long downturn").
231. Ferguson, supra note 26, at 12.
232. CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 320 (1997).

The Great Depression

started in 1929 and kept getting worse until President Hoover left office in March 1933.
233. BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS [BIS], FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1979)
(emphasis added); see also EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 126-32 (discussing the dollar

crisis).
234. For a detailed discussion of the financial services revolution, see generally MICHAEL
MORAN, THE POLITICS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION (1991).

Building on

certificates of deposit that had initiated the "securitization" of commercial banking, money
market mutual funds mushroomed, accounting for $25 billion in 1979 and further quadrupling by
1981. During the 1970s, assets of American banks overseas increased almost seven-fold,

2011]

Is it Greek or d6ji vu all over again?

661

However, what American finance capital needed was a fundamental
break with New Deal regimes and a reversal of the Keynesian capitallabor compromise about a welfare state and full employment. Breaking
the power of the unions and workers in general was an essential step
towards that. Finance capital needed a new disciplinary mechanism to
adjust national economies to the new demands of global accumulation.
This is when the neoliberal counterrevolution was launched. This
neoliberal counterrevolution came in response to economic and political
gains secured by working classes, the colonized, other subordinated
groups, falling rates of profit, and decline in the share of wealth of
capital-owning classes. Since the late 1970s, this counterrevolution has
"swept across the world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform
and discursive adjustment." 235
IV. NEOLIBERAL COUNTERREVOLUTION
A. The Idea, the Road-Tests, and the Launch

The neoliberal project aims to unfold a new social order across the
globe to reverse the setbacks that the economic power and political
hegemony of the wealth-owning classes had suffered on account of
Keynesian welfare in the West, socialism in Eastern Europe, and
nationalism in the global South. 236 Neoliberalism makes increasing
recourse to the law to displace Keynesian welfare states through
liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, and uses the discipline of
expanded markets to remove barriers to accumulation that earlier
democratic gains had achieved. 237 To secure unfettered rights to private
property and profits, it expands and deepens the logic of the market,
undermines state sovereignty and national autonomy, and links local
and global political economies to facilitate transnational accumulation
of capital. 238 Neoliberalism entails the abandonment of the post-Great
matching the growth of the Eurodollar market. By the end of the 1970s, foreign earnings
accounted for more than half of total earnings of the five largest American banks. Panitch &
Gindin, supranote 198, at 57-58.
235. Harvey, supra note 49, at 23.
236. For a comprehensive exposition of neoliberalism, see generally DAVID HARVEY, A
BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER (Alfredo
Saad-Filho & Deborah Johnson eds., 2005); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE
COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT
IS REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD 330-32 (1998); Harvey, supra note 49.
237. For articulation of the case for neoliberal global political economy and related accounts
of the law, see generally ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD
IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Kenneth W. Abbot et al., The Concept of
Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000).
238. See A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL
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Depression Keynesian compromise about state intervention in the
market that aimed to maintain steady aggregate demand through full
employment. 2 39 It deems flexible labor markets and rollback of welfare
safety nets as necessary for stabilization of capitalist economies. 240 As
an opening salvo, radical deployment of tight monetary policy is used as
a shock treatment to break the power of labor and inflationary
expectations of welfare societies. A sustained tight fiscal policy follows
the belief that supply finds its own demand, and that a free market
always tends towards equilibrium. 24 1 In the international realm, free
trade of goods, services, and capital is its "sacred tenet." 242 Margaret
Thatcher summed up the political agenda of neoliberalism: "There is no
such thing [as society]! There are individual men and women, and there
are families . ... 43 Such an agenda necessitates breaking the back of
organized labor and fragmenting coalitions of working classes. 244 For
neoliberalism, "society achieves its coherence not through design but
through the market and its processes of exchange." 245 Consequently,
neoliberalism aims at "disempowerment of government: it disables the
MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 32-34 (2003) ("The rules of private

international trade law establish the fundamental rules governing private property and contractual
rights and obligations operative across the full range of commercial activity, including
international trade, investment, [and] finance . . . .");WILLIAM I. ROBINSON, A THEORY OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM: PRODUCTION, CLASS, AND STATE IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD 9-10
(2004) (describing the rise of transnational capital as the defining feature of globalization);
William I. Robinson, Capitalist Globalization and the Transnationalization of the State, in
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 210, 223 (Mark Rupert & Hazel Smith eds.,
2002) (examining the launch of neoliberalism); Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of
Misreading: Towards a Postmodem Conception of Law, 14 J.L. SOC'Y 279, 287 (1987)
("Transnational capital has thus created a transnational legal space, a supra-state legality, a world
law.").
239. For the economic and political agenda of neoliberalism, see Thomas I. Palley, From
Keyensianism to Neoliberalism: Shifting Paradigms in Economics, in NEOLIBERALISM: A
CRITICAL READER, supra note 236, at 20; Susanne MacGregor, The Welfare State and
Neoliberalism, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 236, at 142.
240. For a detailed discussion, see Hugo Radice, Confrontingthe Crises: A Class Analysis, in
THE CRISIS THIS TIME 21, 34-37 (Leo Panitch & Vivek Chibber eds., 2010).
241. For a detailed exposition, see SKIDELSKY, supra note 197, at 29-51.
242. Paul R. Krugman, Is Free TradePassd?, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 131 (1987).
243. Interview by Douglas Keay with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in London, Eng.
(Sept. 23, 1987), availableat http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689.
244. Calling the neoliberal blueprint a "process of 'dedemocratization,"' Philippe Schmitter
argues that neoliberal economic and political changes have two common features: "1) [T]hey
diminish popular expectations from public choices, and 2) they make it harder to assemble
majorities to overcome the resistance of minorities, especially well-entrenched and privileged
ones." Philippe Schmitter, Democracy's Future: More Liberal, Preliberal,or Postliberal?,6 J.
DEMOCRACY, no. 1, 1995 at 15, 20.
245. BARRY SMART, ECONOMY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF
NEO-LIBERALISM 95 (2002).
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state from interfering with the established order of society."2 46
Neoliberalism does not displace the state as much as it reformulates it
and restructures its options. 247 The neoliberal project is to turn the
"nation-state" into a "market-state,"248 one with the primary agenda of
facilitating global capital accumulation unburdened from any legal
regulations aimed at assuring welfare of citizens. In summary,
neoliberalism seeks unbridled accumulation of capital through a
rollback of the state, and limits its functions to minimal security and
maintenance of law, fiscal and monetary discipline, flexible labor
markets, and liberalization of trade and capital flows.
The neoliberal counterrevolution arrived in stages. 249 First came an
ideological assault on the Keynesian consensus and the welfare state.250
Then, neoliberalism was road-tested on a country-wide scale in Chile
following the coup d'etat of September 11, 1973, under the supervision
of "the Chicago Boys"-so-called for their subscription to Milton
Friedman's economic theories. 251 Chilean government spending was
246. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
ALTERNATIVE 58 (1998).

UNGER,

DEMOCRACY

REALIZED:

THE

PROGRESSIVE

247. Many perceptive observers reject the "state shrinking and declining" argument as
political posturing of neoliberals. In particular, they point to the expansion of the coercive
apparatuses of the state and the shift of the state from a managerial mode befitting the Fordist era
towards a neoliberal entrepreneurial mode. See, e.g., David Harvey, From Managerialism to
Entrepreneurialism:Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism, 71 GEOGRAFISKA
ANNALER, ser. B, 1989 at 3, 4-5.
248. Anthony Carty, Marxism and InternationalLaw: Perspectivesfor the American (TwentyFirst) Century?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE LEFT: REEXAMINING MARXIST LEGACIES 169,
170 (Susan Marks ed., 2008).
JOHN CASSIDY, How
249. John Cassidy terms this "conservative counterrevolution."
MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 7 (2009).
250. The 1971 memo by Lewis Powell just before his elevation to the Supreme Court, which
urged the American Chamber of Commerce to mount a campaign to publicize that what was good
for business was good for America, was perhaps the opening ideological salvo. See HARVEY,
supra note 236, at 43. Serial markers along this road were: formation of the Business
Roundtable; proliferation of corporate political action committees legalized by campaign finance
laws of 1974-and the free speech protection given to these activities by the Supreme Court in
1976; the California Proposition 13 tax revolt of home owners in 1976; the emergence of the
Christian right as the moral majority; and the turn of the American South to the Republican party
as part of the politics of backlash against post-World War II civil rights gains. The ideological
assault also targeted the media, and educational and research institutions. Existing news media
were taken over and new ones established that, along with think tanks financed by wealthy
individual and corporate donors, publicized the supposedly common sense character of
neoliberalism and its promise of liberty, entrepreneurship, and consumerism. For detailed
analyses, see generally MANUEL G. GONZALES & RICHARD DELGADO, THE POLITICS OF FEAR:
How REPUBLICANS USE MONEY, RACE, AND THE MEDIA TO WIN (2006); WLLIAM GREIDER,
COME HOME, AMERICA: THE RISE AND FALL (AND REDEEMING PROMISE) OF OUR COUNTRY
(2009); WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (1992).

251.

See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, TWO LUCKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 398-
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cut by 27 percent; natural resources, manufacturing, and public pension
systems were privatized; trade, profit repatriation, and capital flows
were liberalized; and suppression of unions and labor by an
authoritarian political order lubricated the transition to neoliberalism. 252
While preparing the ground for unbridled capitalism, by 1982-1983, the
neoliberal "shock treatment" ended up with 13 percent contraction of
the Chilean economy with one in five workers unemployed. 253 Foreign
investment and lending poured in, attracted by high rates of profit.
The Chile experiment was followed by "a coup by the financial
institutions against the democratically elected government of New York
City." 2 54 Financial institutions refused to roll over New York's debt,
thereby forcing the city to the edge of bankruptcy. 2 55 A group of
bankers forced New York to accept "fiscal discipline" as the cost of a
bailout-curbing municipal unions, layoffs in public employment, wage
freezes, cuts in social provisions, and imposition of user fees. 256
Management of New York's fiscal crisis "established the principle that
in the event of a conflict between the integrity of financial institutions
and bondholders' returns, on one hand, and the well-being of the
citizens on the other, the former was to be privileged." 257 With trialruns in Chile, New York, and the United Kingdom secured, finance
capital launched the decisive "financial coup" 258 on October 6, 1979 by
way of the "Volcker Shock," characterized by Paul Volcker himself as a

400 (1998) (detailing Friedman's relation to the Chicago Boys during and after the coup d'etat);
JUAN GABRIEL VALDES, PINOCHET'S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN CHILE (1995)

(examining the Chicago Boys' perspective on the market and the transfer of ideas to a developing
country); Rossana Castiglioni, The Politics of Retrenchment: The Quandaries of Social
Protection under Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1990, 43 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 37, 49-51

(2001) (explaining the role of the Chicago Boys before and after the coup d'etat); Patricio Silva,
Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks, 23 J. LATIN

AM. STUD. 385, 392-93 (1991) (describing the Chicago Boys' implementation of economic
policy after the coup d'etat).
252. See FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 213-19 (describing the radical economic changes in
Chile during this era).
253.
254.
255.
FISCAL

Id. at 217; STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 114.
HARVEY, supranote 236, at 45.
Roger E. Alcaly & Helen Bodian, New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Economy, in THE
CRISIS OF AMERICAN CITIES 30,50 (Roger E. Alcaly & David Mermelstein eds., 1977).

256. See id at 52-55 (describing these cutbacks and the reasons for their implementation); see
also wILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN FISCAL CRISIS

28-31 (1982) (explaining how there was a loss of democratic control in New York City as the
Financial Control Board instituted austerity programs).
257.

HARVEY, supra note 236, at 48.

258.

GtRARD DUMtNIL & DOMINIQUE

NEOLIBERAL REVOLUTION 69, 165 (2004).

LtvY, CAPITAL RESURGENT: ROOTS OF THE
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triumph of central banking. 259 To be able to institute a new global
capitalist discipline, the United States had to first, in Volcker's words,
"discipline [itself] ."260 This involved radically limiting the money
supply and allowing interest rates to rise to any level with any shortterm economic cost in order to break the back of inflation, the enemy of
finance capital. 261 The Federal base rate increased from 8 percent in
1978 to more than 19 percent at the beginning of 1981, and did not
return to single digits until 1984, while the inflation rate went down
from 11.3 percent in 1979 to 3.6 percent in 1987.262 An unwavering

anti-inflation agenda was to now guide the Federal Reserve's direct
manipulation of interest rates, giving the Federal Reserve, in Volcker's
words, a central "role in stabilizing expectations [that] was once a
function of the gold standard, the doctrine of the annually balanced
budget, and fixed exchange rates." 263 The Keynesian compromise and
commitment to full employment stood abandoned and displaced by
neoliberalism-the new uber-rule of global accumulation that aims to
expand markets and use market discipline to remove barriers to
accumulation that earlier democratic gains had achieved. The radical
use of monetary policy was the Federal Reserve's bid to become the
anchor of a new phase of the USD-based global economy. In the new
schema, bondholders now became the "disciplinarians of U.S. policy
makers." 264
The "induced recession" triggered by the Volcker Shock was
intended to break the inflationary spiral, and the resulting
unemployment would also break the strength of organized labor as a
means to reverse the gains working classes had secured since the New
Deal.265 It is critical to note that "monetary policy involves trade-offs
between inflation and unemployment. Bondholders worry about

259. Paul A. Volcker, 1990 Per Jacobsson Lecture: The Triumph of Central Banking? 5 (Sept.
23, 1990), availableat http://www.perjacobsson.org/lectures/1990.pdf.
260. PAUL A. VOLCKER & ToYOo GYOHTEN, CHANGING FORTUNES: THE WORLD'S MONEY
AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN LEADERSHIP 167 (1992).
261. JACK CASHILL, POPES & BANKERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CREDIT & DEBT, FROM

ARISTOTLE TO AIG 200 (2010).
262. Marvin Goodfriend, Interest Rate Policy and the Inflation Scare Problem: 1979-1992,
79 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. Q., no. 1, 1993 at 1-2, availableat http://www.richmond

fed.org/publications/research/economicquarterly/1993/winter/pdf/goodfriend.pdf;
Gindin, supra note 198, at 60.
263.

Panitch

&

PETER A. JOHNSON, THE GOVERNMENT OF MONEY: MONETARISM IN GERMANY AND

THE UNITED STATES 178 (1998) (quoting Paul Volcker).
264. The Bond Vigilantes: The Disciplinariansof U.S. Policy Makers Return, WALL ST. J.,

May 29, 2009, at Al2.
265. Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 62-63.
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inflation; workers, about jobs." 266 Along with unemployment induced
by high interest rates, the power of organized labor was broken by direct
and decisive state action. The smashing of the air traffic controllers'
strike in 1981 was termed by Volcker as "the most important single
action of the administration in helping the anti-inflation fight." 267 Alan
Greenspan called this blow to organized labor "a paradigm shift" and a
"political turning point."268 Besides winning the confidence of the
financial markets, the United States could now tell others how to
manage their economies and address their respective balance-of-class
forces. 269 This opened the door for liberalization of U.S. financial
markets, expanding their depth, increasing their liquidity, and propelling
their unprecedented globalization. High interest rates induced an inflow
of capital, U.S. government securities became an investment of choice,
and the USD again became secure as the global currency of choice. 270
The attraction of highly liquid U.S. Treasury bills induced a massive
secondary market in bonds, and allowed the United States to rely on
global financial reserves to run up deficits while expanding its global
economic reach. Volcker Shock thus "represented a convergence of
imperial and domestic responsibilities." 271
The Volcker Shock and the first round of liberalizations, however,
did not quite do the job of restoring vitality to the U.S. economy. High
interest rates resulted in the rise of interest payments as a percentage of
pre-tax profits from 13 percent between 1973 and 1979 to 26 percent
between 1982 and 1990.272 High interest rates also kept the USD
overvalued with a negative impact on exports, and leading corporations
undertook powerful lobbying campaigns demanding relief.27 3 Finally,
in order to restore the viability of the U.S. manufacturing sector, under
pressure from the United States, the G-5 countries signed the so-called
Plaza Accord on September 22, 1985, by which they agreed to take joint

266. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 142.
267. John B. Taylor, Changes in American Economic Policy in the 1980s: Watershed or
In 1980, the government
Pendulum Swing?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 777, 778 (1995).
intervened in the Chrysler bankruptcy proceedings and conditioned loans on securing UAW's
concessions about wage cuts and outsourcing. Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 64.
268. DAVID M. SMICK, THE WORLD IS CURVED: HIDDEN DANGERS TO THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 220-21 (2008).
269. For detailed analyses, see Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 63; Rude, supra note 31,
at 82-88.
270. Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 63.
271. Id. at 65.
272. BRENNER, BOOM AND BUBBLE, supranote 220, at 58.
273. C. RANDALL HENNING, CURRENCIES AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY,
AND JAPAN 276-84 (1994).
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action to reduce the exchange rate of USD "to rescue a US
manufacturing sector on its way to desolation."2 74 As intended by the
Plaza Accord, the USD "duly plunged." 275
These steps were complemented by "aggressive unilateralism." 276
For example, the so-called "voluntary export restraints" of the early
1980s, which were imposed by the United States on Japanese
automakers into the U.S. market, were followed by the threat of closing
off U.S. markets "as a bludgeon" both to limit imports and to force open
Japanese and Asian markets to U.S. exports and direct investments. 277
The Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988 (Super 301)278
extended the reach of the Trade Act of 1974.279 As a result, "actions
brought against 'unfair' trading practices . .. increased dramatically." 2 80

The Structural Impediments Initiative of 1989281 sought a further
opening of the Japanese market. 282 Brenner dates the origins of the
U.S. bubble-economy from the Plaza Accord of 1995, which he rightly
characterizes as a critical turning point for the world economy. 283 it
was this Accord and unilateral acts by the United States-not the free
market-that set off a decade-long devaluation of the USD with respect
to the yen and the mark. The result was relative stabilization of U.S.
manufacturing, a secular crisis for Japanese industry, and an
unprecedented explosion of export-based expansion of Asian
economies. 284 This was the consequence of "quasi-pegging" of Asian
274. BRENNER, BOOM AND BUBBLE, supra note 220, at 59-60.
275. FERGUSON, supranote 4, at 317.
276.

See AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD

TRADING SYSTEM 1 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1991) (providing an overview of
the concept of aggressive unilateralism).
277. BRENNER, BOOM AND BUBBLE, supra note 220, at 60; see also ROBERT GILPIN, THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 80-82,

232-36 (2002) (describing voluntary export restraints and other shifts in American trade policy in
the 1980s).
278. Omnibus Trade and Competition Act of 1988 (Super 301), Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
279. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.).
280.

MILES KAHLER, REGIONAL FUTURES AND TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS 45

(1995). After passage of the new legislation, there was an "onslaught" of pending trade cases.
PIETRO S. NIVOLA, REGULATING UNFAIR TRADE 21-25 (1993).

281. US., Japan Launch StructuralImpediments Initiative-JointStatement by George Bush
and Sosuke Uno-Transcript,DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1989, availableat http://findarticles.com/p/

articles/mi ml079/isn2150 v89/ai_8057493/.
282. For details of the considerable pressure by the United States upon Japan to liberalize its
financial markets, see FRANCES
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN ch. 3 (1989).

MCCALL

ROSENBLUTH,

283.

BRENNER, BOOM AND BUBBLE, supranote 220, at 130-34.

284.

WOLF, supra note 17, at 61, 63.
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currencies with the USD, termed by some as "Bretton Woods Two." 285
However, U.S. balance-of-payment and fiscal deficits kept expanding.
Bringing back balance-of-payment surpluses in foreign hands to help
sustain U.S. fiscal and current account deficits was now a prime agenda.
This is where neoliberal financialization of the U.S. economy entered
the scene, and furnished the grounds for the "dramatic . . . resurrection

of global finance." 286

B. Financializationand the Myth ofDeregulation
"Financialization" refers to a marked increase in the size and
significance of financial markets and institutions in the economy. 287 it
entails a "set of transformations through which relations between
capitals and between capital and wage-labour have been increasingly
financialised-that is, increasingly embedded in interest-paying
financial transactions." 288 The "Volcker Shock" and its aftermath had
restored the confidence of the financial markets. Finance capital was
now poised for accelerated accumulation on a global scale. But first, it
needed to be unshackled from the post-New Deal regulatory order.
What happened over the next two decades was not deregulation but a
redesign of regulations-a re-regulation. To appreciate this critical
point one needs to jettison the formal dichotomy between regulation and
deregulation and between the state and the market. 289 New forms of
state intervention were indispensible for finance capital to have an

285. Id. at 81-97; Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landua & Peter Garber, The Revived
Bretton Woods System, 9 INT'L J. FIN. & ECON. 307, 312 (2004).
286. Banjamin J. Cohen, Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance, 48 WORLD

POL. 268, 268 (1996).
287. See generally DUMtNIL & LEVY, supra note 258, at 110-18 (discussing financialization);
FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2005) (presenting essays

on the effect of financialization on the U.S. economy and the international monetary system);
JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER & FRED MAGDOFF, THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES AND

CONSEQUENCES 77-109 (2009) (discussing the financialization of capitalism and its effects);
Hengyi Feng et al., A New Business Model? The CapitalMarket and the New Economy, 30 ECON.

& SOC'Y 467 (2001) (analyzing the relationship between the U.S. capital market and corporate
business); Paul M. Sweezy, The Triumph of Financial Capital, 46 MONTHLY REv. 1 (1994)

(discussing capital on a global scale).
288. McNally, From FinancialCrisis,supra note 230, at 56 (emphasis omitted).
289. In this context, it is also critical to note that the state and the economy are not unified
entities. A state does not necessarily represent the interests of all who inhabit its territorial
bounds. All societies are stratified, with different groups having different measures of
representation and influence over state-policy, and the impact of state-policy falls differently on
different groups. Similarly, different groups within a society participate in the economy from
different positions. For example, capital and labor, or producers and consumers, or borrowers
and lenders, participate in the same economy but from different positions and with different
interests.

2011]

Is it Greek or d6jA vu all over again?

669

expanded and deepened field of operations. 290 The question was not
deregulation but the shape regulations would take. The market was not
left to its own devices. 291 Instead, elaborate new regulations were
redesigned to pave the way for the ascendency of finance capital, and
"[t]hrough innovation and invention of financial and regulatory
technologies, U.S. actors established the agenda and boundaries of
changes in other markets." 292
The neoliberal counterrevolution entailed an extensive redesigning of
the regulatory regimes related to finance. 293 Regulatory regimes born
of the New Deal and the Keynesian consensus were set aside or
drastically modified, and a host of new regulations were fashioned and
entrenched to achieve hegemony of finance capital.294 After a
generation of the so-called deregulation, however, the United States has
a regulatory regime with over 100 authorities responsible for overseeing

290. In debates about financial globalization, neoclassical economists typically assert that
"technological nonpolicy factors were so powerful ... that they would have caused a progressive
internationalization of financial activity even without changes in government separation fences."
RALPH C. BRYANT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 69 (1987).

While capital

mobility was certainly facilitated by advances in communication and information technologies
and innovations in financial instruments, "contemporary open global financial order could never
have emerged without the support and blessing of states." HELLEINER, supra note 211, at vii.
For a detailed analysis of the relationship between global markets and state policies, see generally
ANDREW C. SOBEL, DOMESTIC CHOICES, INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: DISMANTLING NATIONAL

BARRIERS AND LIBERALIZING SECURITIES MARKETS (1994). The decisions that the states made

in this regard were "solidly rooted in domestic policy dilemmas and distributional debates." Id. at
19. Indeed, financial globalization was "politically engineered ... [and] a reassertion by the state
of an underlying disposition towards financial interests." Ron Martin, Stateless Monies, Global
FinancialIntegration and National Economic Autonomy: The End of Geography?, in MONEY,
POWER AND SPACE 271 (Stuart Corbridge et al. eds., 1994).

291. In 2005, it was rightly observed:
It is tempting ... to conceive of the changes in the global financial system since the
early 1970s as 'deregulation[,]'[] the withdrawal of the state . . . [but this view] cannot
survive serious study of the regulation of financial markets. The modem American
financial markets are almost certainly the most highly regulated markets in history, if
regulation is measured by volume (number of pages) of rules, probably also if
measured by extent of surveillance, and possibly even by vigor of enforcement.
Donald MacKenzie, Opening the Black Boxes of Global Finance, 12 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 555,

569 (2005). Note that Friedrick Hayek, the godfather of neoliberalism, recognized the
indispensability of the state for "free" markets. He took the view that "nothing has done so much
harm to the [market advocate's] cause as the wooden insistence . . . on certain rough rules of
thumb, above all of the principle of laissez-faire [capitalism]." FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD
TO SERFDOM 17 (1944).

292.

SOBEL, supranote 290, at 151.

293. For a detailed analysis of financialization of the U.S. economy, see Greta R. Krippner,
The Financializationof the American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 173 (2005).
294. See Martijn Konings, Neoliberalism and Rethinking the Crisis: Beyond the Re-regulation
Agenda, in THE GREAT CREDIT CRASH 3 (Martijn Konings ed., 2010).
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different and overlapping segments of the financial market.2 95 In 2000,
scholars noted that "[t]he financial system is among the most heavily
regulated sectors of the American economy." 296
The only unifying coherence to this regulatory regime was furnished
by the overarching neoclassical ideology augmented by the "efficient
market hypothesis" that saw all markets as efficient and self-adjusting,
which left to their own, would produce efficiency, innovation, supply
and demand equilibrium, and stability. 2 9 7 This theory, which assumes
that market prices are always right and unemployment is voluntary
leisure, "became the intellectual justification for financial
deregulation." 298 The elaborate legislative interventions of the last
generation changed the very nature of financial institutions beyond
acquiring savings and providing credit. Far beyond its classic role of

295. Joanna Chung, Multi-LayeredPatchwork Will Be Tough to Unpick, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2008, at 13.
296. F. S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING & FINANCIAL MARKETS 46 (9th
ed. 2009).
297. For detailed expositions of the rational market hypothesis, see generally CASSIDY, supra
note 32, at 97-107; JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK,
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); Wade, supra note 20, at 34. For an
insightful analysis of the efficient market hypothesis, and the underlying neoclassical economic
theory, see ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 29-51 (2009). One
scholar notes that "an ideological backlash against state economic interventionism" played a key
part in this reordering of the markets. Philip G. Cerny, The Deregulation and Re-regulation of
FinancialMarkets in a More Open World, in FINANCE AND WORLD POLITICS 51 (Philip G.
Cerny ed., 1993). Another notes the critical role of "widely shared ideological commitments" and
"mindsets." David M. Andrews, Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural
Theory ofInternationalMonetary Relations, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 193, 200-01 (1994).
One should emphasize the global dimension of this phenomenon because of "international
patterns of elite interaction .. . [which] are explicitly concerned to foster . . . a shared outlook

among the international establishments of the major capitalist countries." Stephen R. Gill &
David Law, Global Hegemony and the StructuralPower of Capital,33 INT'L STUD. Q. 475, 483
(1989). The efficient market hypothesis triggered a worldview that saw all human behavior as
being uniformly dictated by an impulse to maximize gains and all facets of life operating in a
competitive market of some sort. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976). For critical evaluations, see DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); Alexander Rosenberg, Review
Symposium: Can Economic Theory Explain Everything?, 9 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 509 (1979).
298. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 68-69. The foundational flaw of neoclassical
economic theory is that "[1]eaving history and its uncertain movement out of the analysis imparts
a false sense of determinacy and predictability to the economic process." Wallace C. Peterson,
Institutionalism,Keynes, and the Real World, 11 J. ECON. ISSUES 201, 213-14 (1977). Because
neoclassical theory assumes that time and institutions do not matter, it remains an inappropriate
tool for analyzing and prescribing real-world policies. For a detailed analysis, see Douglas C.
North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359 (1994). In light of the
2007-2009 financial meltdown, it has been suggested that "September 15, 2008, the date that
Lehman Brothers collapsed, may be to market fundamentalism. . . what the fall of the Berlin wall
was to communism." STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 219.
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credit provision, finance was now positioned "directly at the heart of the
accumulation process, essentially introducing a new sector that
straddled credit and production." 299
A large ensemble of legislation enabled neoliberal restructuring of
financial markets. The critical legislative components were the
following: the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, which eliminated interest rate caps; 30 0 the addition
of the 401K provision to the tax code in 1980, which channeled incomes
into private pension plans; 30 1 the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, which lifted restrictions on the savings and
loan industry to enter commercial lending and corporate bonds and also
allowed inter-state mergers between banks; 302 the Secondary Mortgage
Market Enhancement Act of 1984, which permitted investment banks to
buy, pool, and resell mortgages in slices with varying levels of risk; 303
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which created the Real Estate Mortgage
Investment Conduit, making mortgage-backed securities more
attractive; 304 the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enhancement Act of 1989, which rearranged the government-sponsored
entity landscape; 305 the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994, which allowed banks to operate across state
lines; 306 the Community Reinvestment Act, which directed financial
institutions to expand their market base; 307 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (Financial Services Modernization Act) of 1999,308 which repealed
299. Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 3.
300. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-

221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
301. I.R.C. § 401(k) of 1978 (effective Jan. 1, 1980). For the impact of this tax provision, see
ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING 24-25
(2004).
302. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
303. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat.
1689 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
304. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
305. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enhancement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.

101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
306. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
307. Community Re-Investment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901, implemented by 12 C.F.R. §§ 25, 228,

345, 563(e)). While free-market enthusiasts often cite this legislation as the primary cause of the
mortgage meltdown, default rates on Community Re-Investment Act ("CRA") lending are
comparable to other areas of lending. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 10.
308. Gramm-Leach-Bliley (Financial Services Modernization) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6809 (2006).
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the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933;309 the Commodities Futures
Modemization Act of 2000, which left derivatives out of regulatory
oversight; 310 and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, which made it difficult for consumers to seek
the protections of bankruptcy. 3 1 1
The courts and regulatory agencies played a supportive role in the
interpretation and enforcement of these provisions. In 1986, the courts
upheld the Federal Reserve's ruling that commercial banks' placing
commercial paper issued by corporations with investors did not violate
Glass-Steagall. 312 A November 2001 rule jointly adopted by the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve tied
bank capital requirement in securitization to the ability of banks to get
rating agencies to approve the investment. 3 13 On April 28, 2004, the
SEC agreed to allow large investment banks to use their own "risk
management practices for regulatory purposes." 314 This decision
facilitated investment banks to increase their leverage forty to one. 3 15
The basic principle behind oligarchies-that economic power yields
political power-translated well in the course of neoliberal regulatory
design for financial capital, a design which substantiated that "as a rule,
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit." 316
309. Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (repealed 1999).
310. Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
311. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
312. Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052, 1069-70 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
313. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,614 (Nov. 29, 2001) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 3, 208, 225, 325, 587); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 138-39.

314. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 69 Fed. Reg. 34,428 (June 21,
2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 240). For the impact of this provision on financial
markets, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 140; Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let
Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al.
315. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 163.

316. George J.Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3,
3 (1971). A century ago, Louis Brandeis argued that the "dominant element in our financial
oligarchy is the investment banker." BRANDEIS, supra note 196, at 4. Barney Frank, Chairman
of the House Financial Services Committee, has taken the position that financial institutions and
instruments have taken "a large chunk of the economy hostage. And we have to pay ransom, like
it or not." ANDREw ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS-AND THEMSELVES

38 (2009). Hacker and Pierson take the position that besides the neoliberal legislations, it was
inaction by the U.S. government that facilitated ascendency of wealth-owning classes and
emergence of "winner-take-all-politics." They term such inaction "drift," which they define as
the passive aggressive form of politics, the No Deal rather that the New Deal. Yet it is

2011]

Is it Greek or d6jA vu all over again?

673

One area that was significantly left out of regulatory oversight was
derivatives, which would play havoc down the road. 3 17 This considered
exclusion resulted from a desire to accelerate both the hegemony of
finance capital and the imperial role of the United States. In November
1999, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets concluded
that "to allow the United States to maintain leadership in these rapidly
developing markets .. . the trading of financial derivatives .. . should be
excluded from the [Commodities Exchange Act]." 318 Greenspan found
regulation of derivatives "wholly unnecessary." 319 Larry Summers, the
Secretary of Treasury in 1999-2001, said that one of his great
achievements was ensuring that derivatives remained unregulated. 320
When the finance capital was able to beat back attempts to regulate
derivatives and restrict predatory lending, its "victory over America was
total." 32 1
Besides the changes in U.S. regulatory regimes, the neoliberal
financial reordering was also facilitated by changes in banking rules of

not the same as simple inaction. Rather, drift has two stages. First, large economic and
social transformations outflank or erode existing politics, diminishing their role in
American life. Then, political leaders fail to update policies, even when there are viable
options, because they face pressure from powerful interests exploiting opportunities for
political obstruction.
JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WASHINGTON MADE
THE RICH RICHER-AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 53 (2010).

317. With the end of USD's convertibility, and the move from fixed to floating rates, the
measure-of-value property of money was rendered highly unstable. With this increased
uncertainty, risk-assessment and risk-hedging became critical for capital that moves through
multiple fluctuating currencies. The market for derivatives, instruments designed to hedge risk,
exploded in this context, Because one did not have to have a stake in the underlying security to
buy a derivative, they quickly became instruments of speculation rather than risk-management.
Besides Credit Default Swaps, derivatives mushroomed as speculative bets on the movements of
currencies, interest rates, bonds, and stocks. The modern "derivatives revolution" began with the
1981 invention of the interest rate swap by Solomon Brothers, and by 2008 had grown to USD
350 trillion in face value and USD 8 trillion in gross market value. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 16, at 79-80. As a preview of bigger things to come on the global stage, the game of
"frantically rebundling the risks and stuffing them down the throats of any investor we could
find" found a public entity victim in Orange County that lost USD 2 billion in 1994 in deals that
yielded Merrill Lynch USD 100 million in fees. Id. at 81; see also FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS
GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 117 (2004) (placing

Orange County's bankruptcy within the larger context of the spread of complex and little
understood financial instruments).
318.

PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES

MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 1(1999), available at http://www.treasury.gov/

resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/otcact.pdf.
319.

JOHNSON &KWAK, supra note 16, at 8.

320. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 46.
321. Id. at 10.
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the Bank for International Settlements 322 and increased encroachment
on economic sovereignty of states through an over-extension of U.S.
law and jurisdiction. 32 3 Global operations of American investment
322. The 1988 Basel Capital Accord, designed in the aftermath of the Latin American debt
crisis of the early 1980s, required all banks to maintain capital reserve funds of 8 percent of riskadjusted assets. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE

OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 13 (1998), available at http://www.bis

.org/publ/bcbsc11.pdf. In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Federal Reserve sought replacement of
regulation by a supervisory regime that replaced capital requirements with review of banks'
internal risk management procedures. Eric Newstadt, Neoliberalism and the FederalReserve, in
AMERICAN EMPIRE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL FINANCE 107 (Leo Panitch &

Martijn Konings eds., 2009). Under the 1996 amended Capital Accord, capital reserves of 8
percent against both credit and market risks were required. However, banks could use their own
internal risk models for measuring their market risk. This created a two-tier system of banks.
The global conglomerates that had resources to set up internal risk-measurement and riskmanagement systems determined their own capital requirements. The smaller banks had their
market risk determined by the "standard measurement method" specified in the amendment.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW OF THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 3-

7 (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3ov.pdf. The risk-based capital requirement
forces banks to cut back lending during a financial crisis as the value of equity, the largest part of
a bank's capital, falls. Therefore, capital requirements become more burdensome during a
financial crisis and banks cut back issuing credit. The credit squeeze in a depressed market
exacerbates the downward pressure on the market. In effect, then, the Basel standards end up
with "a global banking and financial system that in stabilizing itself, destabilizes the underlying
macroeconomy." Rude, supra note 31, at 93; see also ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 29, at 203-

09 (critiquing the Basel regulatory regime and its capital requirement structure).
323.

See B. S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the

Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2004) (suggesting that myriad international institutions
undermine democratic processes, especially in the Third World). The exponential rise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in unilateral and multilateral forms has become an avenue to govern matters
beyond international territorial boundaries by reaching deeply inside the domestic jurisdiction of
states and enforcing the neoliberal agenda upon reluctant states in the global South. The United
States, for example, increasingly uses certification mechanisms "to create laws for other States
and to monitor its observance, while the United States itself remains unbound and unmonitored."
Nico Kirsch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in
InternationalLaw, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL

These factors combine with
LAW 161 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
"substantivism" in U.S. courts, which is "a choice-of-law methodology whose goal is to select the
better law in any given case." Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From
Sovereignty to Substance, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 957 (2002). This results in "over-application of

US law" in international disputes, and acts "as a lever forcing convergence . . . outside the
political process that generally structures the harmonization movement." Id. at 966, 972; see also
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 475-77 (2000)

(showing how this "harmonization" has impacted the fields of banking, securities regulation, civil
aviation, cyber law, etc.). The multilateral form is exemplified by the WTO's compulsory
jurisdiction over disputes that lie within its extensive regimes, which opens the door for unilateral
prescriptions and measures related to trade and environmental policies of states in the global
South. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp

and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001) (pertaining to an appeal by Malaysia
over a U.S. import prohibition to protect a species of sea turtles); see also B. S. Chimni, India and
the Ongoing Review of WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Perspective, 34 ECO. & POL. WKLY.

264, 265 (1999) (advocating for a WTO dispute settlement system that gives greater deference to
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banks played a role in transforming not only financial markets, but also
business practices in Europe and East Asia. 324 As a result, a truly
global financial system, "based on the deregulation and
internationalization of the US financial system, is neither a myth nor
even an alarming tendency, but a reality." 325 These redesigned rules of
the game substantiated neoliberalism as the hegemonic global economic
order.
With the neoliberal counterrevolution underway, equity markets in
the United States began to rise, propelled by inflows of funds from
newly privatized pension schemes. Big companies increasingly started
to rely on equity markets for finance. 326 In response, commercial banks
pushed lending into more marginal markets and developed new
financial instruments and fee-and-commission activities. 327 The banks
expanded the scope of the market by hunting out economically marginal
groups for mortgage and consumer credit. In this process,
"[e]conomically marginal people constituted, in effect, a 'developing
country' within the United States, and the banks' strategy was parallel

to the way they recycled petrodollars from oil exporters to developing
countries, especially Latin America, in the 1970s."328 Lifting New Deal
banking restrictions, along with the implementation of the 1988 Basel
standards for bank capital adequacy, accelerated reliance upon fees and
commissions and propriety trading of financial assets. 3 2 9 This
national sovereignty); B. S. Chimni, WTO and Environment: Legitimisation of UnilateralTrade

Sanctions, 37 ECO. & POL. WKLY. 133, 137 (2002) (questioning whether the WTO's dispute
resolution system is being used to advantage wealthier states). Increasingly, courts of the global
South are deemed unsuitable for adjudicating claims against multinational corporations, thus
creating "new national frontiers of responsibility for the conduct of global capital." Upendra
Baxi, Mass Torts, MultinationalEnterpriseLiability and PrivateInternationalLaw, 276 RECUEIL

DES COURS 297, 312 (1999).

For detailed analyses, see Michael Anderson, Transnational

Corporations and EnvironmentalDamage: Is Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399,
402 (2002); H. Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 NETH. INT'L L.
REV. 143, 159-60 (2001).
324. See ROY C. SMITH, THE GLOBAL BANKERS 45-47 (1989) (describing the exportation of
American investment banking practices during the 1980s).
325. John Grahl, Globalized Finance: The Challenge to the Euro, 8 NEW LEFT REV. 23, 44

(2001).

For detailed analyses of Americanization of global finance, see Robert Wade,

Globalization as the Institutionalization of Neoliberalism: Commodification, Financialization,
and the Anchorless Economy, in INSTITUTIONS AND MARKET ECONOMIES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 250-77 (W. Garside ed., 2007).
326. Wade, supra note 20, at 30.
327. For practices of banks during this period, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 57119 (describing the post-1980s proliferation of complex financial instruments); STIGLITZ, supra
note 22, at 77-108.
328. Wade, supra note 20, at 31 (emphasis added).

329. For detailed analyses of speculative operations of finance capital, see PHILIP AUGAR,
THE GREED MERCHANTS: HOW THE INVESTMENT BANKS PLAYED THE FREE MARKET GAME
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originate-and-distribute model rested on creating complex financial
products and selling them quickly to investors and speculators around
the world. 330 In this process, credit rating agencies played a crucial and
supportive role. 33 1 The model grew exponentially after the mid-1990s,
as bundling and securitization of debt became ubiquitous. The
complexity of the financial products helped conceal the risks from
buyers, rating agencies, and regulators. 332
The widening gap between the rich and the poor gave further impetus
to financialization. In the United States, for example, between 1973 and
2002, average real incomes of the bottom 90% fell by 9%, while
incomes for the top 1%increased by 101%, and those of the top 0.1%
rose 227%.333 While in 1991, the wealthiest 1% of Americans owned
38.7% of corporate assets, by 2003 their share rose to 57.5%.334 While
the wealthy continuously needed ever newer financial instruments to
invest in, the working poor turned to credit markets, particularly
mortgages and credit cards, to sustain their living standards. In the
loose monetary environments after 1997 and 2001, financial institutions
(2006); NASSER SABER, SPECULATIVE CAPITAL: THE INVISIBLE HAND OF GLOBAL FINANCE
(1999).
330. Anastasia Nesvetailova & Ronen Palan, A Very North Atlantic Credit Crunch:
Geopolitical Implications of the Global Liquidity Crisis, 62 J. INT'L AFF. 165, 170-71 (2008).
The originate-and-distribute model entailed no incentive for banks to evaluate borrowers, as the
risk would be borne by the final buyer. The originate-and-distribute model distanced lenders
from the consequences of their lending decisions, thus injecting moral hazard into the heart of the
financial system. For detailed discussion of the originate-and-distribute model, see JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 16, at 60-87; STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 6-17.
331. For detailed analysis of the role of rating agencies, see TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW
MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF
CREDITWORTHINESS 17 (2008). In the process of "financialization," the role of rating agencies
became critical as their stamp of approval over new financial instruments as investment-grade
became the only signal of due diligence. Rating agencies, however, were marred by conflicts of
interest. Id. at 151. They depended on fees by referring parties and thus risked losing business
by not obliging any and all seekers with their endorsement. In addition, the rating agencies had a
parallel business of advising how to structure financial products. Id. at 152. The hope that the
products on which they advised would later come before them for rating gave them a double
stream of revenue and incentives to overrate. The law leant a helping hand. Under U.S.
securities law, rating agencies are entitled to take the information provided by a seller of a
financial product more or less at face value without any legally binding obligation to do their own
due diligence about the risks of the product. See Wade, supra note 20, at 32 (concluding that the
ratings agencies had no legal obligation to assess the information provided to them by the
manufacturers of mortgage-backed securities); see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at
139-40 (describing investment banks' methods of rigging their financial models to get high
ratings on their mortgage tranches); STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 92-94 (criticizing the incentive
structure of the ratings agencies and its effect on financial institutions).
332. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 16, at 74-87 (detailing the ways in which modern
financial innovations obscured the line between commercial and investment banking).
333. McNally, From FinancialCrisis,supra note 230, at 60.
334. Id.
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were able to link both these demands-providing relatively cheap credit
and then bundling and securitizing this debt to market to investors
around the world. Loosened regulatory regimes allowed the financial
sector to leverage and increase its own debt exponentially. Between
1980 and 2007, while U.S. consumer debt relative to GDP doubled, the
financial sector debt more than quintupled.335 Demand for the complex
financial products did not naturally flow from their supply; instead, it
had "to be created, and liquidity relied critically on demand being
whipped up." 336 The financial markets relied on the Federal Reserve to
keep the system awash with liquidity to sustain the credit-driven
"financialization." Particularly in response to the "dot.com" crash of
the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates and kept
them low incessantly, creating liquidity and a credit-fueled boom. 337
The "supply of asset-backed securities doubled between 2003 and 2004,
and doubled again between 2004 and 2005."338 With financialization of
the U.S. economy facilitated by new legal regimes, the neoliberal
counterrevolution stood entrenched. The economic impact on returns of
capital, income, and wealth distribution were quick and in tune with the
neoliberal agenda.
C. ScorecardofNeoliberalRe-regulation

The scorecard of the neoliberal counterrevolution shows spectacular
gains for finance capital at the expense of the larger economy and the
working classes. 339 The record of neoliberalism in stimulating
335. Id. at 61. Between 2002 and 2006, the total amount of debt outstanding in the United
States went from USD 31.84 trillion to USD 45.32 trillion, an increase of 42.3 percent. CASSIDY,
supra note 32, at 223-24 fig.17.1.
336. Nesvetailova & Palan, supra note 330, at 166.
337. From a peak of 6.5 percent in 2000, the federal funds rate was cut to 1.25 percent in
November 2002.

CASSIDY, supra note 32, at 221; see also McNally, From FinancialCrisis,

supra note 230, at 61 (suggesting that the lower interest rates facilitated the explosion of credit,
particularly for the working class). This, in turn, propelled "artificial liquidity," "liquidity black
holes," "liquidity illusion," and "ponzi finance," the ubiquitous characterizations of the financial
boom that rested substantially on derivatives based on bundled and securitized sub-prime
mortgages. See Nesvetailova & Palan, supra note 330, at 168 (detailing the rapidity in which
complex mortgage-backed securities became illiquid). Liquidity can and does evaporate
overnight. Assets are easy to sell when market participants share a sense of optimism about their
safety and profitability. When the sense of optimism evaporates, so does liquidity, leaving
behind unwanted burdens of illiquid debt. For detailed analyses of crisis-prone nature of
financial markets, see HYMAN P. MINSKY, CAN "IT" HAPPEN AGAIN? (1982); ANASTASIA
NESVETAILOVA, FRAGILE FINANCE: DEBT, SPECULATION AND CRISIS IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL

CREDIT (2007); Hyman P. Minsky, A Theory of Systemic Fragility, in FINANCIAL CRISES:
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN A FRAGILE ENVIRONMENT (Edward I. Altman & Arnold W.

Sametz eds., 1977).
338. Wade, supra note 20, at 35.
339. See HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 316, at 14 (describing the unequal distribution of
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economic growth remained dismal even before the 2007-2009 financial
meltdown. Annual growth rates in the quarter century after 1973, while
higher than an earlier period of global capitalism from 1820 to 1945,
were below those achieved in the so-called post-war "golden age." 340
While aggregate growth rates were about 3.5% in the 1960s and 1970s,
they were only 1.4% in the 1980s, 1.1% in the 1990s, and below 1%
after 2000.341 Income inequality increased in more than three-quarters
of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") countries between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s. 342 As the
share of labor income shrank, the phenomenal expansion of the
financial sector and its profits helped the share of business income in
the OECD countries to rise from 28% in 1980 to 36% in 2003.343
While in 1982, financial corporations generated 8% of total U.S.
corporate value added and 5% of total corporate profits, by 2007 their
share of corporate value added rose to 16%, and their share of corporate
profits went up eight times to 41%.344 By 2006, the profits per
employee in banking were twenty-six times higher than the average in
all other industries worldwide. 345 The share of national income by the
top 1%of earners in the United States had fallen from a pre-World War
II high of 16% to less than 8% by 1978. The neoliberal turn helped
reverse the trend, and by 2000, this share climbed back to 15%. The top
0.1% of income earners increased their share of the national income
from 2% in 1978 to 6% by 1999. The ratio of median compensation of
workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from 30 to I in 1970 to more
than 400 to 1 in 2000.346 The average hours worked by the average
employed American rose by the equivalent of an extra month's work

wealth in the United States since the 1970s); Tony Cutler & Barbara Waine, Social Insecurityand
the Retreat from Social Democracy: Occupational Welfare in the Long Boom and
Financialization,8 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 96, 102 (2001) (pointing to financialization as

contributing to the curtailment of social welfare systems in the United States and United
Kingdom).
340.

ANGUS MADDISON, THE WORLD ECONOMY, A MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVE 265 (2001).

341.

Harvey, supra note 49, at 33.

342.

OECD, GROWING UNEQUAL?

INCOME DISTRIBUTION

AND POVERTY IN OECD

COUNTRIES 25-34 (2008).
343.

See Robert Hunter Wade, Globalization, Growth, Poverty, Inequality, Resentment, and

Imperialism, in GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 373 (John Ravenhill ed., 2d ed. 2008) (examining
the consequences of economic globalization); WOLF, supra note 17, at 64 (discussing the shift of
income from labor to capital in the context of a global savings glut).
344. Wade, supranote 20, at 33.
345. Id
346. Harvey, supra note 49, at 28; see also TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM.
DEMOCRACY, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY INAN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY 3 (2004) (charting the

growth of inequality in the United States as compared to in Britain and France).
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per year. 347 The household debt and the corresponding debt servicing
burden grew exponentially.3 48 The debt held by the U.S. financial
sector grew from USD 2.9 trillion, or 125% of GDP in 1978, to over
USD 36 trillion, or 259% of GDP in 2007.349 Between 1980 and 2000,
assets held by commercial banks and securities firms grew from 55% of
GDP to 95%.350 Financial sector profits grew from 13% of all domestic
corporate profits from 1978 to 1987, to 30% from 1998 to 2007.351 By
2004, the proportion of corporate profits in the United States going to
finance doubled to over 28%, and the share going to the broader
financial sector, combining finance, real estate, and insurance, doubled
to nearly 50%.352
Perhaps the most important structural change triggered by neoliberal
re-regulation was the emergence of a "shadow banking system"-a
collection of institutions, instruments, and processes that looked and
acted like banks, but remained unregulated and unsecured.3 5 3 By 2007,
"shadow banking" accounted for about 60 percent of the U.S. banking
system. 354 During the Great Recession in 2007, these "shadow banking
beasts born of regulatory evasion . .. [were] at the heart of what would

become the mother of all bank runs."355 It is the subsequent rescue of
the financial sector on the backs of the taxpayers that has amounted to
one of the largest redistributions of wealth in history. 356
The new architecture of global finance did achieve another primary
goal of the neoliberal counterrevolution: it helped to embed the imperial
role of the United States into global financial flows. In particular, the
global expansion of financial markets made it possible for global
347, See JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN 23 tbl.2.3 (1991) (calculating the
increasing amount of labor done by workers in the United States).
348. For the growth of U.S. household debt from 1980 to 2006, see WOLF, supra note 17, at
107 fig.4.31.
349. JOHNSON & KWAK, supranote 16, at 59.
350. Id. at 85.
351. Id.
352. David Leonhardt, Bubblenomics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at WKl; see also
DUMiNIL & LEvY, supra note 258 (discussing the growth of the financial sector under
neoliberalism); Greta R. Krippner, The Financializationof the American Economy, 3 SOCIOECON. REV. 173, 179 (2005) (charting the increase in the profits of the financial sector).
353. ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 29, at 8, 76-80.
354. Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Slump Goes On: Why?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 30,
2010, at 59, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/sep/30/slump-goeswhy/.
355. ROUBINI & MIHM, supranote 29, at 35, 80.
356. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 200. For details of the mechanisms and costs of the rescue,
see ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 29, at 135-57, 165-81; STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 37-52,
109-46.
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savings to flow into the United States at an unprecedented scale. 357
These capital flows are rightly seen as "an imperial tithe the U.S.
imposes on other countries." 358 It is because of the dominant imperial
role of the United States in global finance that balance-of-payment
deficits appear not to have the same implications for the United States
as they do for other states. 35 9 As early as 1971, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston pointed out that "this asymmetry appears to be
appropriate,for it corresponds to an asymmetry in the real world."3 60

In tune with this position, Paul O'Neill, U.S. Treasury Secretary, argued
that, for the United States, the current account deficit was a
"meaningless concept." 36 1 Alan Greenspan placed "the U.S. current
account [deficit] far down the list" of imbalances to worry about.362
This is where an overwhelming non-market force came into play, i.e.,
U.S. imperial domination, which ensured that foreign exchange
surpluses from around the world, particularly from Asia, would fund
escalating U.S. fiscal and current account deficits. 363 In light of this
factor, the theory that exchange rates adjust in response to external
imbalances became inoperative for the United States. 364 Global savings
supported the USD, while the ability to borrow in a currency that it
issues meant that U.S. monetary and fiscal policy "suffer[ed] from no
external constraints[,] . . . not so much a free lunch as an apparently

ongoing free banquet."365 The United States, as the imperial hegemon,
now also became "the superpower of global borrowing," 366 and global
357. For comparative global current accounts in 2006, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 78
fig.4.14.
358. Panitch & Gindin, supra note 198, at 69 (emphasis added).
359. For U.S. current accounts from 1970 to 2006, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 62 fig.4.3
(documenting the decline of U.S. current accounts as a percentage of GDP since 1970).
360.

MICHAEL HUDSON, SUPER IMPERIALISM: THE ORIGINS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S.

WORLD DOMINANCE 327 (2003) (emphasis added). Kindleberger was also of the view that
transactions underlying the deficit were largely a "trade in liquidity, which is profitable to both
sides," rather than a trade deficit or over-investment abroad as was commonly understood.
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL MONEY: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 43 (1981).

361.

The O'Neill Doctrine, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2002, at 12.

362.

ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE: ADVENTURES IN A NEW WORLD 347

(2007).
363. See WOLF, supra note 17, at 98-114 (detailing the multifarious factors underlying the
global savings glut and its effect on U.S. consumption and growth).
364. For change in value of foreign currencies against the USD between 2002 and 2007, see
id. at 96 fig.4.26. The patterns of global capital flows substantiate this development. Between
1996 and 2006, countries with the biggest external deficits experienced appreciation of effective
exchange rates, while countries with the biggest surpluses tended to experience depreciation.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., Trade and Development
Report 16 tbl.1.6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR (2007).
365. WOLF, supra note 17, at 100, 112.
366. Id at 4.
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savings financed "American credit card imperialism."367 The imperial

non-market aspect of this phenomenon is evidenced by the fact that
while nonresidents hold about half of outstanding U.S. Treasury bills
and bonds, two-thirds of these are held by central banks and sovereign
wealth funds. 368
The net effect of global neoliberal financial flows is the transfer of
capital from high-savings to low-savings countries. 369 This has
translated into flows from less developed countries with high savings,
particularly in Asia, to the industrialized economies, particularly the
United States. 370 The United States requires access to foreign capital,
as its household savings rate is the lowest among industrialized
economies. 371 The United States' hardline in favor of unfettered capital
mobility reflected its strategic interest in tapping foreign savings pools,
particularly those in Asia. As the United States turned from a net
creditor to a net debtor in 1985, increased liberalization of global
finance enhanced its ability to sell its debt globally. 372 In the absence of
the gold standard, U.S. Treasury bills have come to stand for the
world's monetary reserve. Today, the U.S. Treasury market is the
largest, deepest, and most liquid financial market in the world with USD
4.84 trillion in securities, and about USD 531 billion in transactions
daily. 373 The resulting inflow of capital keeps the USD strong, which
allows American consumers to import goods cheaply.
367.

ISTVAN MESZAROS, THE STRUCTURAL CRISIS OF CAPITAL 48 (2010) (emphasis added);

see also John Bellamy Foster, Hannah Holleman & Robert W. McChesney, The US. Imperial
Triangle and Military Spending, 60 MONTHLY REV., no. 5, 2008 at 1, 14-15 (discussing U.S.

militarism as a method to retain and expand U.S. hegemony, and to combat periods of economic
stagnation).
368.

ROUBINI & MIHM, supranote 29, at 251.

369. For savings, investment, and current account balances of high-income, emerging market,
and oil exporting countries, see WOLF, supranote 17, at 66 fig.4.5, 67 fig.4.6.
370. For current account balances of developing economies, see id. at 38 fig.3.2.
371. Robert Wade, The Coming Fight over Capital Controls, 113 FOREIGN POL'Y 41, 45
(1998); see also Robert Wade & Frank Veneroso, The Gathering World Slump and the Battle

over Capital Controls, 231 NEw LEFT REV. 13, 42 (1998) (noting the relationship between
savings of Asian economies and deficits of the U.S. economy).
372. See Matthias Thiemann, American Hegemony and the Ascendance ofDirect Finance, 62
J. INT'L AFF. 244, 244-45 (2008) (reviewing SEABROOKE, supra note 217) (noting the

relationship between flexible exchange rates and increased use of dollar-denominated assets to
balance foreign currency fluctuations); see also SEABROOKE, supra note 217, at 111 (discussing
how the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act and the International
Banking Act allowed U.S. banks to hold foreign capital without interest rate ceilings or adequate
reserve requirements).
373. Martijn Konings, American Finance and Empire in HistoricalPerspective, in AMERICAN
EMPIRE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL FINANCE 72 (Leo Pantich & Martijn

Konings eds., 2008). In light of the 2007-2009 financial meltdown and the continuing
vulnerabilities of the U.S. economy, there is the possibility that "US treasuries are a safe haven
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The escalating U.S. current account deficit and credit-driven
consumer spending allowed the U.S. economy to function as "the
'Keynesian engine' of the global economy." 374 As the U.S. economy
became "the consumer of last resort," by 2000, U.S. imports accounted
for one-fifth of world exports and 4 percent of world GDP.3 7 5 This
could be supported only at the cost of a USD 857 billion current account
deficit by 2006.376 While no other country could have sustained such
deficits, foreign capital kept pouring into the U.S. economy. 377 It was
only in 2002, as overcapacity weighed down profit rates and the U.S.
economy started to show signs of vulnerability, that private investors
started to move out of USD-based investments. 378 Private capital flows
into the United States turned abruptly negative in the third quarter of
2007, with an annualized outflow of USD 234 billion, while the
previous quarter had an inflow of USD 823 billion. 379 What saved the
USD at this juncture was, again, the non-market force of imperial
domination-continued investment by central banks in East Asia and
oil-producing Middle-Eastern states, induced by considerable prodding
from U.S. political authorities. 3 80
Today, China is, in effect, the banker of the United States. 381 In
2006, China's increase of foreign exchange holdings almost matched
the net issuance of U.S. Treasury and government bonds. 382 The two
countries are now locked in a "balance of financial terror."383 Centuries
the way Pearl Harbor was a safe haven in 1941." Ferguson, supra note 26, at 11.
374. McNally, FromFinancialCrisis,supra note 230, at 63.
375. Id.
376. Id
377. For global surplus savers and the United States as a borrower between 1995 and 2006,
see WOLF, supra note 17, at 121 fig.5.3.
378. ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE 237 (2006).
379.

GRAHAM TURNER, THE CREDIT CRUNCH: HOUSING BUBBLES, GLOBALIZATION AND

THE WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC CRISIS 90-91 (2008).
380. McNally, From FinancialCrisis, supra note 230, at 65. For global current account
balances between 1997 and 2007, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 79 fig.4.15. For financing of the
U.S. current account, see id. at 123 fig.5.4.
381. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 335. In 2008, when Bank of China cut its exposure to U.S.
Treasury bills, Treasury Secretary Paulson "found himself with a fait accompli. The federal
government had to give reassurances to foreign investors in agency debt if it wanted to avoid
chaos in financial markets and a run on the dollar." John Grapper, A US Government Bail-out of
Foreign Investors, JOHN GAPPER'S BLOG (Sept. 8, 2008, 4:06 PM), http://blogs.fl.com/
gapperblog/2008/09/a-us-government-bail-out-of-foreign-investors/. Grapper added, "It smacks
of debt crises past in Latin American countries, where the ultimate pressure for a bail-out came
from foreign investors." Id.
382. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 335. For the balance of payments of China from 1996 to
2007, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 86 fig.4.19.
383. ROUBINI & MIHM, supra note 29, at 253 (quoting Larry Summers).
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ago, nearly a third of the silver from the Americas, which had tripled
Europe's supply, ended up in China in exchange for silks, spices, and
other goods that Europe imported.3 84 Today, U.S. imperial weight is
able to bring back Chinese foreign exchange surplus to the United
States. Global finance profited from this development, as growing
Chinese surpluses and growing U.S. deficits generated a surge in global
credit relative to gross world product.38 s While China's ability to
supply consumer goods at a low price kept consumer price inflation in
check, reinvestment of China's surplus in the United States helped
propel asset price inflation, including property and financial assets.386
Ballooning U.S. trade deficits were matched by rapid growth of the
world's foreign exchange reserves, mostly denominated in USD.
Global foreign exchange reserves doubled between 2004 and 2008,
increasing as much as they had in the entire previous century.38 7 Global
finance capital now profits from this unprecedented global movement of
capital, while the United States feeds off global savings and foreign
exchange surpluses. 388
D. Transforming the IMF into the Global Enforcer of Neoliberalism

With the neoliberal global financial reordering underway, captains of
global finance understood that, as Robert Rubin states, "periodic
financial crises of one sort or another are virtually inevitable," and that
the United States would act as "chief of the fire department." 389 The
IMF now became, in Larry Summers' words, "the cheapest and most
effective way" to promote U.S. interests in international financial
affairs. 39 0 This required repositioning the IMF as the global enforcer of
384. FERNAND BRAUDEL, supra note 40, at 198, 490-91.

385. Wade, supra note 20, at 36.
386. Id.
387.

Id. at 37; see also RICHARD DUNCAN, THE DOLLAR CRISIS: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,

CURES 44-45 (2005) (discussing how reliance on the dollar as the driver of the international
economy has created intractable problems, notably over-investment in dollar-denominated

assets).
388.

For a comparative chart of net savers and net lenders in 2006, see WOLF, supra note 17,

at 68 fig.4.7.
389. ROBERT RUBIN & JACOB WEISBERG, IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: TOUGH CHOICES FROM
WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 213-15 (2004).
390.

EVA RIESENHUBER,

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND UNDER CONSTRAINT:

LEGITIMACY OF ITS CRISIS MANAGEMENT 125 (2001) (quoting Larry Summers); see also Ruth
Felder, From Bretton Woods to Neoliberal Reform: The InternationalFinancialInstitutionsand
American Power, in AMERICAN EMPIRE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL FINANCE 175,

175-84 (Leo Pantich & Martijn Konings eds., 2009) ("The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944,
which gave birth to the IMF, established an organizational structure and procedures that
guaranteed a pro-American bias in the goals and operation of the new institution.").

684

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 42

the new neoliberal order. The role of the U.S.-dominated IMF changed
from being a currency stabilization fund to that of a manager of foreign
debt crises. Concurrently, the IMF also became a global enforcer of
neoliberalization through structural adjustment programs imposed upon
any state that needed its assistance with debt repayments. Debt crises
are now used to enforce fiscal austerity, privatization, and market
liberalization-the interlinked pillars of the Washington Consensus. 39 1
In 1978, the IMF's Articles of Agreement were amended to redefine
surveillance and expand the scope of state policies that could be
subjected to IMF scrutiny.3 9 2 New Guidelines on Conditionality,
released in 1979, ratified the expanded surveillance power and laid the
basis for conditionality of structural adjustment that would henceforth
accompany IMF assistance. 393 In order to perform its new mandate, the
IMF purged Keynesian economists from its ranks in 1982 and replaced
them with neoliberal monetarists. 394 Concurrently, the World Bank was
turned into "strictly a junior partner, with the guidelines of the programs
dictated by the IMF." 3 95 The World Bank's lending was switched from
project loans to structural adjustment loans subject to IMF approval and
accompanied by IMF-imposed conditionalities. 396
As the Bretton Woods schema of capital controls yielded to
neoliberal orthodoxy, the IMF, which was "founded on the belief that
markets often worked badly, now champion[ed] market supremacy with
ideological fervor." 397 Keynesian concerns about international capital
mobility were jettisoned. The new IMF dogma of unfettered mobility
of capital was summed up by Stanley Fischer, then-chief economist of
the IMF: "[F]ree capital movements facilitate a more efficient global
allocation of savings, and help channel resources into their most

391. This is the name given to a package of economic policy prescribed by the United States,
IMF, and the World Bank. Typically, the package includes fiscal discipline, taxation reform,
liberalization of interest rates, protection of property rights, privatization of industries and
services, deregulation of markets, floating exchange rates, liberalization of trade, and removal of
barriers to foreign direct investment. See STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 53-88; Alfredo Saad-Filho,
From Washington to Post-Washington Consensus: Neoliberal Agenda for Economic
Development, in NEOLIBERALISM: A CRITICAL READER, supra note 236, at 113, 113-19; John
Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN READJUSTMENT:
How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7-20 (John Williamson ed., 1989).
392. HELLEINER, supra note 211, at I10.
393. Louis Pauly, Good Governance and Bad Policy: The Perils of International
OrganizationOverextension, 6 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 401, 415 (1999).
394. HARVEY, supra note 236, at 32-34.
395. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 14.
396. Id. at 13-14.
397. Id. at 12.
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productive uses, thus increasing economic growth and welfare." 398 This
is contrary to the historical record, which shows that periods of high
international capital mobility have repeatedly produced international
banking crises. 399 Financial liberalization often precedes banking
crises; indeed, it seems to help predict them.400
In the neoliberal era, IMF decisions have become "a curious blend of
ideology[,] . . . bad economics[,] . . . [and] thinly veiled special

interests." 401 As a condition of providing loans to overcome balanceof-payment crises, the IMF dictates the macroeconomic policies of the
debtors "leaving domestic governments with little scope for input." 402
The new IMF policies "reflect a quite extreme free market ideology,"403
and "the interests and ideologies of the Western financial
community." 404 Conditionalities on availability of funds now require
structural adjustment programs-a policy package of comprehensive
neoliberal economic reordering that typically includes "harsh fiscal
austerity,"405 privatization, and liberalization.406 If a country rejects
these IMF mandates, it also forfeits the right to assistance from the
World Bank.407 As IMF conditions have started to go "beyond

398.

Stanley Fischer, IMF Seminar: Asia and the IMF, CapitalAccount Liberalizationandthe

Role of the IMF 1 10 (Sept. 19, 1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/apd/asia/
FISCHER.HTM. Calling the apex of global financial management the "Wall Street-Treasury
complex," noted international economist Jagdish Bhagwati argued that "it is a lot of ideological
humbug to say that without free portfolio capital mobility, somehow the world cannot function
and growth rates will collapse." Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 18-19 (citing Interview
with Jagdish Bhagwati in TIMES OF INDIA (Dec. 31, 1997)).
399. REINHART & ROGOFF,supra note 9, at 155.
400. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 159; Kaminsky & Reinhart, supra note 35, at
479-80; Ash Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, The Determinants of Banking Crisis in
Developing and Developed Countries, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 81, 104 (1998), available at

http://204.180.229.21/extemal/pubs/ft/staffp/1998/03-98/pdf/ demirguc.pdf.
401.

REINHART & ROGOFF,supra note 9, at xiii.

402.

ROSs P. BUCKLEY, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: POLICY AND REGULATION 11

(2009).
403. Id. at 12.
404. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 130.

405. Susan George, Conference on Economic Sovereignty in a Globalising World: A Short
History of Neo-liberalism: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and Emerging Opportunities for
Structural Change (Mar. 24-26, 1999), available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/
econl01/neoliberalism.htmil. For a detailed discussion, see generally SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE
WORSE THAN DEBT: THE WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE POOR (1990).

406. Supervising comprehensive reordering of economies of former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe furnished opportunity to the IMF to legitimize its operations beyond its traditional
concern with balance-of-payment adjustments and to enforce its prescriptions on a continental
scale. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 18.
407. Id at 12.
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economics into areas that properly belong in the realm of politics," 408 it
has

begun

to

symbolize

"global governance without global

government."409 The contradictory prescriptions to cope with financial
crises-structural adjustment in the Global South versus monetary
easing in the Global North-emerged as the IMF was redesigned to
impose neoliberalism on debtor countries in the 1980s in response to the
Latin American debt crisis. The austerity imposed by the IMF aimed to
prevent the turmoil from spreading to the Global North, while monetary
easing aimed to end the turmoil itself. 410
As part of the "Big Push . . . to institute a world-wide regime of

capital mobility," 4 11 the U.S. Treasury-Wall Street-IMF complex also
worked hard to promote the WTO's agreement on liberalizing financial
services. In response to resistance from developing economies, leaders
of global finance worked in concert to urge finance ministries around
the world to join the WTO.4 1 2 Again, a debt crisis was used to
accomplish the objective. As the Asian crisis heated up, Asian leaders
dropped their objections as they "saw no choice: either they signed or
their receipt of IMF bailout funds would be complicated." 413 On
December 12, 1997, more than seventy countries signed the agreement
that commits them to open banking, insurance, and securities markets to
foreign firms. In 2000, two publicists of neoliberalism claimed with
satisfaction that "[t]oday's international system is built not around a
balance of power but around American hegemony. The international
financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve American
interests." 4 14
With the U.S. neoliberal financial regulatory regime, a repositioned
IMF, and the WTO's agreement on financial services in place, the
408. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 44-45.
409. Id. at 21.

410. Rude, supra note 31, at 92. When faced with the financial meltdown, U.S. authorities
"chose the blank check option, over and over again . . . [which was] the opposite of what the
United States had pressed upon emerging market governments in the 1990s." JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 16, at 173. If the IMF prescribes to the United States the same remedy as it
does to the Global South, it would be to "nationalize troubled banks and break them up as
necessary." Id.
411. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 19-20.
412. For example, "executives of groups including Barclays, Germany's Dresdner Bank,
Societe Generale of France and Chubb Insurance, Citicorp, and Ford Financial Services of the US
... agreed discreetly to impress on finance ministers around the world the benefits of a WTO
deal." Guy de Jonquieres, Vision of a Global Market: WTO Members are Hoping to Deregulate
FinancialServices, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1997, at 28.

413. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 19.
414. Robert Kagan & William Kristol, The Present Danger, quoted in GOWAN, supra note

193, at 17.
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hegemony of global finance capital under the U.S. imperial umbrella
was complete. 4 15 This neoliberal global financial regime thrives not
only during phases of stability and growth, but also during phases of
instability and crises. 416 Indeed, even natural disasters are turned into
opportunities to enforce rabidly free-market ideologies and policies. 4 17
This is the context in which international debt crises increasingly served
to entrench neoliberalism globally while feeding finance capital through
accumulation by dispossession. We now turn to some of the signal
moments in this journey.
V. INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISES AND ACCUMULATION BY
DISPOSSESSION

A. Latin America: From Petroleum to Tequila

By the mid-1970s, "'[h]ot' money, which had been outlawed at
Bretton Woods, was hot again." 418 Its first victim was Latin America,
particularly Mexico. The debt crisis that it triggered in Latin America
in 1982 was one of the most damaging and far-reaching financial crises
of the twentieth century. 419 Ever since independence in the early
nineteenth century, debt crises have been a recurrent feature of Latin
American states. 420 However, these crises were linked to the boom and
bust cycle of the economies of the region, and matched neither the scale
of the 1980s crisis nor the region's new vulnerability to external
machination. Historically, foreign capital had come to Latin America
415. The U.S. domination of this global financial order is evidenced by the fact that during the
Mexican debt crisis of the mid-1990s, the U.S. Treasury, without even consulting Europeans or
the Japanese, simply instructed the IMF to bailout U.S. bondholders overnight, and channeled
LBS resources towards that objective. GOWAN, supra note 193, at 9.
416.

See PETER GOWAN, THE GLOBAL GAMBLE: WASHINGTON'S FAUSTIAN BID FOR WORLD

DOMINATION 35 (1999) (discussing how financial crises often serve to strengthen U.S.
domination).
417.

See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007)

(arguing that economic crises and natural disasters around the world have been used to push
neoliberal economic policies).
418. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 309. "Hot money" is capital that flows between financial
markets as investors attempt to ensure they get the highest short-term interest rates possible. Hot
money will flow from low interest rate yielding countries into higher interest rate countries by
investors looking to make the highest return. If the amount of capital moving in or out of a
market is high, these financial transfers can affect exchange rates and the balance of payments
suddenly and drastically.
419. See CARLOS A. MARICHAL, A CENTURY OF DEBT CRISES IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM
INDEPENDENCE TO THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1820-1930, at 95 (1989) (discussing the 1982 debt
crisis in Latin America); J. Livingston, The International Financial System: A Flawed
Architecture, 23 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 1, 9-16 (1999) (discussing the impact of the

debt crisis on Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina).
420.

MARICHAL, supra note 419, at 238.
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through bonds, direct foreign investment, and official loans. 4 2 1 Starting
in the early 1970s, lending by major U.S. banks rapidly became the
major source of foreign capital.42 2
The fiction has been long cultivated that bad loans are always the
debtor's fault. 42 3 However, in the case of Latin America, as in
subsequent cases, opportunistic and imprudent overlending by the
banks, fueled by excess liquidity, was the primary cause of excessive
debt and the subsequent crisis. 42 4 The massive lending to Latin
America by U.S. banks in the 1970s was a prime mechanism to recycle
petrodollars-the massive transfer of funds to the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") cartel as a result of the
quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-1974.425 The United States had
quietly favored the oil price hike as a means of regaining a competitive
edge against Europe and Japan given their comparatively larger
dependence on imported oil.4 26 The petrodollars quickly flowed back to
Eurodollar deposits of U.S. banks. 4 27 The oil price hike also triggered a
recession in industrialized countries, and the resulting weakness of
internal demand came at a time when the major U.S. banks were losing
421.

F. G. DAWSON, THE FIRST LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS: THE CITY OF LONDON AND

THE 1822-25 LOAN BUBBLE 237 (1990).
422. B. Eichengreen & R. Portes, After the Deluge: Defaults, Negotiations and Readjustments
During the Interwar Years, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
40-41 (B. Eichengreen & P. H. Linder eds., 1989). By the early 1980s, the total exposure of U.S.
banks to Latin America represented 176 percent of bank capital, and the 1983 exposure of the
nine largest U.S. banks to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico was 115 percent of the capital of those
banks. Jeffery D. Sachs, Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 10 (Jeffery D. Sachs ed., 1989). For net capital flow to Latin America between 1980
and 2006, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 47 fig.3.8.
423. Livingston, supra note 419, at 36-37. Emerging market borrowing tends to be extremely
procyclical; favorable terms of trade lead to high borrowing, and with drops in commodity prices,
borrowing collapses and defaults go up. For details, see Mark Aguiar & Gita Gopinath,
Emerging Market Business Cycles: The Cycle is the Trend, 115 J. POL. ECON., no. 1, 2007 at 69.
424. UNCTC, TRANSNATIONAL BANK BEHAVIOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS
50-51 (Sept. 1989). Even a former BIS General Manager takes the position that behavior of
lenders and investors from the industrialized world played a major role in spurring financial crises
ALEXANDRE LAMFALUSSY, FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING
in developing countries.
MARKETS: AN ESSAY ON FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION AND FRAGILITY 47-66 (2000).
425. See FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 308 (discussing the "revival of nongovernmental capital
export" and Latin America's quadrupling of its foreign borrowing).
426. PETER R. ODELL, OIL AND WORLD POWER 223-25 (8th ed. 1986). This was not the first
or the last time the United States actively orchestrated formation of global cartels. For example,
the U.S. State Department and other agencies actively supported the establishment of a global
aluminum cartel following the plummeting of aluminum prices in 1994. A central actor in this
development was Paul O'Neil, CEO of Alcoa and later Treasury Secretary. See STIGLITZ, supra
note 47, at 173-76.
427. By the end of 1975, 13.8 billion OPEC dollars had been deposited in U.S. banks. PHILIP
A. WELLONS, WORLD MONEY AND CREDIT: THE CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES 23 (1983).
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market share at home. These losses made foreign lending more
attractive.4 28 New markets were quickly found in the Global South, and
the surplus capital in the United States started funding a lending boom
in Latin America.429 Large U.S. banks dominated the syndicated
lending to Latin America, though Canadian, European, and Japanese
banks also participated. 430 Europe and Japan also used these loans to
improve their trade balance by shifting their trade deficits with OPEC to
the Global South. 431 Financial managers saw this recycling of
petrodollars as a positive development and "banks were applauded for
smoothing the transition to higher oil prices." 432
The lending banks were very aggressive in marketing these loans and
came to "depend on income from special deals with riskier clients
willing to pay higher fees, commissions and interest to gain market
access." 433 In the rush to lend mounting petrodollar deposits, "the
banks sent salesmen to Mexico, not analysts." 434 The majority of the
loans went to major industrial, oil, and energy corporations of the
region, many of which were wholly or partially state-owned, and stateowned development banks. 435 And as loans became due, "[njew
lending to repay old loans made sense in the circumstances." 4 36 Banks
found comfort in the fact that, as the Chairman of Citicorp put it,
"[c]ountries never go bankrupt." 437 The primary beneficiaries of the
loans were "[t]echnocrats, generals, and businessmen who received
secret commissions and contracts on the huge flow of foreign funds. In
no period of modem Latin American history has financial corruption
reached such heights . .

."438

The massive debt was accompanied by

428. Id.
429. MARICHAL, supra note 419, at 41-42, 95; FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 309.
430. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 22 (quoting a UN study).
431. WELLONS, supra note 427, at 58-63. Between 1973 and 1979, France's trade surplus

with its former colonies in Africa increased from 550 million to 2.2 billion dollars. UNCTC,
supra note 424, at 11-12.
432. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Aronson, International Lending and Debt, 6 WASH.

Q.

62, 66

(1983).
433. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 24 (quoting UNCTC, DEBT EQUITY CONVERSIONS-A
GUIDE FOR DECISION-MAKERS 24 (1991)).
434.

DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT CRISIS

102 (1984).
435. MARICHAL, supra note 419, at 235.

436. Sachs, supra note 422, at 9.
437. Id. at 8. The massive lending was proving very profitable. In the case of Citibank, for
example, 72 percent of its 1976 earnings came from its international operations, and in 1977,
profits from its Brazilian business exceeded those from its entire U.S. operation. DELAMAIDE,
supra note 434, at 117; Sachs, supra note 422, at 8.
438. MARICHAL, supra note 419, at 238. This underscores that benefits and costs of
liberalized financial flows accrue differentially within societies. Note that "crony capitalism" has
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massive capital flight from Latin America. The capital flight was
propelled on the one hand by the incentives of the combination of high
exchange rates and the history of inflation in the region, and on the
other by distance assets from its often tainted origins. During the
1970s, when Mexico accumulated 75 billion of foreign debt, its private
sector accumulated 40 billion of foreign assets. 439 In 1980-1981,
outflow of private capital from Argentina was 84 percent of the inflow
of debt, and in the case of Venezuela, the outflow exceeded the
inflow.440 For Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela combined, the three
countries hit hardest by the debt crisis, capital flight during 1979-1982
amounted to 67 percent of capital inflows. 44 1
The primary trigger of the debt crisis was the 1979 Volcker Shock
that dramatically raised U.S. interest rates. 44 2
As a spillover,
Euromarket interest rates doubled between 1978 and 1981, peaking at
Given their recently accumulated debt
19.5 percent in March 1980.
load, "the effect on the borrowing developing nations was
catastrophic." 4 44 Aggressive monetary policy in advanced capitalist
countries, particularly the United States, designed to prevent domestic
inflation, "imposed a frightful cost on the less developed world under
the very loans the OECD governments had encouraged their banks to
make." 5 When the crisis hit, banks resisted advancing new funds,44 6
and Latin American governments imposed harsh austerity measures "at
the behest of [] creditors." 447 The banks had no doubt who was
responsible for the debt crisis; indeed, it was the "debtor's inappropriate
demand management and recourse allocation policies prior to 1982, and
their inadequate adjustment to the adverse global environment that

been characterized as "the market economy's most familiar and durable form." WOLF, supra note
17, at 14.
439. Sachs, supra note 422, at 12.
440. Id. at 9.
441. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 64 (1985).
442. ROUBfNI & MIHM, supra note 29, at 25-26. For the Volcker Shock, see supra notes 25875 and accompanying text.
443. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 35 n.71.
444. Robert A. Pastor, The Debt Crisis: A Financial or a Development Problem?, in LATIN
AMERICA'S DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 8 (Robert A.
Pastor ed., 1987).
445. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 36.
446. Rory Macmillan, The Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 305, 328-29
(1995).
447. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 39.
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followed."" 8 This view of responsibility justified banks' resistance to
debt relief resulting in "appalling human suffering."449
The decisive response to the crisis was not market-driven but was
choreographed by the United States. As the crisis escalated and
triggered political instability, the U.S. Treasury Department stepped in.
After the aborted "Baker Plan," the "Brady Plan" was put in place in
1990.450 Skirting the option of debt forgiveness by official lenders to
ease the debt burden, it focused on the debt to commercial banks
through the conversion of loans into collateralized bonds and debtequity swaps. In the case of Mexico, in order to make the restructuring
plan attractive to the banks, the SEC issued a new interpretation of
Financial Accounting Standards (FAS 15), whereby banks did not have
to recognize a loss "if the total future undiscounted cash receipts
specified by the new terms of the loan, including receipts designated as
both principal and interest, equal or exceed the book value of the
loan." 451 "Turning reality on its head," the SEC created a mechanism to
treat interest as principal and make the value of the loan in thirty years
equal to its current value.4 52 After Congress rejected the Treasury's
bailout proposal, the Treasury moved ahead without congressional
approval and "strong-armed other governments to participate," and
"seemed to revel in its ability to outsmart Congress." 453 After
considerable arm-twisting by regulators, banks converted 41 percent of
the total debt into discounted principal bonds, 49 percent into
discounted interest bonds, and advanced new money for the remaining
10 percent.454
The restructuring worked out rather well for the banks. It signaled an
end of the debt crisis to the broader markets, and debtor countries could
448. Id. at 25-26 (quoting R. de Vries, Chief Economist, Morgan Guarantee Trust Company).
449. Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Market Debt Trading

from 1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1802, 1818 (1993).
450. The Baker Plan, named after the then-U.S. Secretary of Treasury, aimed at resolving the
debt crisis with sufficient new credit to debtors so that economic growth would lessen the debt
burden. When banks declined to advance additional funds on top of the existing sovereign debt,
the Baker Plan failed. The Brady Plan, named after the new U.S. Secretary of Treasury, was the
new prescription. For details, see BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 39-54.
451. SEC Letter (July 14, 1989), in JONATHAN HAY & NIRMALJIT PAUL, REGULATION AND
TAXATION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS DURING THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 128 (1991).
452. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 43-44.
453. STIGLITZ,supra note 47, at 256 n.10.

454. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 44. These are aggregate figures. Banks of different
countries chose different combinations of the three parts. German banks converted most of their
share into par bonds; Japanese banks chose discount bonds. Only U.S. and French banks
advanced new funds. Differences in regulatory and tax regimes accounted for the variations. Id.
at 44-45.
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borrow and issue bonds again, generating fees for the banks. Loans
having been converted into bonds, distressed assets went off the balance
sheets and freed up capital for other uses. It gave the banks liquid
bonds in place of the relatively illiquid loans, and triggered a turnaround in secondary market prices of these assets. By 1997, USD 305
billion in loans and USD 2,403 billion in Brady Bonds were traded in
secondary markets. 455 While the Brady Plan resolved the debt crisis
from the perspective of creditors, the debt remained in place to be
serviced at the cost of domestic development and social services
expenditures. Between 1982 and 1990, Latin America repaid far more
than it received in new credits.456 The total indebtedness of Mexico, the
country hardest hit by the crisis, remained unchanged as the relief
afforded by the discounted bonds was offset by new loans. While
Mexico's net annual transfer to lending banks was USD 3.24 billion
before the restructuring, it was USD 3.59 billion after the
restructuring. 457 The debt-servicing burden was borne by the most
vulnerable, who were denied access to healthcare, education, housing,
and a life of dignity. The economic cost of the Latin American debt
crisis was over 2 percent growth per year for the 1980s and, as a result,
it is considered the "lost decade in Latin America." 458
Within ten years, the cycle repeated itself in Mexico in the form of
the so-called "tequila crisis," which spilled over into other Latin
American economies. 459 By 1993, "60 million more Latin Americans
had been driven below the poverty line, bringing the total to nearly half
of the population." 460 A decade later, wages for Mexican workers were
lower, and inequality higher.4 6 1 When all was over, the big winners
455. Id. at 53.

456. Sachs, supra note 422, at 10.
457. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 46.
458. Id. at 22.
459. Just when there was talk of the "new" Latin America and the "Mexico miracle"
following a lending boom of the 1990s, the so-called "tequila crisis" hit Mexico in late 1994.
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at 31-32
(2009). The prescribed tight monetary policy had kept the value of the peso high and hurt

Mexico's exports. The current account deficit was made up of a capital account surplus-an
asset to be sold to foreign investors. In December 1994, Mexico devalued the peso, hot capital
made for the exits, and the peso tumbled to half its pre-crisis value; by early 1995, Mexico was

paying investors an interest rate of 75 percent. Id. at 47-48. During 1995, Mexico's GDP
plunged 7 percent, its industrial production fell by 15 percent, and the financial crisis started to
spill to other Latin American countries. Id. at 48. Mexico had to be rescued with a USD 50
billion bail out. Id. at 51. The cost of Mexico's bank rescue in 1994-1997 was equal to 15
percent of its GDP, and a substantial part of that went to owners of banks. STIGLITZ, supra note
22, at 41.
460. Duncan Green, Hidden FistHits the Buffers, NEW INT'L, Oct. 1995, at 35.
461. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 42.
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were the lending banks and the wealthy and politically well-connected
borrowers, and the losers were the taxpayers and the impoverished.462
In yet another instance of accumulation by dispossession, extra-market
forces had choreographed the market to facilitate accumulation of
capital. The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s-the first
international debt crisis of the neoliberal era--demonstrated a pattern
that held true for subsequent debt crises. Excess global liquidity was
channeled by financial institutions of the Global North into credit to the
Global South. Unbridled international mobility of capital accentuated
boom and bust cycles of debtor countries. The unsustainable burden of
servicing the debt was borne by the working classes of the debtor
societies. The crisis was managed to secure the interests of global
finance capital and to enforce expansion of neoliberal economic
restructuring of debtor economies.
B. Asian Flu and the Second Opium War

The fire sale of Asian assets to foreign interests triggered by the
Asian debt crisis463 was evocatively dubbed "the Second Opium
War." 464 Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz, who observed the
crisis closely, argues that "capital account liberalization was the single
most importantfactor leading to the crisis."46 5 In a similar vein, Nobel

Laureate economist James Tobin takes the view that Asian countries
were "victims of a flawed international exchange rate system that, under
U.S. leadership, [gave] the mobility of capital priority over all other
considerations." 466 The debt that became a problem in Asia was
private, as opposed to public or quasi-public as the case in Latin
America. It started as a currency crisis and metastasized into a general
economic crisis with long-term impact on the region and beyond.

462. This is in tune with the broader pattern that, once a debt crisis has passed, "[the big
winners are the wealthy, politically influential risk takers, and the biggest losers are the taxpayers
in countries like Mexico or Indonesia." Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as
Lender ofLast Resort, 17 CATO J. 275, 276-77 (1998).
463. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 129-30.

464. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 14. For detailed accounts of the First Opium War
from 1840 through 1842, see PETER WARD FAY, OPIUM WAR, 1840-1842 (1998) (providing a
history of the origins of the First Opium War); CARL TROCKI, OPIUM, EMPIRE AND THE GLOBAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY: A STUDY OF THE ASIAN OPIUM TRADE 1750-1950, at 1-11 (1999)
(discussing the impact of the opium trade on world economics in the lead up to the First Opium
War).
465. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 99.
466. James Tobin, Why We Need Sand in the Market's Gears, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1997, at
C3.
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The Asian crisis struck when no one expected it. As opposed to the
Latin American crises of the 1980s, the Asian crisis occurred within "a
benign international environment with low interest rates and solid
growth in output and exports." 467 Interest rates in the lending countries
were low and stable, bank lending was rising to record levels, Asian
economies were booming, and rating agencies were lavishing praises
The macroeconomic
upon the governments in the region. 4 68
fundamentals were strong-low inflation, healthy fiscal profiles, and
stable or rising exchange reserves. In the 1990s, the region, while
accounting for a quarter of world output, accounted for over half of
world growth and almost two-thirds of world capital spending. 46 9
Between 1990 and 1996, capital formation in East Asia (excluding
Japan) jumped by nearly 300 percent, compared to 40 percent growth in
the United States and Japan, and a mere 10 percent growth in Europe. 47 0
International debt crises arise when a country's total indebtedness
exceeds its capacity to service the debt. The measures of this capacity
are debt-export ratio and debt-service ratio. These crises are generally
signaled by a debt-export ratio over 200 percent, and a debt-service
ratio over 20 percent. 47 1 These ratios for the East Asian and Pacific
regions were 99 percent and 12 percent respectively in 1996.472
Consequently, this was not a conventional debt crisis. The countries at
the center of the Asian crisis were following a neoliberal prescription to
the letter. Tight fiscal and monetary policies, low inflation, high private
savings and investment rates, open capital markets, and export-led
growth had come to define these "Asian Tigers" and the "Asian
miracle." 473 These countries, with some of the highest saving rates in
467. 1 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 1998, at 4, 30 (1998).
468. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 3.
469. Id. at 4.
470.

ROBERT BRENNER, THE ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE 300 (2006).

471. Aronson, supra note 432, at 68.
472. 1 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 1997, at 160 (1997).

473. The unusually high export-led growth rates achieved by Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan,
Thailand, Singapore, and South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s earned these titles. These Asian
economies had a high-debt model, with debt/equity ratios commonly two to one, primarily
because savings and bank deposits are much higher. The high ratios of bank deposits to GDP and
corporate debt to equity make the financial structure vulnerable to shocks that depress liquidity.
This requires considerable support and guidance from the governments in tune with a national
industrial strategy. This is at the root of the developmental state in Asia that combines high
household savings, high corporate debt/equity ratios, bank-firm state collaboration, a national
industrial strategy, and investment incentives conditioned on international competitiveness. See
ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 34, 256 (1990) (discussing the role that the
state industrial structure has played in domestic investment strategies in East Asian economies);
see also CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL
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the world, had been capital exporters. They had all the capital they
needed for their development.
Working "in the interests of owners and managers on international
capital," IMF sought to open up Asian economies to global capital "in
one way or another." 474 Urged on by the IMF, Thailand, Indonesia, and
Korea opened their economies to global capital flows prematurely
without adequate regulatory supervision. 475 Hot capital rushed in
quickly and these economies became vulnerable to "self-fulfilling
speculative attacks." 476 Following the historic "capital-push" model,47 7
in the two years preceding 1997, excess liquidity in the United States
and Europe resulted in record quantities of capital flowing into the
Asian region. 4 78 The capital inflows went primarily into property and
stock market investments, driving up the prices of those assets in
speculative bubbles. Faced with steep yield curves, local banks
borrowed short term and lent long term without adequately hedging
their foreign exchange exposure. 47 9 Crony capitalism prevalent in
many countries of the region engendered the moral hazard for local
banks owned or controlled by influential quarters, and high-risk and
highly lucrative ventures were influenced by the prospect of a local
bailout should things turn sour. Lack of exchange rate flexibility added
to the problem. Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea had pegged their
currencies to the USD in the mid-1990s. The USD was appreciating
and so were the pegged currencies. With increasingly high-tech
exports, these economies were now competing with Japan at a time
when Japanese currency was depreciating, which put pressure on the
export competitiveness of the pegged-currency countries in the region.
China's devaluations in the early 1990s, and the U.S.-Japan
POLICY, 1925-1975, at 305-26 (1982) (describing the interplay between post-World War II
industrial structure and national financial growth in Japan as a potential model for the region).
474. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 18.
475. For composition of net capital flows to Asian emerging market economies between 1980
and 2006, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 48 fig.3.9.
476. KRUGMAN, supra note 459, at Ito.
477. Excess liquidity in creditor nations has historically triggered capital moving to debtor
nations. See MARICHAL, supra note 419, at 95, 212-13 (describing the movement of European
investments into Latin American public works projects in the early 1870s); id. at 212 tbl.8
(showing the high rate of default on capital loans to Latin American nations in the early 1900s);
see also DELAMAIDE, supra note 434, at 96, 99, 120 (explaining how the massive foreign

investments in Latin America throughout the twentieth century made effective debt rescheduling
and renegotiation with these nations difficult in the early 1980s).
478. Investors in the United States were confronted with very low interest rates and an inflated
stock market. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 58.
479. For share of short-term borrowing in foreign-currency borrowing of Asian Crisis
countries, see WOLF, supra note 17, at 54 fig.3.14.
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arrangement before the 1996 election 4 80 that resulted in depreciation of
the yen, seriously impacted Korean and Southeast Asian
competitiveness. As export earnings and stock markets fell, there was a
rush by the banks to call in the loans across the board. When the size of
impending losses became apparent, capital fled the region in a panic.
The sudden swing from a capital inflow to an outflow in late 1997 was
over 10 percent of GDP of the countries involved.4 8 1
The financial turmoil began with the devaluation of the Thai baht in
July 1997, and spread quickly to Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
and South Korea.482 By the end of 1997, all of these countries were in
deep contraction. When loss of confidence struck, it led to rapid
outflow of hot capital, and a freezing of external re-financing. 483 This
led to deep depreciation of local currencies and revealed massive
unhedged foreign exchange exposures, severely damaging balance
sheets of local corporations. 4 84 Fleeing foreign capital treated the whole
region as one, failing to distinguish between the quite different strengths
and weaknesses of the economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines, and South Korea. 485

480. The USD appreciated against the yen after 1995 as a result of an agreement between the
U.S. Treasury and the Japanese Finance Ministry to help Japan export its way out of its recession,
use the surpluses to buy Treasury bills, and thus keep U.S. interest rates at politically desirable
levels. See Klaus Engelen, How Bill Clinton Really Won, EUR., Nov. 1996, at 14-20; Chalmers
Johnson, Cold War Economics Melts Asia, NATION, Feb. 23, 1998, at 16-20 (explaining the role

of the Clinton administration in post-Cold War economies in Asia).
481. Rude, supra note 31, at95.
482. See Christopher Rude, The 1997-98 East Asian FinancialCrisis:A New York MarketInformed View, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL AND REFORM 369-403 (Barry Herman ed.,

1999) (noting that local and foreign market speculation over the stability of local currencies
exacerbated the pressure already mounting on those currencies, thus speeding financial collapse).
483. In a deregulated capital market, capital flows are pro-cyclical-capital flows out in a
recession, precisely when it is needed most, and flows in during a boom, exacerbating inflation.
484.

WORLD BANK, supra note 467, at 5, 30.

485. Asian economies, while only modestly linked by way of the flow of goods, were "linked
in the mind of investors." KRUGMAN, supra note 459, at 94. Flow of capital into Asia was often
channeled through "'emerging market funds' that lumped the countries together. When bad news
came from Thailand, money flowed out of these funds, and hence out of all the countries in the
region." Id at 93.
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When problems began, the IMF's advice exacerbated the situation. 486
The IMF diagnosed that Thailand had "a conventional demandmanagement problem-excessively easy fiscal and monetary policy and
a deteriorating current account-requiring a general policy of
tightening.""87 The IMF sought increased interest rates, tightening of
credit, and fiscal austerity. These caused domestic deflation and
worsened the crisis by causing widespread bankruptcies and further
erosion of confidence. The IMF strategy "discourage[d] investment,
compound[ed] the recessionary impact of the reversal in capital flows,
and generally exacerbate[d] the difficulties faced by firms, banks, and
public finances." 488 Thailand required the opposite treatment to which
it was subjected-a supportive rather than tight fiscal policy.489
Analysts agree that the IMF funds should have been used "not for
rescuing foreign creditors, nor for financing capital flight, but for
financing compensating fiscal expansion."4 90 Even when financial
crises are partly caused by the weakness of an economy's economic
fundamentals, the time to deal with the structural issues is not while the
crisis is at its peak. The short-term focus must be on minimizing the
damage by counter-cyclical interventions, with long-term reforms left
for another day.491 The IMF made matters worse by overemphasizing
the supposed structural causes of the crisis. 492 The IMF policy of
encouraging bank closures in crisis countries caused "a bank panic that
486. See, e.g., Gordon De Brouwer, The IMF and East Asia: A Changing Regional Financial
Architecture, in THE IMF AND ITS CRITICS 254, 254-55 (David Vines & Christopher L. Gilbert

eds., 2003) (explaining that the IMF misread the nature of the crisis at its outset, which led to its
insistence on the implementation of ideologically rigid macroeconomic, structural, and market
policies throughout the region); see also Robert Weissman, Twenty Questions on the IMF, in
DEMOCRATIZING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 84, 90-91 (Kevin Danaher ed., 2001) (suggesting that

the IMF missed an opportunity to contain the Asian crisis when it chose to use the same approach
it had used for other financial crises).
487. De Brouwer, supra note 486, at 257.
488. ARIEL BUIRA, AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CRISES 20 (1999); see also
WARNER M. CORDEN, THE ASIAN CRISIS: IS THERE A WAY OUT? 42 (1999) (stating the IMF

underrated the adverse effects of high interest rates in the region).
489. De Brouwer, supra note 486, at 268. The misdiagnosis is captured by this summary:
"[The [IF] failed to anticipate the severity of the Asian downturn or see that the restrictive fiscal
policies it recommended would themselves make that downturn worse . . . . [T]he Fund's fiscal
targets were too tight and . . . larger deficits should have been encouraged." BARRY J.
EICHENGREEN,

TOWARDS A NEW FINANCIAL

ARCHITECTURE: A PRACTICAL POST-ASIA

AGENDA 110 (1999).
490. CORDEN, supra note 488, at 59; STIGLITZ,supra note 47, at 104-32.

491. CORDEN, supra note 488, at 45; De Brouwer, supra note 486, at 3; Hak K. Pyo, The
Financial Crisis in Korea and Its Aftermath: A Political Economic Perspective, in CAPITAL
FLOWS WITHOUT CRISIS: RECONCILING CAPITAL MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 237,

243 (Dipak Dasgupta et al. eds., 2001).
492. CORDEN, supra note 488, at 48; De Brouwer, supra note 486, at 2.
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helped set off financial market declines in much of Asia.'4 93 Instead of
highlighting their flaws, it would have been "better to try to calm
markets by emphasizing the positive features of these economies.' 4 94
Instead, the IMF "engineered a simultaneous contraction in aggregate
demand and supply." 495 Contractionary policies advocated by the IMF
"exacerbated the contagion, the spread of the downturn from one
country to the next."4 9 6 In Jeffery Sachs' evocative words, "instead of
dousing the fire, the IMF in effect screamed fire in the theater.'4 97 The
IMF's insistence on closing down banks, even in the absence of deposit
insurance-induced bank runs, and its insistence on cutting demand and
liquidity, caused bankruptcies in even efficient and profitable firms. 498
Bank closures and bank runs in Indonesia induced by the IMF
exacerbated political unrest and ethnic divisions in Indonesia. When
food and fuel subsidies were drastically cut back, riots exploded.4 99
The Asian crisis proved once again that "financial crises have always
caused transfers of ownership and power to those who keep their own
assets intact and who are in a position to create credit."5 00 During and
after the Asian crisis, very little excess capacity was shed; rather, it was
"re-organized and snatched up by foreign investors seeking to capture
valuable assets from distressed and ailing firms." 01 The euphoria the
fire-sale of Asian assets created for global finance capital was captured
well by an investment banker: "If something was worth $1 billion
yesterday, and now it's only $50m, it's quite exciting." 502 The
combination of devaluations, IMF-imposed liberalization, and IMFassisted recovery precipitated "the biggest peacetime transfer of assets
493.

David E. Sanger, IMF Now Admits Tactics in Indonesia Deepened the Crisis, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at Bl.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.

CORDEN, supranote 488, at 48.
STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 111.
Id. at 107.
Jeffery Sachs, The IMF and the Asian Flu, AM. PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 16, 17.
Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 5.

499. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 119. The ubiquitous riots triggered by IMF-prescribed
policies have been dubbed the "IMF Riots." See JAHN WALTON & DAVID SEDDON, FREE
MARKETS AND FOOD RIOTS: THE POLITICS OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 39-45 (1994)
(describing the protests that often follow in response to IMF-initiated structural adjustment
policies).
500. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 20.
501. McNally, From FinancialCrisis, supra note 230, at 63; see also Paul Burkett & Martin
Hart-Landsberg, Crisis and Recovery in East Asia: The Limits of CapitalistDevelopment, 8 HIST.
MATERIALISM 3, 27 (2001) (discussing the role foreign investors played in the post-crisis South
Korean economy).
502. Clay Harris & John Ridding, Asia Provides Golden Buying Opportunities, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 1998, at 16; see also Investing in South Korea: Bargains Galore, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7,
1998, at 67-68.
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from domestic to foreign owners in the past fifty years anywhere in the
world, dwarfing the transfer from domestic to U.S. owners in Latin
America in the 1980s." 50 3
While aggravating the crisis, the IMF used it to expand the
enforcement of the neoliberal agenda in the region. Even after the crisis
had begun, at the September 1997 annual meeting of the IMF and the
World Bank in Hong Kong, the IMF put pressure on developing
countries to liberalize capital markets. 504 The IMF's stand-by
agreement with Korea exemplifies the IMF's push for structural and
institutional changes in the middle of a financial crisis.505 The U.S.
Treasury Department was directly involved in stiffening the IMF's
insistence on radical financial opening in Korea. 506 The IMF package
called for closing down or recapitalizing troubled financial institutions,
allowing foreign institutions to freely buy domestic ones, requiring
banks to follow Basil prudential standards, requiring international
accounting standards to be followed, and requiring the use of
international accounting firms for auditing.50 7 The Korean government
was prohibited from intervening in lending decisions of banks or from
giving credit and tax concessions to firms to avoid bankruptcies. 508
Capital accounts were to be opened and all restrictions on foreign
borrowing by corporations eliminated. 509 The trade regime was to be
liberalized by eliminating restrictive import licensing and trade-related
subsidies. Labor markets were to be liberalized to improve labor
market flexibility. Added to this were tighter monetary and fiscal
policies to restrict domestic demand. 510 Here, neoliberalism by
mandate was imposed in one sweep.
U.S. Treasury joined the IMF to squelch Japan's offer of USD 100
million to create an Asian Monetary Fund in order to finance an
urgently needed stimulus.5 1' The alternative IMF package consisted of
503. Wade & Veneroso, supra note 36, at 20-21.
504. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 93.
505. For the text of the agreement, see Republic of Korea-IMF Stand-by Arrangement:
Summary of the Economic Program, Dec. 5, 1997, IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/oth/

korea.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
506. The Treasury made it clear that Korean financial liberalization was a precondition of
U.S. contribution to the bailout. Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, Behind the S. Korean Bailout:
Speed, Stealth, Consensus, WASH. POST., Dec. 28, 1998, at 1.
507. See Republic ofKorea-IMF Stand-by Arrangement, supra note 505.

508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. As financial clouds gathered in Asia, in summer 1997, Japan proposed to establish an
Asian Fund to assist economies of the region in trouble. Not wanting Japan to send its capital to
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long-term loans from USD 15 billion for Thailand to USD 57 billion for
South Korea. These loans were made on the condition that they would
be used to repay creditors. The loans thus became long-term public
debts for these countries and bailouts for the creditors. 512 More
specifically, the IMF bailouts were made available for the purpose of
fully repaying short-term bank debt-the very debt that had triggered
the crisis. The IMF rewarded short-term speculative creditors and
inflicted severe adversity upon the economies of the region. It has been
noted that "[f]oreign creditors were thus the main recipients of the
money loaned to crisis countries." 5 13 Indeed, the bailouts amounted to
being "a welfare system for Wall Street."5 14 While the IMF later
admitted that the tight fiscal policy it had recommended was
excessively austere, 5 15 the BIS applauded that large banks "have been
able to avoid significant loss," credited "risk mitigants . . . [and]

solvency [capital] requirements of GlO banks," and claimed that banks
were "much better diversified than in past crises, in terms of both
countries and types of counterparties." 516 The public bailout of the
lenders only reinforced the moral hazard for short-term speculative
capital, which quickly found a new outlet in Russia for massive credits
in late 1997 and early 1998, this time triggering Russia's crisis in
August 1998.517
Asia rather than to the United States by buying Treasury bills, and not wanting Japan to emerge
as the bailout leader, the U.S. Treasury, and Deputy Secretary Larry Summers, in particular,
insisted that the cleanup be entrusted to the IMF. Japan agreed to desist in a November 1997
meeting in Manila. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 112-13; see also Johnson, supra note 480, at 16.
512. Charles W. Calomiris &Allan H. Meltzer, Fixing the IMF, 56 NAT'L INT. 88, 88 (1999).
513. Buckley, supra note 34, at 69; see also GEORGE SOROS, OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING
GLOBAL CAPITALISM 269 (2000).
514. Charlotte Denny, IMF Sheds No Tearsfor Argentina, GUARDIAN, Apr. 29, 2002 (quoting
a senior G-7 official).
515. IMF, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED
APRIL 30, 1998, at 25 (1998).
516. Supervisory Lessons to be Drawnfrom the Asian Crisis 15-16 (BCBS Working Paper
No. 2, 1999), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs-wp2.htm.
517. For details of the Russian financial crisis, see ARIEL COHEN, RUSSIA'S MELTDOWN:
ANATOMY OF THE IMF FAILURE (1998); STEPHEN F. COHEN, FAILED CRUSADE: AMERICA AND
THE TRAGEDY OF POST-COMMUNIST RUSSIA (2000); MICHAEL MCFAUL, RUSSIA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION: POLITICAL CHANGE FROM GORBACHEV TO PUTIN (2001); THE NEW RUSSIA:
TRANSITION GONE AWRY (Lawrence R. Klein & Marshall Pomer eds., 2001); PETER
REDDAWAY & DMITRI GLINSKI, THE TRAGEDY OF RUSSIA'S REFORMS: MARKET BOLSHEVISM
AGAINST DEMOCRACY (2001); Ross P. Buckley, A Force for Globalization: Emerging Markets
Debt Tradingfrom 1994 to 1999, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 185 (1999). Fearful of inflation, IMF
insistence that Russia maintain an overvalued currency and support it with billions of dollars in
loans ultimately crashed the economy. The first round was the instantaneous price liberalization
that set in motion an inflationary spiral that wiped out domestic savings. The second round was
tightening monetary policy by raising interest rates. Natural resources prices were kept
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While speculative hot capital was made whole, the vulnerable had to
bear the brunt of the crisis, and millions of people were plunged into
dire poverty. Unemployment rates went up fourfold in Korea, threefold
in Thailand, and tenfold in Indonesia. 518 In Korea there was an increase
in absolute poverty and an increase in income and wealth inequality.519
In Indonesia alone, thirty million more people dropped below the $1 per
day poverty line. 520 In 1998, GDP in Thailand fell by 10.8 percent, in
Indonesia by 13.1 percent, and in Korea by 6.7 percent. 52 ' Currencies
in countries that followed IMF prescriptions fell rapidly-the Thai baht
fell by 50 percent, the Indonesian rupiah by 75 percent and the Korean
won by 40 percent. 522 By increasing unemployment and poverty
throughout the Global South, the Asian crisis "put downward pressure
artificially low to attract foreign investment. The end result was that between 1990 and 1999,
Russian GDP fell 54% and industrial production fell 60%, devastation greater than that suffered
during World War II. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 135-43. The overvalued ruble had flooded the
market with foreign goods and led to massive contraction of the domestic manufacturing sector.
The ill-fit between market principles and a centralized govemance system led to an explosion of
corruption and the creation of state-backed oligarchs. See generally P. Murrell, Can NeoClassicalEconomics Underpin the Economic Reform of the CentrallyPlannedEconomies?, 5 J.

ECON. PERSPECTIVES 59 (1991) (comparing centrally planned economies and market economies).
When the Asian crisis resulted in a dramatic fall of 40% in crude oil prices between 2007 and
2008, the weight of servicing the huge foreign debt became unbearable. By the middle of 1998, it
became clear that Russia would need outside assistance to maintain its exchange rate. As
confidence in the currency eroded, the yield on local currency government bonds went up to
150%. Yields on dollar-denominated bonds rose from 10% to 50%. As the crisis mounted, IMF
offered the first rescue package of USD 4.8 billion in July 1998. IMF insisted that Russia borrow
more in foreign currency than in rubles, discounting the risk of imminent devaluation that would
make repayment of foreign currency loans more expensive. Under "enormous political pressure
from the Clinton administration to lend money to Russia," the IMF and the World Bank crafted
another rescue package of USD 22.6 billion. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 148-49. The rescue
came too late, and on August 17, 1998, Russia announced a unilateral suspension of payments
and a devaluation of the ruble. The ruble crashed, losing 45% in real terms by January 1999. The
Russian default precipitated a global financial crisis, interest rates soared and even relatively
sound developing economies could not raise credit. Brazil, Argentina, and other Latin American
economies were pushed into currency and financial crisis. The New York Federal Reserve was
forced to engineer a private bailout of LTCM. An industrial giant had been turned into a natural
resource exporter. The human costs of the transition were enormous. While in 1989, only 2% of
Russians lived in poverty, by 1998, the number had soared to 23.8%, and 50% of children were
living in families in poverty. Id. at 149-50.
518. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 97.
519. While "the labor and capital income of the highest 10% in 1998 increased by 8% .. . that
of the other 90% of income earners decreased sharply." Pyo, supra note 491, at 248.
520. Crisis in Asia Spawns Millions of Newly Poor, WALL ST. J., June 4, 1999, at B-5A.

Likewise in Mexico two years earlier, "[t]he austerity program the Mexican government put in
place when its economy faltered was a devastating blow to the country's working poor, but the
big investors emerged largely unscathed." David E. Sanger, Maybe a Bankrupt Nation Isn't the
Worst Thing in the World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at WK6.

521. Pyo, supra note 491, at 248.
522. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 67.
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on wages worldwide, thus increasing the global rate of exploitation." 5 2 3
Speculators also used the crisis to attack currencies and stock markets in
the region, particularly those of Hong Kong and Malaysia. 524
The crisis brought to an end the longest period of rapid growth in the
Global South and the so-called "Asian miracle." Japanese banks,
invested heavily in the region, were hit particularly hard. Coming on
top of the collapse of the "bubble economy" in the early 1990s, the
Asian flu pushed Japan further into long-term deflation that it has not
recovered from since. The crisis led global finance to reduce its
exposure to the global South generally. This had an immediate adverse
effect on "emerging economies" that were forced to adopt tighter fiscal
and monetary policies to counter the downward pressure on their
currencies. Quickly, signs of acute financial stress appeared in Russia,
Brazil, and Argentina. Russia defaulted in August 1998, followed by
the collapse of the LTCM hedge fund, with the latter leading to a
general panic in financial markets. 52 5

523. Rude, supra note 31, at 75.
524. At the height of the crisis, in "possibly the largest market conspiracy of all time,"
speculators took short positions worth USD 30 billion in the Hong Kong stock market.
KRUGMAN, supra note 459, at 130. Hong Kong aggressively used its monetary authority's
sizable reserves to intervene in the market and routed the speculators. Id. at 130-31. While
Malaysia accused speculators to be doing America's bidding "to cut assertive Asians down to
size," Hong Kong officials claimed that hedge funds had paid reporters to run stories about
impending devaluations to engineer a run on the currency. Id. at 95, 129.
525. On the rise and fall of LTCM, see NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT (2000); ROGER
LOWENSTEIN,

WHEN

GENIUS

FAILED:

THE RISE AND

FALL OF LONG-TERM

CAPITAL

MANAGEMENT (2000); Donald MacKenzie, Long-Term Capital Management and the Sociology
of Arbitrage, 32 ECON. & SOC'Y 350, 374 (2003). LTCM, the hedge fund founded in 1994, had

by 1998 leveraged USD 4.8 billion in capital into more than USD 125 billion in assets and several
times more in off-balance sheet positions. With a twenty-five to one leverage ratio, LTCM
delivered returns over 40 percent in 1995 and 1996, and had 60,000 trades on its books in August
1998. SCOTT, supra note 16, at 15-16. The brains behind LTCM and the Black-Scholes model
of options were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 1997. The number of options sold, and
involvement of other financial institutions earned LTCM the title "the Central Bank of
Volatility." DUNBAR, supra, at 178. In October 1998, LTCM lost 90 percent of its capital and
the New York Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury engineered a bail-out with an infusion of
USD 3.6 billion in capital by a consortium of fourteen Wall Street banks that were both lenders to
and counterparties of LTCM. FERGUSON, supra note 4, at 328; SCOTT, supra note 16, at 16-17.

The unwinding of LTCM's highly leveraged derivative positions caused the otherwise deep and
liquid U.S. Treasury market to freeze up and threatened to unravel the very foundations of the
global financial system. Rude, supra note 31, at 95. Reviewing the LTCM crisis, the BIS
concluded that "[plolicymakers should ... appreciate that the fallout from last year's financial
market strains was less pronounced on real activity in the industrial[ized] countries." COMM. ON
THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS., REVIEW OF FINANCIAL MARKET EVENTS IN AUTUMN 1998, at 2 (1999),

availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfsl2.htm.
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Note that the countries in the region that did not follow the IMF
model of free capital mobility weathered the crisis better. For example,
Malaysia, instead of following IMF prescriptions, and in the face of
opposition by its central bank, pegged its currency, the ringgit, to the
USD in September 1998, decreed repatriation of all offshore ringgits
within a month, and froze repatriation of foreign capital for twelve
months, later turning the capital exit control into an exit tax.526 These
capital controls allowed Malaysia to have a shallower downturn and to
recover quickly. 527 Similarly, China and India avoided the contagion
from the Asian crisis, enjoying growth of 8 and 5 percent respectively
during the period, due to strong capital control regimes. 528 This relative
insulation helped the two economies again during the 2007-2010 global
financial crisis. Insulation from the crisis was also provided by the fact
that while India's public debt is 80 percent of GDP, 90 percent of that is
owed to its own citizens. 529 This phenomenon demonstrates that
effective capital controls and reliance on domestic savings to fund
public debt can insulate an economy from speculations of hot capital, as
well as from the spread of destabilizing impact of debt crises.
Imprudent recycling of excess global liquidity into debt to developing
economies and unbridled international mobility of capital furnished the
grounds for the Asian debt crisis, like they had for the Latin American
crisis. Management of the crisis by the IMF further aggravated the
economic costs, with the burden falling primarily on the working
classes and the poor of debtor countries. The crisis was used by the
IMF to further advance the neoliberal agenda of privatization,
liberalization, and removal of capital controls. The few countries that
resisted neoliberal prescriptions weathered the crisis better,
demonstrating that strong regulation of finance capital, including strict
526. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 123.
527. See Ethan Kaplan & D. Rodrik, Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?, in
PREVENTING CURRENCY CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 393, 397 (Sabastian Edwards & Jeffery
Frankel eds., 2002) (recognizing that Malaysia's use of capital controls produced better financial
results than those that would have resulted if it had adopted IMF prescriptions).
528. STIGLITZ, supra note 47, at 125-26. For details of how capital controls have worked well
both historically and during the Asian crisis, see generally RAMKISHEN RAJAN, THE SOUTHEAST
ASIAN CURRENCY AND FINANCIAL CRISIS: A CASE OF 'SUDDEN DEATH' OR 'DEATH
FORETOLD'? (2010); Sebastian Edwards, How Effective are Capital Controls?, 13 J. ECON.
PERSP. 65 (1999); S. H. Poon, Malaysia and the Asian Financial Crisis: A View From the
Finance Perspective, 2 AFR. FIN. J. 13 (1999); Carmen M. Reinhart & Richard T. Smith,
Temporary Controls on Capital Inflows, 57 J. INT'L ECON. 327 (2002); Akira Ariyoshi et al.,
Country Experiences with the Use and Liberalization of Capital Controls, IMF OCCASIONAL
PAPER 1, 29-30 (1999).
529. Vikas Bajaj & Keith Bradsher, Asia's Economies Prove Resilient Despite the Danger of
Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at Bl.
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capital controls, are vital for the autonomy and economic wellbeing of
countries in the Global South.
C. Argentina: The Darlingof the IME Defaults

The Argentinean debt crisis of 2001-2005 is yet another instance of
unbridled capital flows combining with IMF debt-crisis management to
trigger accumulation by dispossession. However, it is also a lesson of
how sovereign default can be used to secure meaningful debt relief and
to break free of the stranglehold of the IMF. Argentina's crisis
stemmed directly from IMF policies. 530 In its new role as enforcer of
neoliberalism, the IMF had pushed for liberalization of capital accounts
before prudential regulations were in place. This had "proved to be a
recipe for disaster" during the Asian crisis, and proved the same for
Argentina. 53 1 As was typical with this practice, speculative prospects
attracted a rush of short-term foreign capital. While the rush created
temporary booms in targeted markets, those booms remained
unconnected to economic fundamentals. Of course, at the first sign of
trouble, capital flees, leaving disaster in its wake, which is exactly what
happened in Argentina. The situation in Argentina was exacerbated by
the fact that throughout the 1990s, high liquidity in industrialized
countries made a flow of massive credit possible. Argentina relied on
foreign capital to fund its budget and capital account deficits. 532
Security firms reaped USD 1 billion in fees to underwrite government
bonds from 1991 to 2010, as a "gusher of foreign money" poured into
Argentina with "reckless abandon." 533
Having subscribed to the neoliberal prescriptions, Argentina became
a "darling of the IMF and the financial markets," 534 and was held as
"the best case of 'responsible leadership' in the developing world." 53 5
It privatized a broad range of industries, doubled its exports, achieved
record levels of agricultural and industrial output, and experienced
530. L. Rother, Giving Argentina the Cinderella Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2002, at

A14. In a classic case of contagion, Argentina's financial collapse in 2001 can be traced back to
the fallout from the 1995 Mexican crisis, which was later exacerbated by the Asian crisis of 1997,
and the Brazilian crisis of 1998. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at xiv.
531.
532.

BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 79.
Miguel Kiguel, Structural Reforms in Argentina: Success or Failure?, 44 COMP. ECON.

STUD. 83, 101 (2002).
533.

Paul Blustein, Argentina Didn't Fall on Its Own; Wall Street Pushed Debt Till the Last,

WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2003, at Al. In 1998, Argentinean bonds accounted for 28.8 percent of the
bellwether Emerging Markets Bond Index-Plus, which "virtually forced" investors to lend to
Argentina even if its long-term solvency was in doubt. Id.
534. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 76.
535. Chaos in Argentina, NATION, Jan. 21, 2002, at 3.
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marked growth in oil and mineral production. Between 1991 and 1998,
GDP increased by 44 percent and inflation remained under control. 536
By the end of 1998, however, partly due to the global fall in commodity
prices induced by the Asian flu, Argentina entered a severe recession
that by 2001 developed into a severe crisis. 537 IMF and neoliberal
prescriptions precluded countercyclical policies. Instead, in 1999 taxes
were raised, along with a 13 percent wage cut for public workers, and
deep cuts made in education and pensions. 538 The neoliberal shocktherapy only aggravated the crisis. A 2004 IMF internal audit found
that the fund "significantly contributed to one of the most devastating
financial crises in history . . . [and] certainly deepened a recession that

threw millions of Argentineans into poverty." 5 3 9
The principal cause of the crisis was the earlier decision to peg the
Argentinean peso to the USD, as well as the massive inflows of foreign
capital facilitated by complete liberalization of capital accounts. 540 The
peg effectively controlled inflation and made Argentina very attractive
to foreign capital. However, by fixing the exchange rate, Argentina
gave up the principal means to deal with balance-of-payment
problems-adjustment in exchange rate to ensure its exports remained
competitive. For example, Brazil, faced with similar pressure on its
balance of payments, devalued its currency by 40 percent and avoided a
crisis. 54 1 Pegging the peso to the USD meant that to be able to
guarantee convertibility, the central bank had to back each peso in
circulation with a USD at hand.5 42 Once hyperinflation had been put
under control by 1994, a gradual decline in value of the peso would
have boosted exports and made the economy stronger. 543
The IMF's initial response to the Argentinean crisis in 2000 was a
USD 40 billion bailout to service a mix of public and corporate debt. 54
536. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 75.
537. EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 207.
538. Simon Jeffery, Crisis in Argentina, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2002, 2:59 PM), http://www
.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jan/04/qanda.argentina.
539. Paul Blustein, IMF Says Its Policies CrippledArgentina; Internal Audit Finds Warnings
Were Ignored, WASH. POST, July 30, 2004, at El.
540. EICHENGREEN, supra note 196, at 205; Martin Feldstein, Argentina's Fall, 81 FOREIGN
AFF. 8, 10 (2002).
541. William Gruben & Sherry Kiser, Why Brazil Devalued the Real, FED. RES. BANK
DALLAS (July 1, 1999), http://www.dallasfed.org/eyi/global/9907real.html.
542. Feldstein, supra note 540, at 8.
543. Ross P. Buckley, Re-envisioning Economic Sovereignty: Developing Countries and the
IMF, in RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? 267, 279-80 (Trydy
Jackobson et al. eds., 2008); Jeffery Sachs, A CrashForetold:Argentina Must Revamp Its Society
andEconomy for a High-tech World, 159 TIME INT'L, Jan. 14, 2002, at 17.
544. Eric Hershberg, Why Argentina Crashed and Is Still Crashing, 36 NACLA REP. ON
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Concurrently, the IMF required the so-called "pesofication"-domestic
banks were required to convert their assets into pesos at a one-to-one
rate and their liabilities into pesos at a rate of 1.4 to 1. The government
then compensated the banks for the losses this entailed by a massive
issue of government bonds. 54 5 With these moves, the burdens of private
losses shifted to the public. A former president of Argentina's central
bank summed up the bottom line: "The government has transferred
about 40% of private debt to workers ... . We are experiencing a megaredistributionof wealth and income unprecedented in the history of the
capitalist world."546 The model followed the pattern of "massive
returns to the rich" set by the earlier capital flows and debt crises in the
Global South.54 7 As before, the poor had to repay the debts through
higher taxes, and suffer from unemployment and reduced spending on
health care, education, and infrastructure. 54 8
The 2000 currency delinking and austerity measures failed to contain
the crisis. Between March 2001 and March 2002, domestic financial
assets shrank from USD 126.8 billion to USD 41 billion. 54 9 Argentina's
GDP fell 10.9 percent in 2002, per capita income decreased by 23
percent, and unemployment rose to 26 percent. 550 The long-term
consequences for millions of Argentineans turned dire.55 1 In once
prosperous Argentina, over half of the population was pushed below the
poverty line, and over a third of the population could not afford
adequate food. 552 Faced with the government's reluctance to enact
AMERICAS, no. 1, 2002 at 32.
545. Andres Gaudin, Thirteen Days that Shook Argentina-And Now What?, 35 NACLA REP.
ON AMERICAS, no. 5, 2002 at 6; Latin Banks: Eyes on Brazil, EMERGING MARKETS MONITOR,

Aug. 19,2002, at 12.
546. Gaudin, supra note 545, at 6-9 (emphasis added).
547. A Survey ofLatin America, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at 991-93.
548. For detailed analyses, see JORGE G. CASTANEDA, UTOPIA UNARMED: THE LATIN
AMERICAN LEFT AFTER THE COLD WAR 5 (1993); Ross P. Buckley, The Rich Borrow and the
Poor Pay: The Fatal Flaw of International Finance, 19 WORLD POL'Y J. 59 (2002); Jerry
Dohnal, Structural Adjustment Programs:A Violation of Rights, 57 AUSTRALIAN J. HUM. RTS.
72 (1994); Harold James, Deep Red-The International Debt Crisis and Its Historical
Precedents, 56 AM. SCHOLAR 331 (1987).
549. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 76-77.
550. Hector E. Maletta, A Catastrophe Foretold: Economic Reform, Crisis, Recovery and
Unemployment in Argentina (Univ. of El Salvador, Instituto de Investigaci6n en Ciencias
Sociales, Working Paper Series, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=903124.
551. See Sophie Arie, Rich Argentina Tastes Hunger, OBSERVER (May 19, 2002, 2:38 BST),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/may/19/argentina.sophiearie (describing the struggle of
Argentina's middle class to maintain its way of life as the financial crisis caused dietary staples to
become unaffordable luxuries).
552. See Mark Milner & Charlotte Denny, It's Penalty Time for Argentina, GUARDIAN, May
8, 2002, at 22 (noting the dire social consequences that resulted from the paralysis of Argentina's
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further austerity measures, the IMF denied further credits. In response,
Argentina defaulted on its foreign debt of USD 132 billion in December
2001.553 Argentina's president took the position that he would not
service the debt from the "suffering and hunger of the people." 554
In September 2003, Argentina demanded that the creditors write-off
75 percent of the USD 4.3 billion in debt and all the interest that had
accumulated since the default. Wiping out the accumulated interest
meant that the value of offer, which Argentina described as
"unmovable," was only 10 percent of the total outstanding debt."' In
late 2004, Argentina improved the offer so that USD 82 billion of bonds
would be converted into USD 42 billion in new bonds with lower
interest rates and longer maturities. This amounted to agreeing to honor
50 percent of the outstanding debt, but not the USD 23 billion in past
In March 2005, creditors holding 76 percent of
due interest.
Argentina's debt agreed to exchange the debt for bonds at a 66 percent
discount of the present value. Argentina emerged as a "defaulting
debtor on the most advantageous terms ever secured by a middleincome country in debt restructuring in history." 556 The Financial
Times bemoaned the "dangerous precedent," claiming that "Argentina
gambled, and the gamble paid off"ss7 In April 2005, Argentinean
President Nestor Kirchner declared: "There is life after the IMF, and it's
a good life."ss

The genesis of Argentina's debt crisis shared the pattern of the Latin
American and Asian debt crises: it was also caused by global excess
liquidity, imprudent lending, and absence of capital controls. Just like
in the other two cases, the burden of Argentina's unsustainable debt fell
on the working classes. However, Argentina's response to the crisis
departed from the pattern of the other two crises. Argentina, after
rejecting the IMF's neoliberal prescriptions of debt management,
demanded radical debt write-offs, chose the option of default to secure
banking system).
553. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 76.
554. Argentina and the IMF: Which is the Victim?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 6, 2004, at 63.

Argentina's poverty rate doubled from 27 percent in 1999, to 54.7 percent in 2004, and the debt
that represented 47.4 percent of GDP in 1999 rose to 140 percent of GDP in 2004. BUCKLEY,
supra note 402, at 83.
555. The End of the Affair, ECONOMIST (Feb. 20, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/
2440367?story_id=2440367.
556. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 84.
557. Argentina Sets a Dangerous Precedent: The IMF Should Set Tough Conditions for

Further Lending, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2005, at 20 (emphasis added).
558.

Christopher Swann, Hugo Chavez Exploits Oil Wealth to Push IA4F Aside, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 1, 2007, at Bl.
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unprecedented concessions from its creditors. Argentina's experience
of default provides a productive example for all developing economies
carrying mountains of debt. It demonstrates that debtor economies "are
in a good position to impose solutions on creditors . . . [and] that a
determined sovereign is normally stronger than its creditors . .. unless

they have the assistance of a great power." 55 9 Sovereign defaults had
declined in recent decades substantially as a result of changes in the
U.S. and U.K. laws restricting application of sovereign immunity when
sovereigns engage in commercial activity. 560 The experience of
Argentina, however, underscores that default is an attractive option for
debtor states. By late 2010, many experts have come to believe that the
"better and fairer" option even for Europe's weakest economies is to
default. 561 Indeed, faced with the escalating debt crises in Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain, experts have recommended a Europe-wide default
plan.562 When faced with excessive debt, historically the options have
been to "[c]ut, print, or default." 563 The IMF prescription is always to
cut spending, which amounts to a default on the commitments to
politically weak sections at home. The print option, i.e., vaporizing
debt through inflation, is not a viable option because international debt
today is mostly in foreign currency and thus immune to local currency
inflation. Furthermore, condemning domestic bondholders to inflationdriven, negative real interest rates is not viable anymore as the term
structure of government debt in local currency is often much shorter.564
Attractiveness of the default option increases by the fact that,
historically, new creditors are generally indifferent to a sovereign
559. WOLF, supra note 17, at 8, 186.
560. See generally Georges R. Delaume, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the
Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1994) (evaluating the

U.S. courts' interpretations of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
where public debts are involved); G. W. Larson, Default on ForeignSovereign Debt: A Question
for the Courts?, 18 IND. L. REV. 959 (1985) (analyzing issues that arise in default actions against
foreign sovereign debtors).
561.

Landon Thomas, Jr., In Europe, a Look at Defaults to Stem the Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

23, 2010, at Bl. Many experts now say that "bailouts only delay the inevitable." Id. The IMF
finds default unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely. See CARLO COTTARELLI ET AL., IMF STAFF
POSITION NOTE, DEFAULT INTODAY'S ADVANCED ECONOMIES; UNNECESSARY, UNDESIRABLE,
AND UNLIKELY (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/
spnlO12.pdf. Kenneth S. Rogoff, an expert on sovereign debt crises, points out that the IMF's

position stems from the fact it is controlled by creditor nations. Thomas, supra, at B 1.
562. See, e.g., Simon Johnson, Will Ireland Default? Ask Belgium, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25,
AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/will-ireland-default-ask2010,
6:00
belgium/; Nouriel Roubini, Irish Woes Should Speed Europe's Default Plan, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2010, 9:02 PM), http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/b3dbaa92-ffl-1Idf-bf4b-00144feab49a.html.
563. Ferguson, supra note 26, at 11.
564. Id at 12.
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debtor's default history. 565 If a single debtor state fears retaliation and
being cut off from credit markets, the way out may well be a collective
moratorium on servicing, or repudiation of foreign debts by all or
groups of developing countries. Here it is important to note that "[m]ost
countries in all regions have gone through a prolonged phase as serial
defaulters on debt owed to foreigners." 566 Furthermore, ubiquitous
rescheduling and restructuring of debts are deemed "negotiated partial
defaults." 567 A collective default then is a matter of proverbial hanging
together or hanging separately. Such action, or even the threat of such
action, may be sufficient to force favorable restructurings and changes
in the global financial architecture. A collective default to force radical
changes in the global financial architecture would also bring the nonmarket political nature of the international debt question out in the open.
The case of forgiveness of Iraqi debt recently underscored this fact.56 8
565.

R. M. Auerback, Sovereign Debt: Default and Restructuringof Debts Owed to Private

Creditor,18 J.INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 440,442 (2003).
566. REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 9, at 49. Since 1800 there have been 250 defaults on
external debt. Id. at 111.
567.

Id. at 90.

568. Iraq under military occupation presents a vivid picture of neoliberal-designed political
economy and exceptional treatment of foreign debt for political ends. Perhaps, the "shock and
awe" of the bombing campaign in the Iraq War was a sufficient substitute for any monetarist
shock-therapy to prepare the ground for implementing neoliberalism in one sweep. The
September 19, 2003 orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority in occupied Iraq did just that.
See Antia Juhasz, Ambitions of Empire: The Bush Administration Economic Plan for Iraq (and
Beyond), 12 LEFT TURN MAG., Feb.-Mar. 2004, at 27-32, available at http://www.ifg.org/

analysis/globalization/ambition.htm. The orders mandated full privatization of public enterprises,
full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of profits, opening of
Iraq's banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies, elimination of nearly all
trade barriers, a flat tax, outlawing strikes, and banning unions in key sectors of the economy.
The orders were to apply to all sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, services,
finance, construction, transportation, and the media. An Iraqi member of the Authority called it
"free market fundamentalism . . . a flawed logic that ignores history." Thomas Crampton, Iraqi
Official Cautions on Imposing Free Market, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at C5. At the end of

2004, the sovereign debt of Iraq stood at USD 120 billion, apart from the USD 200 billion owed
in reparations as a result of the first Gulf war. BUCKLEY, supra note 402, at 81-87. In late 2004,
as a result of strong lobbying by the United States and the Paris Club, the standing group
representing governments of the nineteen largest creditor states, agreed to write off 80% of the
debt owed to them by Iraq. The agreed upon relief was designed to unfold in three phases: 30%
of the outstanding debt as of January 1, 2005 to be cancelled immediately; a further 30% to be
cancelled upon Iraq's subscription to a standard IMF program with the usual conditionalities; and
a further 20% to be cancelled upon completion of the last IMF board review after three years of
implementation of standard IMF program. The remaining 20% was rescheduled over a period of
twenty-three years including a grace period of six years. Id. at 88. The Iraqi Finance Minister
had characterized Iraq's burden as an "odious debt, used to build up the war machine of the
ousted regime, largely through arms purchases supported by lending countries." Joanna Chung &
Stephen Fidler, RestructuringUnder Fire: Why IraqiDebt Is No Longer a Write-Off, FIN. TIMES,

July 17, 2006, at 15 (quoting Iraqi Finance Minster Ali Allawi). The Paris Club shied away from
mentioning the term and rested their position on unsustainability of debt servicing given the war.
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In the context of collective bargaining about international debt, the
Global South should rekindle the demands for a New International
Economic Order that were left by the wayside in the turn to
neoliberalism. 569 This would call for a new accounting that balances
the debt of the Global South against the siphoning of value from the
Global South during and since the colonial era. Only such a historical
settling of accounts can usher in a global economic system based on
equity and justice.
VI. CONCLUSION

The financial meltdown and the deep recession of 2007-2009 have
rung the death-knell of the neoliberal free-market consensus that
exercised hegemony over national and global socio-economic policy
making for over thirty years. We are told that anemic growth and
pervasive joblessness are the "new normal" of the U.S. economy. 570
Paul Volcker, the architect of the 1979 "Volcker Shock," reports that
"[p]eople are nervous about the long-term outlook, and they should
be." 57 1 These may be new developments for the United States, but
Greece and other societies saddled with mountains of foreign debt
confront much worse. Money may well make the world go around, but
It has been pointed out that even after the write-off, Iraq will remain "shackled with over USD 25
billion of debt, not to mention new loans being peddled by the IMF and World Bank ....
Furthermore, IMF conditions-such as privatization and ending food rations-could further
exacerbate the poverty and instability in Iraq." Saddam's Debt, the IMF and the Privatizationof
Iraq'sEconomy, JUBILEE IRAQ (May 26, 2005), http://www.jubileeiraq.org/ resources.htm.
569. In the early 1970s, developing countries sought to free themselves of trade dependency
and the debt trap by creating a New International Economic Order ("NIEO"). This aimed to
improve the terms of trade for raw materials and build up agricultural and industrial selfsufficiency. The NIEO was a comprehensive package of multilateral policy options that aimed to
improve the position of Third World countries in the world economy relative to the richest states.
It came together at the Non-Aligned Movement's ("NAM's") Conference held at Algiers in
September 1973. Subsequently, the leaders of the NAM requested a Special Session of the UN
General Assembly to address issues associated with international trade in raw materials. At this
Session in April 1974, the Group of 77 ("G-77") secured the adoption of the Declaration and
Program of Action for a NIEO despite lacking the support of the United States and a small group
of advanced industrialized countries. The NIEO's prescriptions for world trade were designed to
stabilize and raise the prices of the commodities many G-77 members relied upon to earn foreign
exchange, and to overcome long-term declines in their terms of trade. For details, see generally
SANEEP CHAUHAN, DEMAND FOR NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1997); THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1977);
ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979). For a perceptive analysis of how the United States
undermined this progressive initiative and instead pushed for financial dominance over the rest of
the world, see MICHAEL HUDSON, GLOBAL FRACTURE: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (2005).
570. Nelson D. Schwartz, Jobless and Staying that Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at WKl.
571. Louis Uchitelle, Volcker, Loud and Clear,N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010, at Cl, C7.
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it is an extremely bumpy ride. The architecture of global finance
distributes gain and pain of financial flows to the advantage of finance
capital and to the detriment of working and marginalized classes around
the world. International debt crises that have become ubiquitous in
recent decades testify to this phenomenon. All this is not some natural
result of operations of the ostensibly "free" market. Extra-market forces
and means channel the markets to achieve these results. It took a
politically directed foundational reconstruction of international financial
systems to bring about this state of affairs.
In response to the Great Depression, the two World Wars, and
struggles of working classes, a Keynesian compromise between capital
and labor aimed at full employment and a welfare state gradually
unfolded. As a necessary precondition, a global regime of capital
controls was instituted to contain the predatory and destabilizing
tendencies of global finance capital. The result was a prolonged phase
of sustained economic growth and stability and incremental expansion
of civil and economic rights of working classes. Falling rates of profit,
expanding U.S. balance-of-payment deficits, and threats to U.S.
economic hegemony brought this phase to an end in the 1970s.
Thereafter, a neoliberal economic order was put in place, aimed at
reversing the gains of the working classes and consolidating U.S.
economic and political hegemony.
Elaborate reordering of the U.S. and global financial regulatory
regimes facilitated unbridled international mobility of finance capital.
This enabled finance capital to play a dominant role in the global
economy, raised its rates of profit, and channeled global savings to
sustain U.S. fiscal and balance-of-payment deficits. The exponential
expansion of financialized credit economy created debt peonage within
advanced capitalist countries and mounting debt burdens
internationally. International debt combined with absence of capital
controls accentuated boom and bust cycles of debtor countries.
Recurrent international debt crises have been the result. These crises
are managed in ways that further impoverish vulnerable sections of the
debtor societies and augment the power of finance capital. International
debt crises over the past three decades have facilitated further expansion
of neoliberalism. These crises are used to enforce neoliberalism on
debtor countries through mandates and conditionalities of structural
adjustment. Promotion of open financial markets generates further
crisis-prone debt. And the cycle continues in an ever-escalating mode.
Financial crises and their management have become functional to
neoliberalism's reproduction and extension. They are exploited to
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reduce or remove barriers to capital that the market and diplomacy are
unable to dislodge.
There has to be a better way. The accounts above show that the
better way is a rollback of neoliberalism. In particular, finance capital
needs to be contained and subordinated to productive and distributive
needs both globally and within states. In order to do this, effective
international capital controls and a balance-of-payments stabilization
fund-one that is free of imperial control-are indispensible. Turning
the clock back to Bretton Woods is not viable or desirable. We have to
imagine and design systems of global capital flows that are not
subservient to predatory capitalism. A collective moratorium on debt
servicing or even a default by developing economies is a viable means
to force a reordering of the global financial architecture. Only this will
enable all states to gain economic sovereignty, for the people to take
charge of their collective destiny, and for human beings to have priority
over capital.

